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PROPHECY AND CASUISTRY:
ABORTION, TORTURE AND MORAL DISCOURSE
M. CATHLEEN KAVENY*
I. INTRODUCTION
N his groundbreaking book, After Virtue, the philosopher Alasdair
.MacIntyre argues that "the most striking feature of contemporary moral
utterance is that so much of it is used to express disagreements; and the
most striking feature of the debates in which these disagreements are ex-
pressed is their interminable character."' In support of his claim, he gives
examples from three well-known and seemingly never-ending debates of
our time: the debate over whether it is ever just to wage war, the abortion
debate and the debate about the relative priority of social equality and
individual liberty. 2 The consequence of this interminable disagreement,
MacIntyre believes, is a widespread emotivism, which he defines as the view
that "all evaluative judgments and more specifically all moral judgments
are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feel-
ing, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character." 3
What has caused such disagreement? According to MacIntyre, it was
the loss of a coherent tradition of moral reasoning. In the wake of the
religious wars of the early modern era, the Enlightenment project aimed
to provide the West with a rational, secular foundation for moral norms
that was both universally applicable and universally acceptable. With its
failure, we are left with bits and pieces of incompatible moral traditions,
the flotsam and jetsam from the shipwrecks of innumerable attempts to
* John P. Murphy Foundation Professor of Law and Professor of Theology,
Notre Dame. A.B., Princeton University; M.A., M. Phil.,J.D., Ph.D, Yale University.
This Essay is based on Professor Kaveny's lecture given on February 23, 2005.
1. ALASDAIR MAcINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 6 (1981).
2. Id. at 6-7 (discussing idea that competing arguments within each debate
may be logically valid, yet there is no rational way to weigh claims against each
other).
3. Id. at 11.
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formulate a coherent framework for moral reflection that have been prof-
fered over the centuries in the West.
4
What to do now? In the celebrated last chapter of this celebrated
book, MacIntyre opines that "we are not waiting for Godot, but for an-
other-doubtless very different-St. Benedict."5 According to MacIntyre,
the only hope that "morality and civility might survive the coming ages of
barbarism and darkness" 6 is to mimic the strategy that allowed them to
survive the dark ages of the past: the creation of monastic environments
dedicated to passing on the tradition of the virtues. In later books
MacIntyre comes to identify this tradition more closely with the Christian
tradition, particularly as exemplified in the thoughts of St. Thomas
Aquinas. 7
My fear, however, is that MacIntyre's monastery will be far less harmo-
nious than he hopes. Serious tensions may well arise between and among
the dedicated neo-traditionalists committed to retrieving and preserving
the possibility of coherent moral discourse within the monastery walls.
Why? As I will argue in this Essay, the intractability of contemporary moral
disagreement does not arise solely from the inevitable tension among frag-
ments of moral argument plucked from incompatible moral theories.
Our difficulties do not stem solely from the challenge of brokering the
rival moral claims of Kantians and utilitarians, or from negotiating the
tension between hedonists and stoics. In the United States at the turn of
the twenty-first century, we also confront serious moral disputes among
persons who see themselves as belonging to the same moral tradition, and
as holding themselves accountable to the same values and same account of
the virtues. Consider, for example, the 2004 American presidential elec-
tion. It was widely perceived to be an election that turned to some degree
upon "moral values." 8 Yet it generated bitter controversy among members
4. Id. at 238 (noting ramifications of failed Enlightenment project).
5. Id. at 245.
6. Id. at 244.
7. See generally ALASDAIR MAclNnvRE, THREE RwAL VERSIONS OF MORAL EN-
QUIRY. ENCYCLOPAEDIA, GENEALOGY, AND TRADITION (1990) (discussing three dis-
tinct methods of moral thought); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH
RATIONALITY? (1988) (addressing questions raised by After Virtue).
8. 2004 Election Results, CNN.coM (2004), http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/
2004/pages/results/states/US/P/00/epolls.O.html. The poll left unspecified
what was meant by "moral values." A question in a CNN Poll asked which issue was
most important to voters in their selection for president. The options were: taxes,
education, Iraq, terrorism, economy/jobs, moral values, health care. Kerry won
73% of the votes from voters who believed Iraq was the most important issue, 80%
of those who said economy/jobs, and 77% of those who said health care. Those
who thought terrorism or moral values voted for Kerry far less frequently (Kerry
received 14% and 18%, respectively). Bush won 80% of the votes from voters who
believed that moral values was the most important issue and 80% of those who said
terrorism. In contrast, Bush received only 26% of those who said Iraq, 23% of
those who said health care, and 18% of those who said economy/jobs. All of these
categories implicate "moral values." For example, the question of Iraq raises issues
of when and under what conditions it is just to wage war, and both the economy
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of the same religious communities, who presumably view the nature and
purpose of human life in much the same way.
9
In attempting to probe the nature of the disputes among co-religion-
ists surrounding that election, we must tread cautiously. Some disagree-
ments no doubt turned on factual questions: Did President Bush in fact
have a reasonable basis for thinking there were weapons of mass destruc-
tion in Iraq? Other disagreements turned on narrowly prudential judg-
ments regarding the intermediate and long-term consequences of various
courses of action: What was the likely effect of the American presence in
Iraq for the stability of the Middle East? In addition, it goes without saying
that not everyone who self-identifies as a member of a particular moral or
religious tradition will treat its resources as a significant component in
their own moral deliberations.
Nonetheless, setting those cases to one side does not eliminate the
problem. We continue to find ourselves faced with deep clashes of moral
judgment among well-educated, committed adherents of the same relig-
ious tradition. 10 They do not give rise to fruitful discussion about differ-
ences, but instead signal the breakdown of conversation, and frequently
even the breakdown of community. My hypothesis is that at least some of
these clashes-and some of these ensuing breakdowns-are not precipi-
tated by factual disputes, or by the application of mutually inconsistent
moral premises. Instead, they are driven by clashes in moral sensibility,
which shapes and reflects clashes in style of moral discourse. More specifi-
cally, I believe that they are driven by tensions between the prophetic style
and health care raise issues of socialjustice. All these issues have been the subject
of extensive reflection by moralists working within the Christian tradition, as well
as other moral traditions. For an article putting the poll questions in a broader
context, see Dick Meyer, Moral Values Malarkey, CBSNEws.coM, Nov. 5, 2004, http:/
/www.cbsnews.com/stories/ 2004/11/05/opinion/meyer/main653931.shtml
(criticizing debate). For more extensive analysis, see Moral Values: How Important?
Voters Liked Campaign 2004, but Too Much 'Mud-Slinging', PEW RES. CENTER, Nov. 11,
2004, http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/233.pdf (reviewing voter opinions).
9. See John C. Green et al., The American Religious Landscape and the 2004 Presi-
dential Vote: Increased Polarization, PEwFORUM.ORG (2004), http://pewforum.org/
publications/surveys/postelection.pdf (discussing voter characteristics).
10. According to a CNN exit poll, Protestants comprised 54% of the voting
population in the 2004 presidential election; 59% of them voted for Bush, while
40% voted for Kerry. Catholics, who constituted 27% of voters, gave 52% of their
votes to Bush, and 47% to Kerry. Twenty-five percent ofJews, who comprise 3% of
the population, voted for Bush, while 75% voted for Kerry. Among those who
acquiesced to the description: white evangelical/born-again (23% of the popula-
tion), 78% voted for Bush, while 21% voted for Kerry. Of those who did not ac-
cept this description, 43% voted for Bush, while 56% voted for Kerry. Sixty-one
percent of those who attended church weekly voted for Bush, while 39% voted for
Kerry. Breaking down this statistic by religion gives an interesting picture: 70% of
Protestants who attend church weekly voted for Bush (29% voted for Kerry), while
only 50% of Catholics who attend church weekly voted for Bush (43% voted for
Kerry). See 2004 Election Results, supra note 8 (describing proportions of population
voting for Bush or Kerry based upon demographic and religious characteristics).
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and the casuistical style-between prophecy and casuistry.1 1 In testing this
hypothesis, I would like to work inductively, attempting to describe and to
map this clash, and perhaps to take a few small steps at managing it in a
way that might prevent the breakdown of conversation, even while refus-
ing to pretend to have reached a false truce.
Let me begin by forthrightly acknowledging my limitations; prophecy
and casuistry are big topics, and I am just beginning this study: so I begin
with what I know best, hoping to move outward from there; I am a moral
theologian working in the Christian tradition, in particular the Catholic
Christian tradition. I am also an American lawyer. The resources upon
which I will draw are largely made available. through those venues. But
11. My approach is similar to, but not identical with, the approach taken by
the Jesuit John W. O'Malley in his important volume, Four Cultures of the West.
O'Malley and I share a fascination with rhetoric. Regarding the disputes between
Catholics and Protestants during the Reformation, he observes that: "[H]ow things
were said was just as important as what was said, even though the how and the what
could never be neatly separated." SeeJOHN W. O'MALLEY, FOUR CULTURES OF THE
WEST 2 (2004). O'Malley argues that the West has produced four "cultures": the
prophetic culture, the academic culture, the humanistic or poetic culture and the
artistic culture. By culture he means a "configuration" of meaning; he goes on to
say that:
The elements within the configuration are forms, symbols, institutions,
patterns of feeling, patterns of behavior, and the like. Among such ele-
ments in culture two [academic culture], for instance, are lectures, exam-
inations, academic gowns, and, most certainly, the diploma. Style of
discourse is an especially important element in the configuration of any
given culture, constitutive and revelatory of its design. Professors talk dif-
ferently from poets. When taken together, the elements express a set of
reciprocally dependent values and interpretations of reality. The artist
has different priorities than the prophet. The different priorities suggest
how the internal logic of the configuration makes it self-validating to
those living within it and resistant to other such configurations. Prophets
sound unrealistic, even dangerously reckless, to the statesman. I use the
word configuration because it indicates relationships and proportions. Val-
ues central to one culture may be found in another but not so centrally as
to give it shape.
Id. at 29-30.
O'Malley's project is much broader than mine. As the foregoing quotation
suggests, he is concerned with illuminating four ways of perceiving what amounts
to reality as a whole. In contrast, my focus in this Essay is upon how a moral
agent-or someone trying to influence a moral agent-grapples with the prospect
of taking a morally controversial action or following a morally controversial pro-
gram of action. The scope of my project is therefore more similar to that ofJames
Gustafson in his Varieties of Moral Discourse. See generallyJAMES GUSTAFSON, VARIETIES
OF MORAL DISCOURSE: PROPHETIC, NARRATIvE, ETHICAL, AND POLICY (THE STOB LEC-
TURES) (1988). As will become apparent below, I am indebted to Gustafson's dis-
cussion of prophetic discourse. What I term "casuistical discourse" or "practical
reason" incorporates elements of what he terms ethical discourse and policy dis-
course. Nonetheless, my focus differs from Gustafson's in two respects. First, as
my examples of abortion and torture in the last presidential election indicate, my
focus is more upon live moral controversies than upon the more timeless reflec-
tion of academics. Second, I am more concerned with elaborating upon the
stormy relationship between prophetic discourse and the discourse of casuistry or
practical reason.
[Vol. 51: p. 499
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one cannot begin to talk either of prophecy or casuistry without honoring
the foundational contribution made by the Jewish tradition. The Pro-
phetic books of the Hebrew Bible are a gift to all peoples, particularly to
Christians, for they form part of our "Old Testament." Moreover, the Jew-
ish tradition has incorporated an extensive understanding of law and casu-
istry. 12 In addition, Islam offers its own prophetic resources in the Qu'ran
and centuries of Qu'ranic commentary, as well as jurisprudential and casu-
istical resources in fikh-literature.13 But I must begin where I can.
In Section II, I will briefly explain what I mean by "prophecy" and
"casuistry," or more precisely, by the "prophetic" style of discourse and the
"casuistical" style of discourse. In Section III, I will illustrate how the deci-
sion to use on one or the other genre of moral discourse constrains the
shape of the ensuing moral conversation, even among people who share
the same moral and religious world view. My analysis will focus on two
issues that provoked a tremendous amount of discussion in religious cir-
cles in general and in Catholic circles in particular both before and in the
aftermath of the 2004 presidential election: abortion and torture. Let me
assure those readers who are weary of the culture-wars that my primary
objective is not to engage the arguments themselves. Instead, I want to
take notice of the form-prophetic or casuistic-in which those argu-
ments were cast around the time of the election, and to attempt to unravel
the consequences of that form for the ensuing moral conversation among
persons who share the same basic world view. How do we find a way be-
yond the tension between these two forms of moral discourse, even while
preserving their respective raisons d'etre? I will grapple with this question
in Section IV. After describing several less-than-successful attempts to
overcome the tension between prophecy and casuistry, I will attempt to
articulate a way in which they might be brought into a fruitful relationship
of creative tension.
II. DEFINITIONS
Both casuistry and prophecy are discursive practices with long histo-
ries in Western moral discourse. Naturally, the meaning of either term
cannot be fully understood apart from those stories. It will suffice here,
12. For a brief introduction to Jewish perspectives on the relationship of law
and morality, see Law and Morality, in 10 ENCYCLOPAEDIAJUDAICA 1480-84 (1971).
For an introduction to Jewish perspectives on prophecy, see Prophets and Prophecy,
in 13 ENCYCLOPAEDIAJUDCA 1151-82 (1971).
13. For a brief introduction to Islamic views of prophecy, see U. Rubin,
Prophets and Prophethood, in 4 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE QUR'AN 289-307 (2004). For
an introduction to Islamic views of law, see W. Hallaq, Law and the Qur'an, in 3
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE QUR'AN 149-72 (1993); M.B. Hooker, Shari'a, in 9 ENCYCLO-
PAEDIA OF ISLAM 321-28 (1997);J. Schacht, Fikh, in 2 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM 886-
91 (1964);J. Schacht, Hiyal in 3 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM 510-13 (1967). See also
DUNCAN B. MACDON.LD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF MUSLIM THEOLOGY, JURISPRUDENCE
AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 65-117 (Premier Book House 1964) (1903) (outlin-
ing development of Muslim jurisprudence).
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however, to provide brief, working definitions that will facilitate my own
analytical purposes. I hope that a fuller picture of the nature and scope of
casuistry and prophecy, of casuistical discourse and prophetic discourse,
will emerge during the course of my discussion.
A. Prophetic Discourse
To give a straightforward, but circular, definition of prophetic dis-
course is to say that it is the discourse characteristic of prophets. Some
would call Nostradamus a prophet, and treat his predictions as proph-
ecy. 14 Others would deem Bob Dylan a prophet, and proclaim that his life
and songs channeled something of a divine spirit. 15 In my view, the use of
the terms "prophet," "prophecy" and "prophetic" in both these contexts
should be viewed as analogical extensions of their core meaning. As I am
using them here, the paradigmatic meaning of the terms "prophet" and
"prophecy" centers around the prophetic writings in the Old Testament or
Hebrew Bible. 16 The term "prophetic discourse" refers in the first in-
14. Michel de Nostradamus (1503-1566), was a French astrologer and physi-
cian whose prophecies created intense interest not only in his own time, but in
much later times, including our own. Nostradamus, in 8 THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRiTANNICA 802 (2005) (describing Nostradamus).
15. Bob Dylan (1941- ), an American folk singer whose life and songs helped
to define the generation that came of age in the 1960s. Dylan, Bob, in 4 THE NEW
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 309 (2005) (discussing Bob Dylan).
16. How does one identify prophetic literature? As David Petersen argues,
one can give at least two answers to this question: a canonical answer, which fo-
cuses on certain scriptural books, and an authorial answer, which focuses on the
writings of those deemed to be prophets. DAVID L. PETERSEN, THE PROPHETIC
LITERATURE: AN INTRODUCTION ch. 1 (2002) (suggesting possible definitions of
prophetic literature).
The canonical answer would focus on the fact that both Jewish and Christian
traditions divide the Hebrew Bible/Old Testament into three categories: Torah,
Prophets and Writings. The Hebrew canon divides the prophetic books into the
categories of those attributed to the "Former Prophets" (the book of Joshua, the
book of Judges, the first and second books of Samuel and the first and second
books of Kings) and those attributed to the "Latter Prophets" (the books of Isaiah,
Jeremiah, Ezekiel and the "Twelve," which include the books of Hosea, Joel, Amos,
Obadiah, Jonah, Micah, Nahum, Habakkuk, Zephaniah, Haggai, Zechariah and
Malachi). The Hebrew canon places the book of Daniel, as well as the book of
Lamentations, under the category of the "Writings." Protestant Christians recog-
nize the Hebrew canon as their canonical Old Testament, while Roman Catholics
and Orthodox Christians include an additional seven books in the Old Testament,
including Baruch among the prophetic books, as well as additional passages in the
book of Daniel. Donald Senior, General Introduction, in THE CATHOLIC STUDY BIBLE,
RG 2-4 (Donald Senior ed., 1990) (describing Biblical texts and background). As
Petersen notes, the difficulty with this approach is that it is difficult to think of the
books of the "Former Prophets" as prophetic literature. PETERSEN, supra, at 2 (not-
ing problems with identifying prophetic literature).
The prophets' writings are also frequently divided according to the categories
of "major prophets" and "minor prophets," which division refers to the length of
the writings, not to their importance. The major prophets include Isaiah, Jer-
emiah, Ezekiel and sometimes Daniel. The books of Lamentations and Baruch are
attached to the book of Jeremiah. Lamentations purports to be written by Jer-
[Vol. 51: p. 499
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stance to the rhetorical forms and substantive concerns that are character-
istic of the biblical prophet.
What sort of discourse is characteristic of the biblical prophets? Here,
it is helpful to note that four terms are commonly used to describe them
in the Hebrew Bible: h6zeh ("seer"), r6'eh ("diviner"), 'Vs hd' e16 hfm ("man
of God") and ndbf' ("prophet").17 In general, the first term refers to some-
one who receives divinely ordained visions, while the second refers to
someone who can discern helpful information from the divine world.
18
Broadly speaking, these two terms account for the fact that we sometimes
use the term prophet to refer to someone with the power to predict future
events, such as Nostradamus. The third term, which is prominent in the
stories of Elijah and Elisha, refers to men who "possess the power of the
holy and hence are dangerous, powerful, and due appropriate respect."1 9
In my view, the use of the term "prophet" with respect to Bob Dylan evokes
the sense that he was in some sense as a holy man of his time, that is, as a
man with a mysterious and potentially dangerous contact with the divine.
The fourth term, ndbf', is the most common term used in the Hebrew
scriptures for a prophet. What does it mean? Scholars note that it came
to have a very broad range of meanings that came to overlap in time with
the meaning of the three other terms. Nonetheless, the root meaning of
this term, nab, which means "to call," appears to be significant. 20 A
prophet is someone who is called and commissioned by God, usually to
emiah after the fall of Jerusalem to the Babylonians, and Baruch was Jeremiah's
scribe. The minor prophets are identical with the "Twelve" identified with respect
to the Hebrew Canon above. Prophet, in 11 NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 764 (2d
ed. 2003) (explaining history and development of term).
As Petersen notes, another way of identifying prophetic literature is by saying
that it is literature spoken or written by the Hebrew prophets. There is, however, a
clear difficulty with this approach. Not all of the literature pertaining to the
prophets is written by or attributed to them. For example, the prophet Elisha is
written about in the book of 2 Kings; he did not write it. Someone other than
Jeremiah, probably his scribe Baruch, wrote about certain aspects in Jeremiah's life
(e.g., Jeremiah 28). Scholars generally agree that the book of Isaiah cannot be
attributed entirely to the prophet known by the name Isaiah bin Amoz, because
many sections of that book refer to events that took place long after his death.
PETERSEN, supra, at 3-4 (explaining difficulties of definition).
Petersen himself opts for a more general, "generative" definition of prophetic
literature. It is "that [which] attests to or grows out of (i.e., is generated by) the
activity of Israel's prophets." Id. at 4.
17. PETERSEN, supra note 16, at 5 (discussing terminology). Specialists in the
field emphasize the impossibility of pinning mutually exclusive univocal meanings
on these terms. See id. at 6-8 (defining terms). For a more specialized historical
discussion, see JOSEPH BLENKINSOPP, A HISTORY OF PROPHECY IN ISRAEL 26-30 (West-
minster John Knox Press 1996) (1983) (examining historical labels).
18. PETERSEN, supra note 16, at 6 (explaining terminology).
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., BLENKINSOPP, supra note 17, at 28-29 (noting development of
nab); PETERSEN, supra note 16, at 6 (discussing terminology); Bruce Vawter, C.M.,
Introduction to Prophetic Literature, in THE NEWJEROME BIBLICAL COMMENTARY 188-89
(1990) (providing history of Israelite prophecy).
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deliver a message to God's people. 21 That message frequently pertained
to God's perspective on the relationship between God and Israel, and
more specifically to the ways in which His chosen people were fulfilling-
or failing to fulfill-the obligations of their covenant at a particular time
and place in their history.
It is this aspect of prophetic discourse that is of particular interest to
us here, for it is the aspect which strives to function as an impetus for
social critique and reform. As the great Jewish thinker Abraham Joshua
Heschel stated:
The prophet was an individual who said No to his society, con-
demning its habits and assumptions, its complacency, wayward-
ness, and syncretism. . . . His fundamental objective was to
reconcile man and God. Why do the two need reconciliation?
Perhaps it is due to man's false sense of sovereignty, to his abuse
of freedom, to his aggressive, sprawling pride, resenting God's
involvement in history. 2
2
One can, however, speak "prophetically" in the sense described by
Heschel without appropriating for oneself the mantle of a prophet. To
put the point another way, persons who do not claim actually to be deliver-
ing particular messages from God can and do draw upon the forms and
the themes of prophetic discourse preserved in the Hebrew Bible/Old
Testament in order to call attention to the moral and political challenges
confronting their respective societies. Such persons do not believe God
has directly conscripted them to communicate a new message to the com-
munity on his behalf. They do, however, tend to see themselves as follow-
ing in the footsteps of the biblical prophets; as illuminating the moral
dangers of the current situation by drawing upon the themes and style of
discourse of the biblical prophets.
What are the basic characteristics of prophetic discourse more gener-
ally, particularly as invoked in contemporary discussion of moral issues?
In the Stob Lectures at Calvin College, the distinguished Protestant
21. As stated in A History of Prophecy in Israel-
The standard introductory formula 'thus says Yahweh' is taken from the
protocol used in official oral and written communications emanating
from a royal court, which suggests that the prophets understood them-
selves as emissaries of Yahweh. The royal messenger was an important
official, often a member of the court, whose task was to relay a message or
command from the ruler verbatim, though he might add some words of
an exhortatory, comminatory, or explanatory nature of his own. This
provides a simple but important clue to the way in which prophets con-
ceived of their task, since several of them claimed to have access to the
presence of Yahweh as divine ruler and to have been sent out on a mis-
sion by Yahweh.... The conviction of acting under such a mandate is
essential for understanding how prophets thought theologically of their
authority and right to a hearing.
BLENKINSOPP, supra note 17, at 29-30 (footnotes omitted).
22. ABRAHAM J. HESCHEL, The Prophets vol. 1 (1969).
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ethicist James Gustafson maintains that prophetic discourse characteristi-
cally "takes the form of moral or religious indictments. It is the word of
the Lord proclaimed against the moral evil and apostasy of the world and
societies. It shows in dramatically vivid language just how far the human
community has fallen from what it ought to be." 23 Gustafson believes
these indictments have two characteristics. First, "they usually, though not
always, address what the prophet perceives to be the root of religious,
moral, or social waywardness, not specific instances in which certain poli-
cies are judged to be inadequate or wrong."24 Second, prophetic dis-
course "use[s] language, metaphors, and symbols that are directed to the
'heart' as well as to the 'head.' The prophet usually does not make an
argument; rather he demonstrates, he shows, he tells."2 5
An additional characteristic of prophetic discourse identified by Gus-
tafson is its utopian nature. Gustafson does not use this term technically,
but merely to indicate that "prophets sometimes proclaim and depict an
ideal state of affairs which is radically in contrast with the actual state of
affairs in which we live together in society."2 6 As Gustafson also notes, the
path from the real to the ideal is not necessarily clear: "Of itself, the uto-
pian vision does not precisely show how we are to get.., to the fulfillment
of the alluring ideal future."
Of what use are the Hebrew prophets to us here and now? As the
scholar of rhetoric James Darsey tells us, the use of prophetic rhetoric has
a long tradition in American political and social controversies. 27 Borrow-
ing from Matthew Arnold, Darsey argues that reform movements either
conform to the ideal of "sweetness and light" (from Greek ideals of rheto-
ric) or to the ideal of "fire and strength," which come from the Hebrew
prophets. Arguing that the "'fire and strength' of the prophets is as much
a part of our cultural inheritance as is the 'sweetness and light' of the
Greeks,"28 he maintains that our inability to grapple with it has lead to an
inability to understand our own social plight. The prophets, as Darsey
notes, were radicals: "Radicalism ... is defined by its concern with the
political roots of a society, its fundamental laws, its foundational princi-
ples, its most sacred covenants. It is common for radicals to claim to be
the true keepers of the faith; they oppose society using its own most noble
expressions and aspirations."29 Both so-called "liberals" and so-called
"conservatives" can be radicals in this sense; Darsey's case studies in the
use of prophetic rhetoric include the abolitionist Wendell Phillips, 30 the
23. GUSTArSON, supra note 11, at 7-8.
24. Id. at 8.
25. Id. at 11.
26. Id. at 13.
27. See generally JAMES DARsEv, THE PROPHETIC TRADITION AND RADICAL RHETO-
RIC IN AMERICA (1997) (outlining American prophetic history).
28. Id. at 7.
29. Id. at 9.
30. Id. at 61-84 (noting Phillips's position as orator).
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socialist Eugene Debs,3 1 the communist hunter Joseph McCarthy32 and
the founder of the John Birch Society, Robert Welch. 3
Prophetic discourse, as Darsey reminds us, is rarely "polite" or "civil";
in fact, it is frequently perceived by its audience as corrosive of communal
bonds. Nonetheless, its presuppositions and its ultimate purpose are not
ultimately negative. Those who engage in prophetic discourse (or pro-
phetically symbolic activity) are attempting to break through a commu-
nity's entrenched habits of apathy and injustice in order to prevent them
from smothering the fundamental values and commitments upon which
that community is founded, so that it might flourish in the years to
come. 34 Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that these constructive inten-
tions frequently remain unrealized, and that attempts to invoke prophetic
language only exacerbate moral balkanization and even moral cynicism.
The use of prophetic discourse is risky business, both for the prophet and
for the community.
B. Casuistical Discourse
The word "casuistry" comes from the Latin word "casus" meaning
case. For a definition of casuistry, I will turn to another distinguished
Protestant moralist of the second half of the twentieth century, my
teacher, Paul Ramsey. Without using the term itself, he offered this ac-
count of casuistry in Nine Modern Moralists.
Casuistry is the exercise of man's capacity to make moral deci-
sions in the face of concrete, particular circumstances and cases,
by his knowledge of the human essence through its basic inclina-
tion in him and the choices he is impelled to make, leaving in
the wake of his acts of judgment a deposit of "natural" law, that
first becomes visible, not to abstract reason but in jus gentium.35
31. Id. at 85-108 (noting Debs's skill as orator).
32. Id. at 128-50 (explaining McCarthy's demagoguery).
33. Id. at 151-74 (noting that member of far right was powerful rhetoricist).
34. For instance:
Rosa Park's refusal to surrender her seat on a bus in Montgomery, Ala-
bama, is not the same as the belligerent occupation of a seat for two by a
disaffected youth on a Chicago el [train] at rush hour, and a critique of
incivility that fails to recognize this distinction misses an essential differ-
ence between the threats to comity of the 1960s and those of the 1980s
and 1990s. Further, I will argue, it misses the lessons that the American
radical tradition holds for our current disquietude.
Id. at 5.
35. PAUL RAMSEY, NINE MODERN MORALISTS: PAUL TILLICH, KARL MARx, H.
RICHARD NIEBUHR, FYODOR DosToEvsKY, REINHOLD NIEBUHR, JACQUES MARITAIN,
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, EMIL BR 4 (1983).
508 [Vol. 51: p. 499
PROPHECY AND CASUISTRY
Influenced by Edmund Cahn 36 and Jacques Maritain,3 7 Ramsey here
seems to plump for an inductive (and significantly intuitive) account of
casuistry, which he opposes to a model based on the deduction of solu-
tions to particular cases from invariable general principles or rules.38 In
my view, however, this account is incomplete. Casuistry does have induc-
tive aspects, and even intuitive aspects, but they relate in complicated ways
to two other aspects with which Ramsey grappled a little later on in his
career.
The first additional aspect is the recognition that casuistry has to grap-
ple with the question how to describe human acts in a way that will facili-
tate moral analysis. Of all the possible true things we can say about an
agent's action, what counts from a moral perspective, and what is irrele-
vant? We know, for example, that an agent's immediate and more remote
purposes in acting are relevant to our moral analysis of her action. How
do we identify those purposes, how do we take into account other morally
relevant circumstances of the act?39 We know, as well, that other features
of an action can be relevant, at least under some circumstances. The chal-
lenge is to identify features of a human act that trigger the application of
our moral rules or principles, as well as to describe features that are im-
portant for other reasons, perhaps for the sake of justifying an exception
to the relevant rule or principle. Ramsey began looking at these issues
systematically in a book called Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics. He is far,
however, from the first Christian moralist to do so. Most notably, St.
Thomas Aquinas systematically analyzed the morally relevant components
of the human act in the Summa Theologica.40
The second of these additional aspects has to do with the relationship
between principles, rules, and exceptions in deciding particular cases, a
topic which Ramsey explored in Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics41 and in
a long article, The Case of the Curious Exception.42 How do we think about
cases in which a normally applicable rule does not seem to apply? How
are exceptions generated? Some theorists suggest we articulate exceptions
to the application of a particular moral or legal rule for reasons entirely
36. EDMOND N. CAH-IN, THE MORAL DECISION: RIGHT AND WRONG IN THE LIGHT
OF AMERICAN LAw (1955); EDMOND N. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE (1949).
37. JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE (1951); JACQUES MARITAIN, THE
RIGHTS OF MAN AND NATURAL LAw (1943).
38. ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY: A HIs-
TORY OF MORAL REASONING (1988) (setting up same dichotomy).
39. RAMSEY, supra note 35, at 192-99.
40. THOMAS AQUINAS, 2 SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. I-II, q. 18 (Fathers of the En-
glish Dominican Province trans., Christian Classics 1981) (1911) [hereinafter
SUMMA THEOLOGICA].
41. See PAUL RAMSEY, DEEDS AND RULES IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS 192-225 (1967)
(exploring relationship between rules and exceptions).
42. See Paul Ramsey, The Case of the Curious Exception, in NoRM AND CONTEXT IN
CHRISTIAN ETHICS 67-138 (Gene Outka & Paul Ramsey eds., 1968) (discussing ex-
ceptions to rules and how they form).
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extrinsic to that rule. Ramsey argued that in some cases, it is more accu-
rate to say that we are deepening, extending and qualifying the meaning
of that rule as it confronts circumstances not included in the central cases
of its application. In my view, that argument reflects a key aspect of legal
reasoning in the Anglo-American tradition, as well as in good moral
casuistry.
Needless to say, the task of identifying morally salient features of
human actions draws upon and reinforces basic convictions regarding the
nature of human flourishing, and the relative worth of human beings. For
example, consider the statement: "A shot and stabbed four people who
were ahead of him in the Starbucks' line." If the circumstance "A is the
king's son" is relevant to the moral analysis of A's action in a given society,
we learn a great deal about the way that such a society is organized and
what its values are. Or to strike closer to home, consider the claim, "An
American hospital has an obligation to provide life-saving care and treat-
ment to B, who appears broken, bloodied and bruised at the bay of its
emergency room." If the circumstance "B is an illegal alien" creates a valid
exception to the claim, we learn a great deal about our own society's or-
ganization and values.
43
In addition to careful attention to description of the action under
consideration, and the application of rules and principles to the situation
at hand, what are some of the other characteristic tools of casuistry? As
Richard Miller notes, casuists often make use of paradigmatic cases, a set
of presumptively applicable rules and principles drawn from and reflect-
ing those cases, as well as analogical reasoning by which the case under
consideration is compared to the paradigmatic cases.44 Importantly, espe-
cially for law, and for types of casuistry situated within well-defined author-
itative traditions, it also makes use of precedent. The manner in which
similar cases have been resolved in the past has significant weight in the
resolution of the case at hand. This is not to say that authoritative deci-
sions of past cases trigger blind deference. No two cases are precisely the
same, and it is the task of the decision-maker in the case at hand to decide
if its factual differences from the relevant precedent justify a different
outcome.
43. Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42
U.S.C. § 1395dd (2003), requires hospitals that receive federal funds and that offer
emergency services to provide a medical screening examination to any person who
presents for treatment of an emergency medical condition, including active labor.
If a patient does indeed have such a condition, the hospital is required to provide
treatment designed to stabilize that condition, regardless of the patient's ability to
pay, and regardless of the patient's immigration status. In 2004, the House of
Representatives rejected a bill that required hospitals to obtain information on the
immigration status and employment of a person presenting for emergency medical
treatment, and which mandated the Homeland Security Department to initiate
deportation proceedings against those found to be illegal aliens. H.R. 3722, 108th
Cong. (2004).
44. See RICHARD B. MILLER, CASUISTRY AND MODERN ETHICS: A POETICS OF
PRACTICAL REASONINcG 5 (1996) (noting use of paradigmatic cases among casuists).
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Who engages in casuistry? As the foregoing analysis suggests, lawyers
and judges in common law countries such as the United States and the
United Kingdom engage in casuistical reasoning. In addition, Roman
Catholic moral theology from the time of the Council of Trent (1545-
1563) to the time of the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965) was domi-
nated by casuistical reasoning, largely because of the intimate relationship
between moral theology and canon law.45 More specifically, the function
of Catholic moral theologians during that time period was largely to pro-
vide priest-confessors with sufficient information so that they could accu-
rately assess the nature and gravity of the sins confessed by penitents, in
order to apply the appropriate penance. While Protestantism abolished
the sacrament of penance, several important Protestant moralists (particu-
larly those working in the Anglican tradition) appropriated and extended
the casuistical tradition for their own purposes. 46
Yet casuistal discourse is not employed exclusively by these profes-
sional casuists, any more than prophetic discourse is the exclusive prov-
ince of those whom God has called by name to be prophets. We all
employ casuistical discourse to the extent to which we deliberate about the
rightness or wrongness of a particular action using some or all of the ana-
lytical tools described above. Casuistry is a way of engaging in practical
reasoning-it is a form of our day-to-day moral discourse, in which we
consider the rightness or wrongness of particular actions in light of appli-
cable moral principles, particular features of the action and particular
characteristics of the agent performing it.
C. Terminology and Its Limits
In the remainder of this Essay, I will use the term "prophet" to refer
to a person engaging in prophetic discourse, unless it is clear from the
context that I mean to refer to the biblical prophets themselves. I will use
the term "casuist" to refer to a person engaging in casuistical discourse. It
is important to note, however, that the terms do not describe fixed per-
sonal attributes. More specifically, those who are "prophets" with respect
to one moral issue, or even with respect to one context in which that issue
is discussed, can be "casuists" with respect to another moral issue, or with
respect to the same issue in a different context. Furthermore, the two
types of discourse are not entirely parallel. Casuistical discourse is our
normal mode of practical reasoning. Prophetic discourse, on the other
hand, is anything but normal. It is a clarion call to respond appropriately
to what the prophet believes to be a moral crisis. While it is conceivable
45. For a widely used account of the history of Catholic moral teaching, see
JOHN MAHONEY, THE MAKING OF MORAL THEOLOGY: A STUDY OF THE ROMAN CATHO-
LIC MORAL TRADITION (1987).
46. For a helpful overview, see the articles in CONSCIENCE AND CASUISTRY IN
EARLY MODERN EUROPE (Edmund Leites ed., 1986). See also LOWELL GALLAGHER,
MEDUSA'S GAZE: CASUISTRY AND CONSCIENCE IN THE RENAISSANCE (1991); THOMAS
WOOD, ENGLISH CASUISTICAL DIVINITY DURING THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (1952).
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that a person could approach each and every moral issue they faced with
the tools provided by casuistical discourse, it is virtually inconceivable that
someone might be similarly devoted to prophetic discourse. No one can
treat every decision they face as a moral crisis; to attempt to do so destroys
the very concept of a crisis. Consequently, the fact that a person engages
in prophetic discourse in some circumstances but not in others does not
in itself count as a sign of moral incoherence or hypocrisy. Prophecy by its
nature is an episodic form of discourse.
D. Potential Tensions
Where might prophecy and casuistry clash with respect to their re-
spective approaches to moral reflection? In my view, a clash is possible on
five levels. First, prophecy and casuistry can clash with respect to the prior-
ity they assign to certain issues. For example, prophets and casuists can
agree that abortion or torture is morally unacceptable; prophets, however,
are more inclined to see the issue as dwarfing every other issue on the
horizon, while casuists generally tend to see it in as situated within a
broader range of issues deserving moral attention.
Second, prophets and casuists can clash with respect to first-order
moral analysis of a given action. Generally speaking, prophets tend to be
impatient with the analytically nuanced descriptions of human actions
proposed by casuists, as well as with casuistical attempts to identify and
justify exceptional situations that warrant a departure from the general
moral rule. No doubt some of their impatience is due to the constraints of
prophetic discourse. For example, the rhetorical power of a prophetic
denunciation of idolatry or abortion would be significantly diluted if the
prophet devoted significant attention to the precise features that an action
must exhibit in order to fall under the moral prohibition of abortion 47 or
idolatry.48 In addition, prophets are not likely to be sympathetic with the
attempts of casuists to justify exceptions to a general moral rule by probing
its rationale and tacit assumptions. A prophet is likely to view such at-
tempts as a morally bankrupt effort to "get around" the rule for one's own
venal purposes. Furthermore, to the extent that the prophet views the
moral rule as directly or indirectly given by God, she is less likely to believe
47. For example, does a medical procedure designed to end the burdens of
pregnancy upon a woman with a failing heart count as a morally prohibited "abor-
tion" if it is done foreseeing, but not intending, the death of her unborn child?
For a conservative Roman Catholic casuistical approach that makes moral distinc-
tions along these lines, see GERMAIN GRISEZ, THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS VOL. 2:
LIVING A CHRISTIAN LIFE 498-504 (1993).
48. St. Paul, for example, is casuistical in his approach to the question
whether a Christian may eat meat sacrificed to idols. On the one hand, he recog-
nizes that doing so will not harm the "strong"-those who clearly recognize that
there is only one true God. On the other, he cautions that eating such meat may
be spiritually dangerous to the "weak"-those whose commitment to monotheism
is tenuous. He urges the strong to be solicitous of the spiritual well-being of the
weak in deciding how to proceed in such cases. See 1 Corinthians 8:1-13.
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that its rationale and scope can or should be probed by human reason.
Casuists, for their part, believe that prophets are intellectually crude and
even self-indulgent in issuing broad condemnations without taking care to
specify precisely the range of activity to which those condemnations apply.
Third, prophets and casuists can clash with respect to the manner in
which they assess the character of those who engage in the morally troub-
lesome practices in question. Prophets generally take an agent's engage-
ment in the acts in question (and sometimes, even her toleration of such
acts) as conclusive evidence of bad character. More specifically, they tend
tacitly to apply a tightly focused conception in the "unity of the virtues." 49
They perceive a person who engages in an action such as abortion or tor-
ture as so conclusively lacking in the virtue of justice that it is impossible
for her to possess more than the simulacra of the other virtues. Casuists
are more likely to assess character more holistically, in light of a broader
scale of virtues and vices; they are more likely to be sympathetic to the
claim that a generally good person engaged in or authorized morally un-
acceptable acts for mistaken, but understandable reasons.
Fourth, and relatedly, prophecy and casuistry can clash with respect
to the proper response of the society to the practices in question, particu-
larly if those practices are already entrenched. Prophets are more likely to
think that the immorality of a practice such as abortion or torture calls for
its immediate and total abolition, while casuists are more likely to regard
the question of societal response to an immoral practice as deserving of
separate moral analysis.
Fifth, and finally, prophets experience the temporal horizon of their
moral decision-making in a very different way than casuists. Prophets ex-
perience themselves and their society as held within a moment of crisis
(kairos),50 as facing a decisive turning point about whether to pursue a
path toward salvation or toward damnation. Casuists, in contrast, tend to
see even very important moral decisions as occurring in a long, drawn-out
span of history (chronos)5 1 in which analogous decisions have arisen before
and will arise again. The idea that any one moral issue can, by itself, con-
stitute a turning point in history is not one to which casuists are naturally
attracted.
49. This controversial position has been advocated by a number of the philo-
sophical luminaries of the West, including Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas. See, e.g.,
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS Bk. VI, Sec. 13 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962);
SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 40, at pt. I-II, q. 65; Plato, Protagoras 329b5-334c3,
in THE COLLECrED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 324-29 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington
Cairns eds., 1963).
50. See Paul S. Minear, Time and the Kingdom, 24J. RELIGION 77, 80-86 (1944)
(discussing critical moment of decision notion of time).
51. See Time (In the New Testament), in 14 NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 84 (2d
ed. 2003) (discussing linear notion of time).
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III. ABORTION AND TORTURE IN CONTEMPORARY DEBATES
The foregoing reflections suggest that prophetic discourse and casuis-
tical discourse often do not make tranquil companions. In fact, the choice
to use one or the other mode of moral reflection to frame a particular
topic sets one down a path that is virtually guaranteed to make it difficult
to have a fruitful conversation with someone who has chosen to use the
other mode, even if the prophet and the casuist share the same basic moral
and religious values. This claim, it seems to me, is supported by public
discussion of abortion and torture in the 2004 American election and its
aftermath.
Why did these two issues become flash points? Briefly, abortion be-
came an issue because President Bush intimated that he would appoint
judges to the United States Supreme Court who would overturn Roe v.
Wade,52 the 1973 decision conferring constitutional protection on a wo-
man's right to choose an abortion. 53 His Democratic opponent, Senator
John Kerry, was an unequivocal supporter of the rights conferred by Roe,
and pledged to appoint only judges who would uphold the decision. Tor-
ture rose to public attention because the revelation of the atrocities at Abu
Ghraib Prison in Iraq in the spring of 2004 coincided with the leaking of
legal memos from the Attorney General's Office and the Office of the
Counsel to the President which seemed to facilitate, if not entirely to en-
dorse, torture practices. 54
52. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (conferring constitutional protection on right to
abortion).
53. To my knowledge, President Bush never actually made the appointment
of anti-Roe judges an explicit campaign promise (although he did promise to ap-
point judges similar in philosophy to Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Clarence
Thomas). As I write, he has had the opportunity to make two appointments to the
Court: Chief Justice John Roberts, a judge on the United States Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit, was originally nominated to replace Associate Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor, who resigned her position on July 1, 2005. After the death the late
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist on September 3, 2005, President Bush nomi-
nated Roberts for the position of Chief Justice. Although Roberts is often de-
scribed as a devout Catholic, it is not clear whether he would vote to overrule Roe
should the opportunity present itself. Roberts was sworn in as Chief Justice on
September 29, 2005. On October 3, 2005, President Bush nominated Harriet
Miers, White House Counsel and his former personal attorney, to serve as Associ-
ate Justice; on October 27, 2005, he accepted her letter withdrawing her nomina-
tion after intense controversy about her qualifications. On October 31, 2005,
President Bush nominated Samuel Alito, a judge on the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, in her stead. Alito was sworn in as an Associate
Justice on January 31, 2006.
54. Shocking photographs of the abuse of Iraqi prisoners by American
soldiers were first published by Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, NEW
YORKER, Apr. 30, 2004, at 42. More photographs were broadcast on May 4, 2004 by
CBS on the news show 60 Minutes. Newsweek broke the story of the Torture Memos
in a special report. SeeJohn Barry et al., The Roots of Torture, NEWSWEEK, May 24,
2004, at 26 (describing government memoranda seemingly approving torture tac-
tics). The article argues that the Torture Memos, which explicitly concerned only
al-Qaeda operatives and members of the Taliban, constituted the first step "on the
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Abortion and torture are problematic practices within Christian cir-
cles generally, and within Roman Catholic circles in particular. Both prac-
tices are condemned as "unspeakable crimes" by the Second Vatican
Council, the most recent ecumenical council of the Roman Catholic
Church. 55 More broadly, whether or not they are believers, few people
indebted to Western culture for their moral framework consider abortion
and torture unambiguously good. Nonetheless, both practices are often
engaged under color of "necessity." In a perfect world, women would not
need to seek abortions. We do not, however, live in a perfect world. Wo-
men sometimes find themselves pregnant when they are not physically,
emotionally, financially or socially equipped to raise a child. Under such
circumstances, many will seek abortions. In a perfect world, no govern-
ment would be faced with a choice between complying with the laws of war
and safeguarding its people. We do not, however, live in a perfect world.
Nations sometimes find themselves faced with ruthless adversaries who will
stop at nothing in order to achieve their political objectives. Under such
circumstances, many of their agents will engage in torture and similar
practices in order to preserve their way of life.
Neither prophets nor casuists, in my judgment, will dispute the fore-
going statements as empirical descriptions. They will differ fundamen-
tally, however, in their basic strategy regarding how to respond to the
complex reality those statements describe. Prophets tend to emphasize
the need for radical and unambiguous compliance with the patterns of
action appropriate for denizens of the kingdom of God-no matter what
the circumstances. Casuists, on the other hand, tend to focus on the fact
that God's kingdom is not yet perfectly instantiated in our midst, and that
our responsibilities to those made in God's image and likeness require we
take due account of this fact. What is "due account"? That depends. In
some cases, for example, it may mean attempting to define the prohibition
in question as precisely as possible, in order to take into account the other
values at stake. In other cases, it may mean demanding that other values,
road to Abu Ghraib." Id. The first article in the New York Times about the memos
appeared on May 21, 2004. Neil A. Lewis, The Reach of War, Geneva Conventions:
Justice Memos Explain How to Skip Prisoner Rights, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2004, at A10.
55. Vatican Council II, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modem World
27, in 1 THE CONCILAR AND POST CONCILIAR DOCUMENTS 928 (Austin Flannery ed.,
4th prtg. 1998). The Vatican Council stated:
The varieties of crimes are numerous: all offenses against life itself, such
as murder, genocide, abortion, euthanasia and willful suicide; all viola-
tions of the integrity of the human person, such as mutilation, physical
and mental torture, undue psychological pressures; all offenses against
human dignity, such as subhuman living conditions, arbitrary imprison-
ment, deportation, slavery, prostitution, the selling of women and chil-
dren, degrading working conditions where men are treated as mere tools
for profit rather than free and responsible persons: all these and the like
are criminal: they poison civilization; and they debase the perpetrators
more than the victims and militate against the honor of the creator.
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including the persistence of sin, be taken into account in the formulation
of legal efforts to impose prohibitions on such practices, even if they do
not affect one's judgment of their moral status.
Moreover, abortion and torture are prime examples of two areas in
which there has been increasing tension between traditional Christianity
and modern Western society. Consider, for example, the relationship be-
tween the Catholic Church and the United States. During the early years
of the Second Vatican Council, which began during the presidency of
John F. Kennedy, American Catholics were buoyed by the hope that Amer-
ican values and Catholic values would reflect and reinforce one another.
56
Yet thanks to fateful decisions on both sides, the optimistic mood dissi-
pated. Abortion and torture represent two areas in which the tension be-
tween magisterial teaching and American mores have diverged most
sharply.
Consider first the tensions in the realm of sexuality and procreation.
In 1965, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that married couples had a
constitutionally protected right to use contraception. 5 7 In 1968, Pope
Paul XV reaffirmed the church's traditional prohibition of artificial con-
traception, as well as all sexual activity outside of marriage. 58 In 1972, the
Supreme Court extended constitutional protection to the use of contra-
ception by unmarried couples, 59 and in 1973 found that the Constitution
protects a pregnant woman's right to obtain abortion, 60 a right which it
steadily protected and expanded over the next fifteen years. 61 While most
56. In particular, the development and articulation of a more positive assess-
ment of religious liberty owed a great deal to the American theologian John
Courtney Murray. See VATICAN COUNCIL II, DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
(1965).
57. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (declaring married
couples' right to use contraception).
58. See POPE PAUL VI, HuMANAE VITAE: A CHALLENGE TO LovE (1968).
59. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending right to use contra-
ception to unmarried couples).
60. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179
(1973).
61. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)
(invalidating parental and spousal consent provisions, prohibition of saline abor-
tions and requirement of physicians performing abortions to exercise professional
skill to attempt to save life of fetus); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (requir-
ing states mandating parental consent to provide judicial bypass procedure); City
of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (invalidating re-
quirement that information about fetal development, abortion risks and alterna-
tives to abortion be provided to women seeking abortions, twenty-four hour
waiting period requirement, parental consent requirement with no parental by-
pass, requirement that all abortions after first trimester be performed in hospitals
and requirement governing "humane and sanitary" disposition of fetal remains);
Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)
(reaffirming positions articulated in Bellotti and Akron).
The line of cases expanding abortion rights came to an end in Webster v. Repro-
ductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), where the Court upheld a prohibition
on the use of public facilities for abortions as well as the requirement that tests for
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other Western democracies were also liberalizing their laws related to con-
traceptives and abortion, the Vatican not only stood firm in its rejection of
both practices, but also increased the forcefulness of its opposition under
the long papacy of John Paul II, which extended from 1978 to 2005.
More specifically, in his 1995 encyclical Evangelium Vitae, John Paul II
framed the moral tension between Western democracies and the Catholic
Church as a conflict between "the culture of death" and the "culture of
life." The "culture of death" is characterized by its support of such prac-
tices as abortion, infanticide and euthanasia in the name of what the Pope
believes to be a false freedom; in contrast, the "culture of life" is character-
ized in part by its implacable opposition to such practices as utterly incon-
sistent with respect for human dignity.62 Because it involves the taking of
innocent and utterly helpless human life, many Catholics (and other
Christians) see abortion as the paradigmatic issue exposing the tension
between secular values and Christian values on human sexuality and
reproduction.
63
A second area in which there has been significant tension between
the evolving teaching of the Roman Catholic Church and American cul-
ture is the arena of war and peace. 6 4 Before the end of the Cold War,
viability be performed on fetuses of at least twenty weeks gestation. The current
framework for the Supreme Court abortion jurisprudence was set in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), which affirmed
Roe's core holding while abandoning its trimester framework and adopting a new
"undue burden" test, which appears less hostile to restrictions on abortion than
Roe's "strict scrutiny" test.
62. See POPE JOHN PAUL II, EVANGELIUM VITAE 18-21 (1995) (explaining
roots of Catholic Church's opposition to abortion and euthanasia). Pope John
Paul II writes:
To claim the right to abortion, infanticide, and euthanasia, and to recog-
nize that right in law, means to attribute to human freedom a perverse and
evil significance that of an absolute power over others and against others. This is
the death of true freedom: 'Truly, I say to you, everyone who commits sin
is a slave to sin' (Jn. 8:34).
Id. 20.
63. See id. 58 ("Abortus neconon infanticidum nefanda sunt crimina." (cit-
ing VATICAN II, PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD
51 (1965))). John Paul II writes: "Among all the crimes which can be committed
against life, procured abortion has characteristics making it particularly serious
and deplorable. The Second Vatican Council defines abortion, together with in-
fanticide, as an 'unspeakable crime.'" Id.
64. While official Catholic teaching has never advocated pacifism, it also has
never treated the waging of war as free from significant moral constraints. More
specifically, it has contributed to the development of a Christian 'Just war" tradi-
tion, which has held that it can be morally just to wage war under certain circum-
stances, provided that certain conditions are fulfilled. Rooted in the reflections of
St. Ambrose and St. Augustine upon the obligations of a Christian empire, that
tradition has long placed significant limitations upon a nation's decision to go to
war (ins ad bellum) and what constitutes proper conduct during a war (ius in bello).
See ROLAND H. BAINTON, CHRISTIAN ATTITUDES TowARD WAR AND PEACE: A HISToIU-
CAL SURVEY AND CRITICAL RE-EvALUATION 89-100 (1960). Beginning in the 1960s,
with the specter of total nuclear destruction precipitated by the Cold War, Chris-
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nuclear deterrence symbolized the potential conflict between American
values and Christian values in the realm of statecraft. Deterrence policies
based upon mutual assured destruction and other counter-population
targeting strategies ultimately depended upon the conditional willingness
to engage in an action utterly inconsistent with respect for human beings
as made in the image and likeness of God. Deterrence policies based
upon counter-force targeting strategies were acknowledged to be morally
superior to counter-population strategies. At the same time, it was widely
feared that the destructive power of nuclear weapons could not be con-
tained or controlled once the taboo against their use was broken. Para-
doxically, the Russians and the Americans designed a system in which the
preservation of their respective societies depended upon the specter of
mutual annihilation.
Christian moralists working within the just war tradition were in gen-
eral agreement that the actual infliction of indiscriminate destruction
would be radically immoral. Some made powerful arguments that the de-
terrence policy itself was radically immoral, on the grounds that it is illicit
to threaten to do that which it is illicit to do. 65 Others, cognizant of the
likely consequences of immediate unilateral disarmament, argued that the
system of nuclear deterrence was (barely) tolerable while efforts to de-
velop a morally superior alternative were underway. 66 In short, in the
Cold War era, the dilemma of nuclear deterrence constitutes an acute re-
minder that there is no easy way to harmonize one's commitment to the
values embedded within a Christian moral framework with the exigencies
of preserving the American way of life.
In my judgment, the use of torture in order to obtain information
concerning potential terrorist activity will come to symbolize the tension
between American values and Christian values in the political sphere in
our own era. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the war on
terrorism has become America's paradigmatic battle to defend its way of
life. In his speech before Congress less than two weeks after al-Qaeda at-
tacked the country on September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush pro-
claimed to the nation:
Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end
there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach
has been found, stopped and defeated. (Applause.)
tian moralists began to rethink the application of the doctrine of just war in light
of the exigencies of a nuclear age. For an influential and accessible recent articu-
lation of the application of the nuclear age, which also attempts to grapple with
the insights provided by Christian pacifism, see NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHO-
LIC BISHOPS, THE CHALLENGE OF PEACE: GOD'S PROMISE AND OUR RESPONSE (1984).
65. See generallyJOHN FINNIS ET AL., NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, MORALITY, AND RE-
ALISM (1987).
66. The most notable articulation of this position was in the pastoral letter on
war and peace written by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops. See supra
note 64, J 162-98.
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Americans are asking, why do they hate us? They hate what we
see right here in this chamber-a democratically elected govern-
ment. Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our free-
doms-our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our
freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.
67
The most powerful-and indispensable-advantage of terrorists is the
element of surprise regarding the timing and location of their attacks.
Correlatively, the greatest imperative for those battling terrorists is to ob-
tain information about their future plans. In the midst of the distress pre-
cipitated by the September 11, 2001 attacks, some American intelligence
officers made the judgment that captured members of al-Qaeda and allied
groups would be unlikely to respond to normal methods of interroga-
tion.68 Consequently, they began to contemplate the possibility that the
only reliable way to obtain useful information would be to use methods of
interrogation long thought to be inconsistent with fundamental American
values such as respect for human beings as embodied souls.
69
Some of these methods were thought to amount to torture. What is
torture? According to the United Nations Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, "tor-
ture" is defined as follows:
[A] ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confes-
sion, punishing him for an act he or a third person has commit-
ted or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on dis-
crimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted
by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of
a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It
67. President's Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Re-
sponse to the Terrorists Attacks of September 11, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1347
(Sept. 20, 2001).
68. See Memorandum from Joint Task Force 170, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to Com-
mander, Joint Task Force 170 (Oct. 11, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO
ABU GHRAB 227 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter
THE TORTURE PAPERS] (requesting approval of more aggressive interrogation plan
because "current guidelines... limit ability of interrogators to counter advanced
resistance"). The legal brief attached to this October 11, 2002 memorandum fur-
ther amplifies and justifies this request. See id. at 229.
69. As Al Gore puts it: "[Olne of the clearest indications of the impending
loss of intimacy with one's own soul is the failure to recognize the existence of a
soul in those over whom power is exercised . . . ." Brian Ross & Richard Esposito,
CIA's Harsh Interrogation Techniques Described ABCNEWs.COM, Nov. 18, 2005, http://
abcnews.go.com/WNT/Investigation/story?id=1322866&page=1.
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does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in
or incidental to lawful sanctions. 70
Why, precisely, is torture morally wrong? I have found no more per-
suasive account than that given by Elaine Scarry in The Body in Pain. Scarry
argues that the precise objective of torture is to "unmake" the victim, to
destroy his or her identity through the infliction of severe pain:
[W] hat the process of torture does is to split the human being
into two, to make emphatic the ever present but, except in the
extremity of sickness and death, only latent distinction between a
self and a body, between a "me" and "my body." The "self' or
"me," which is experienced on the one hand as more private,
more essentially at the center, and on the other hand as partici-
pating across the bridge of the body in the world, is "embodied"
in the voice, in language. The goal of the torturer is to make the
one, the body, emphatically and crushingly present by destroying
it, and to make the other, the voice, absent by destroying it. It is
in part this combination that makes torture, like any experience
of great physical pain, mimetic of death; for in death the body is
emphatically present while that more elusive part represented by
the voice is so alarmingly absent that heavens are created to ex-
plain its whereabouts. 71
Like nuclear deterrence, torture has been perceived by some govern-
mental officials as necessary to protect American society from an implaca-
ble enemy's devastating terrorist attacks. At the same time, like nuclear
deterrence (in counter-population forms), it is a practice that is inconsis-
tent with respect for the dignity of a human being as an integrated unity of
body and soul. Whereas nuclear deterrence involved the (conditional)
willingness to destroy the physical integrity of other human beings, torture
involves the unconditional willingness to destroy their psychic integrity by
(almost) destroying their physical integrity. To will either type of destruc-
tion, even conditionally, is not consistent with respect for human
dignity.72
70. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art. 1(1),June 26, 1987, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113.
71. ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE
WORLD 48-49 (1985).
72. Does it matter that our nuclear deterrence policy targeted ordinary citi-
zens going about living their day-to-day lives, while our torture practices seem to be
targeted at persons who belong to terrorist cells? The Catholic Church has drawn
a sharp distinction between combatants and non-combatants, long teaching that it
is always impermissible intentionally to kill non-combatants, although their deaths
may be foreseen and accepted as the side-effect of an operation directed against a
legitimate military target. While mainstream Catholic thought has taught that it is
permissible to intentionally kill combatants, it has also taught that once a combat-
ant has been disarmed, so that he is no longer a direct physical threat, he regains
the immunity of a non-combatant. Moreover, torture is not an activity that is per-
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Abortion and torture, then, are moral issues of the highest impor-
tance, raising fundamental questions about the nature and the scope of
our obligation to respect human dignity. At the same time, there are sig-
nificant practical pressures leading to the decision to engage in both these
practices, which means that they will not be easy either to ban or to eradi-
cate. Consequently, both abortion and torture are issues ripe for the con-
frontation between prophecy and casuistry.
A. Abortion, Prophecy and Casuistry
1. Prophetic Voices
In my view, prophetic discourse on the issue of abortion in the con-
text of the 2004 presidential election is characterized by several features,
all of which reflect Gustafson's definition of prophecy. 73 First, we find a
broad use of the language of moral indictment. Legalized abortion is
portrayed as the gravest of all moral issues facing our generation.
7 4
Vivid words are deployed to evoke revulsion and horror at how the
practice of abortion has destroyed millions of unborn lives. Legalized
abortion is analogized to Nazi genocide, 7 5  the enslavement of
mitted in the case of either combatants or non-combatants, no matter what good
may be obtained by so doing.
73. A helpful list of the writings-mainly from what I have termed the pro-
phetic perspective on abortion and the election-can be found at Senator John
Keny, Abortion and the Relation Between Church & State. See The Church and the
Liberal Tradition, http://www.ratzingerfanclub.com/liberalism/john-kerry-cath-
olicelection.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2006) (cataloguing websites expressing
opinions aboutJohn Kerry's political views and their impact on Catholicism). An-
other helpful list from the same perspective can be found on the website of Women
for Faith and Family. See Catholics and Political Responsibility, http://www.wf-f.org/
Catholics -andPolitics.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2006) (listing documents pertain-
ing to Catholicism and roles religion plays in politics).
74. See Bernard W. Schmitt (Bishop of Wheeling-Charleston), Pastoral Letter on
Abortion, Oct. 20, 2004, http://www.dwc.org/news/oct2104.shtmi (quoting POPE
JOHN PAUL II, THE GOSPEL OF LiFE (EvANGELIUM VITAE) 62 (1995)). Schmitt stated:
Therefore, I want to say, clearly and distinctly, as your brother and your
Bishop, that abortion is the greatest moral evil of our age. As the deliber-
ate killing of an innocent human being, there is "no circumstance, no
purpose, no law whatsoever" that can justify or excuse abortion. "It is
contrary to the Law of God which is written in every human heart, knowa-
ble by reason itself, and proclaimed by the Church.
Id.
75. Archbishop Raymond Burke began a pastoral letter about the election by
invoking Nazi Germany. Raymond Burke, On Our Civic Responsibility for the Common
Good, Oct. 1, 2004, http://www.ewtn.com/library/bishops/burkecom.htm (depict-
ing Nazism as emblematic of importance of Catholics being their "brother's
keeper"). In an interview he gave to reporter Thomas A. Szyszkiewicz from Inside
the Vatican (ITV) he articulates his purpose in so doing:
ITV: In your pastoral letter you begin with a story about a Bavarian sacris-
tan's remembrance of the Nazi era. Are you making an equation here
between what's happening in the U.S. and what happened then? Or are
you saying we're headed down that path or possibly headed down that
path?
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African-Americans 76 or the perpetuation of racist practices such as segre-
gation. 77 Those who support legalized abortion, like John Kerry, are com-
pared to Nazi leaders78 or anti-abolitionists. 79 To Roman Catholics
Archbishop Burke: What I'm doing here is I'm saying this situation is
instructive for us because here was a situation in which a government was
attacking a whole class of people, actually several classes of people, and
somehow the general citizenry became cooperators in that. And we have
to recognize that in the question, for instance of abortion, embryonic
stem cell research, euthanasia, whatever it might be, a class of people are
being excluded from the care for the common good. And we're responsi-
ble for that. And that's the reason I use that example.
I don't think it's a question of if we're heading down that way. I mean,
it's a fact that 40 million unborn children have been aborted since 1973.
In some way, and I make the point at the end of the letter, too, even as
Catholics we have to ask ourselves, "What have we done?" If all Catholics
would join those Catholics and other people of good will who were work-
ing to promote the respect for human life, this situation wouldn't be what
it is.
Interview with Archbishop Raymond Burke, Oct. 5, 2004, http://www.wf-f.org/
Burke-ITV.html.
76. See John J. Meyers (Archbishop of Newark), A Time For Honesty, May 5,
2004, http://www.rcan.org/archbish/jm_letters/ATimeforHonesty.htm. Meyers
argued:
But with abortion (and for example slavery, racism, euthanasia and traf-
ficking in human persons) there can be no legitimate diversity of opin-
ion. The direct killing of the innocent is always a grave injustice. One
should not permit unjust killing any more than one should permit slave-
holding, racist actions, or other grave injustices. From the perspective of
justice, to say "I am personally opposed to abortion but..." is like saying
"I personally am against slavery, but I can not impose my personal beliefs
on my neighbor." Obviously, recognizing the grave injustice of slavery
requires one to ensure that no one suffers such degradation. Similarly
recognizing that abortion is unjust killing requires one-in love and jus-
tice-to work to overcome the injustice.
Id.
77. See generally Michael J. Gaynor, Holy Communion Should Be Denied To Kerry,
May 25, 2004, http://www.catholic.org/featured/headline.php?ID=999 (opining
thatJohn Kerry is ineligible to receive Holy Communion because of his pro-choice
beliefs).
78. See, e.g., Valerie Mierzwa, Could Kerry Be the "Hitler of the Unborn", Oct. 31,
2004, http://www.catholic.org/featured/headline.php?ID=1483 (comparing John
Kerry to Adolph Hitler for his pro-choice beliefs); see also Barbara Kralis, John Kerry
Was an Altar Boy-So Was Adolf Hitler, Oct. 25, 2004, http://www.renewamerica.us/
columns/kralis/041025 (criticizingJohn Kerry's purported devout Catholic beliefs
and his attempts to convince voters his beliefs are sincere).
79. See Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Not in Good Conscience, http://
www.nationalreview.com/comment/george-bradley2004lOl20849.asp (last visited
Feb. 20, 2006). The authors stated:
To vote forJohn Kerry in 2004 would be far worse, however, than to have
voted against Lincoln and for his Democratic opponent in 1860. Stephen
Douglas at least supported allowing states that opposed slavery to ban it.
And he did not favor federal funding or subsidies for slavery. John Kerry
takes the opposite view on both points when it comes to abortion. On the
great evil of his own day, Senator Douglas was merely John Kerry-lite.
PROPHECY AND CASUISTRY
adopting this stance, legalized abortion is portrayed as the most indisputa-
ble mark of the United States' pervasive complicity in what the late Pope
John Paul II called a culture of death.
Consequently, to the advocates of this position, it was not only legiti-
mate, but urgently necessary, to cast one's vote in the presidential election
with primary reference to the issue of legalized abortion. By "primary ref-
erence" I do not mean to suggest that abortion was the only issue that was
morally relevant to the choice of a President. I mean, rather, to suggest
that prophets employ a lexical ordering: a candidate who supports abor-
tion rights (particularly with the dedication that Kerry has devoted to the
cause) has, in essence, morally disqualified himself from the race. From
their perspective, he has shown himself to be fundamentally mistaken
about a morally prismatic issue;80 his fitness to lead the nation cannot be
rehabilitated by his stands on a number of other issues, no matter how
morally superior they may be to Bush's.8 ' Several Catholic bishops sug-
80. Some American Catholic bishops declared that they would not give Holy
Communion to Catholic politicians who were pro-choice. The majority of bishops
did not follow this course of action. See Kevin Eckstrom, Cardinal Says "Majority" of
Bishops Wouldn't Deny Communion, July 11, 2004, http://www.beliefnet.com/story/
170/story_17061_l.html (reporting Cardinal Theodore McCarrick of Washing-
ton's belief that politicians should not be denied Communion merely because
their political beliefs differ from those of Catholic Church). A document adopted
by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops at their meeting in June 2004
explicitly left it up to each individual bishop to decide what to do in his own
diocese:
The question has been raised as to whether the denial of Holy Commu-
nion to some Catholics in political life is necessary because of their public
support for abortion on demand. Given the wide range of circumstances
involved in arriving at a prudential judgment on a matter of this serious-
ness, we recognize that such decisions rest with the individual bishop in
accord with the established canonical and pastoral principles. Bishops
can legitimately make differentjudgments on the most prudent course of
pastoral action. Nevertheless, we all share an unequivocal commitment
to protect human life and dignity and to preach the Gospel in difficult
times.
Catholics in Political Life, http://www.usccb.org/bishops/catholicsinpolitical-
life.shtml (last visited Feb. 20, 2006). After some conservative Catholics charged
that this document was inconsistent with Catholic teaching, Joseph Cardinal Ratz-
inger, then Prefect of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, gave
his explicit approval. SeeJerry Filteau, Cardinal Ratzinger Says He, U.S. Bishops "In
Harmony" on Politics, July 14, 2004, http://www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/
cns/0403830.htm (reporting Cardinal Ratzinger's declaration of support for
American bishops decisions on withholding Communion from pro-choice
Catholics).
81. See Frank Pavone, You Wouldn't Even Ask, http://priestsforlife.org/elec-
tions/wouldntask.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006) ("If a candidate who supported
terrorism asked for your vote, would you say, 'I disagree with you on terrorism, but
where do you stand on other issues?' I doubt it.").
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gested that a Catholic would commit a serious sin if he or she voted for
Kerry.8
2
82. A few Catholic bishops proclaimed that one could not vote for a pro-
choice politician without committing a mortal sin. For example, Bishop Michael
Sheridan wrote:
There must be no confusion in these matters. Any Catholic politicians
who advocate for abortion, for illicit stem cell research or for any form of
euthanasia ipso facto place themselves outside full communion with the
Church and so jeopardize their salvation. Any Catholics who vote for can-
didates who stand for abortion, illicit stem cell research or euthanasia
suffer the same fateful consequences. It is for this reason that these
Catholics, whether candidates for office or those who would vote for
them, may not receive Holy Communion until they have recanted their
positions and been reconciled with God and the Church in the Sacra-
ment of Penance.
Michael Sheridan (Bishop of Colorado Springs), A Pastoral Letter to the Catholic
Faithful of the Diocese of Colorado Springs on the Duties of Catholic Politicians and Voters,
May 1, 2004, http://www.wf-f.org/Sheridan-MaylLetter.html.
Archbishop Charles Chaput of Denver seemed to take much the same posi-
tion in an interview with a reporter from the New York Times.
In an interview in his residence here, Archbishop Chaput said a vote for a
candidate like Mr. Kerry who supports abortion rights or embryonic stem
cell research would be a sin that must be confessed before receiving
Communion.
"If you vote this way, are you cooperating in evil?" he asked. "And if you
know you are cooperating in evil, should you go to confession? The an-
swer is yes."
David D. Kirkpatrick & Laurie Goodstein, Group of Bishops Using Influence to Oppose
Kerry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2004, at Al. In response to the widespread controversy
Chaput's remarks generated, the Archdiocese of Denver published a full transcript
of the interview, available at www.archden.org/images/nytjtranscript.pdf. It does
not appear to me that the full transcript undermines the accuracy of the position
attributed to Chaput in the New York Times article.
John Myers, the Archbishop of Newark, voiced a similar approach in an op-ed
in the Wall Street Journal:
As Mother Teresa reminded us on all of her visits to the U.S., abortion
tears at our national soul. It is a betrayal of our nation's founding princi-
ple that recognizes all human beings as "created equal" and "endowed
with unalienable rights." What evil could be so grave and widespread as
to constitute a "proportionate reason" to support candidates who would
preserve and protect the abortion license and even extend it to publicly
funded embryo-killing in our nation's labs?
JohnJ. Myers, A Voter's Guide: Pro-Choice Candidates and Church Teaching, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 17, 2004, available at http://www.opinionjournal.com/taste/?id=110005634.
Archbishop Raymond Burke of St. Louis issued statements along the same
lines, but then appears to have qualified his position. In a June interview with a
reporter for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, he suggested that knowingly voting for a
pro-choice candidate would be a sin, no matter why one voted for him. Later, he
stated that he meant to say that it was only a sin to vote for a pro-choice candidate
because that candidate was pro-choice. See Tim Townsend, Burke Gives Catholics Lee-
way in Votingfor Abortion-Rights Supporter, ST. Louis PosT-DIsPATCH, Sept. 6, 2004, at
3 (characterizing nature of Archbishop Burke's statements).
Why the equivocation? In my view, because Chaput, Burke and Meyer are
attempting to address the issue of abortion and the law prophetically. For exam-
ple, the prophetic orientation of Archbishop Burke is exemplified by the title of an
article that he published in America Magazine. See Prophecy for Justice: Catholic Politi-
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Second, there is a type of utopianism at work in the arguments of the
prophetic opponents of abortion. To be sure, it is a particular kind of
negative utopianism; these prophetic voices frequently proceed as if over-
turning Roe v. Wade will make a dramatic, almost total difference in the
way unborn life is treated in America. Moreover, as Gustafson suggests, we
find relatively little concentrated analysis of the steps likely to lead to this
negative utopia. Bush is good because he is opposed to Roe, Kerry is bad
because he supports Roe. Very few prophetic opponents of abortion spent
a great deal of time soberly considering whether either candidate was
likely to make much of a difference in the legal status of abortion if
elected President.83 Utopias, even negative utopias, are not built on the
soft sands of differential policy analysis, but on the stony ground of radical
commitment.
In my view, an additional aspect of the prophetic approach to abor-
tion and the election is worth mentioning: its sense of urgency. The pro-
life movement had been struggling without success for over thirty years to
reverse Roe and the widespread practice of legalized abortion that the deci-
sion has enabled. At the time of the 2004 election, the elements at last
seemed aligned in their favor: a Republican House, a Republican Senate
and a country recoiling from too much emphasis upon autonomy and in-
dividuality and experiencing a renewed concern for the fragile connec-
cians and Bishops, AMERICA, June 21, 2004, at 11. They are soon brought up short
by the fact that Ratzinger framed the issue in a more casuistical way, with the ana-
lytical tools used to analyze "cooperation with evil," discussed in more detail below.
A casuistical approach draws distinctions that are not seen as immediately obvi-
ous-or helpful-to those advocating a prophetic approach so they have to find
ways to preserve the prophetic insight within a casuistical framework of analysis-
generally by insisting ab initio that no reason could possibly be sufficiently "propor-
tionate" to justify electing a pro-choice politician.
83. Glen Stassen, a Professor of Theological Ethics at Fuller Theological Semi-
nary, wrote an op-ed arguing that abortion rates were actually more likely to fall
under a Kerry presidency than a Bush presidency, because he would provide social
services that would make it more attractive for women to choose childbirth rather
than abortion. See Glen Stassen, Pro-Life? Look at the Fruits, Oct.13, 2004, http://
www.sojo.net/index.cfm?action=sojomail.display&issue=041013#5 (opining that
historical data suggests because of democratic-favored social policies, abortion
rates would continue to increase under President Bush). Stassen later admitted
that some of the statistics he had presented were erroneous, but did not back away
from his general point that it was important to focus on providing assistance to
women facing crisis pregnancies in order to reduce the abortion debate. He ar-
gued that Bush had not done so, with the result that abortion rates had been
declining more slowly under his presidency than under Clinton's. See Author Ad-
mits Flaws in Abortion Rate Study, but Challenges Critics, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, June 28,
2005, available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1058/is_13122/
ain14727053 (admitting to data errors but challenging critics to disprove his hy-
pothesis). What interests me here is the hostility with which those adopting a pro-
life prophetic stance treated those prepared to consider the idea that there might
not be perfect convergence between re-electing a President who had voiced oppo-
sition to legalized abortion and actually reducing the abortion rate. See, e.g.,
George & Bradley, supra note 79 (comparing abortion supporters to slavery sup-
porters in eighteenth century).
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tions between family, friends and community. The likelihood was high
that at least one vacancy would occur on the Supreme Court during the
upcoming presidential term; with the right appointments-which Presi-
dent Bush implied that he would provide-Roe could be reversed. By con-
trast, if Kerry were elected, it would be likely that the next round of
Supreme Court appointments would support a broad constitutional right
to an abortion, thereby settling matters for the next generation, if not in-
definitely. The notion of this particular moment in time as kairos, as a
unique opportunity to make an important and decisive change in the
course of events, controls the prophetic approach to abortion and the
election.
2. Casuistical Voices
What about the casuists in the debate over abortion and the presiden-
tial election? Let me begin by being clear: the casuists agreed with the
prophets that abortion is a grave moral wrong. They did not, however,
begin their reflections from that stance. They began with the casus, the
particular case or question to be decided, and worked from there. And
that case or question was whom to vote for as the next President of the
United States. In approaching this question, they applied a multi-tiered
system of action-guides, in the manner that casuists typically do. For exam-
ple, CardinalJoseph Ratzinger issued a statement to the American bishops
indicating that Catholics were to deliberate about whether or not to vote
for a politician who is pro-choice in accordance with the longstanding ma-
trix governing what is labeled by the Catholic moral tradition "coopera-
tion with evil."84 This matrix, given its first definitive formulation by St.
84. See Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Memo on Communion Principles, July 21,
2004, http://www.archden.org/dcr/news.php?e=89&s=1&a=2134. Ratzinger
wrote:
A Catholic would be guilty of formal cooperation in evil, and so unworthy
to present himself for holy Communion, if he were to deliberately vote
for a candidate precisely because of the candidate's permissive stand on
abortion and/or euthanasia. When a Catholic does not share a candi-
date's stand in favor of abortion and/or euthanasia, but votes for that
candidate for other reasons, it is considered remote material coopera-
tion, which can be permitted in the presence of proportionate reasons.
Id. The memo, which was leaked to the Italian press and was not officially released
by Ratzinger's office, generated a great deal of controversy. SeeJerry Filteau, Cardi-
nal McCarrick Says Leaked Ratzinger Memo Is Not the Whole Stoiy, July 6, 2004, http://
www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/cns/0403723.htm (purporting that leaked
memo was not complete and not reflective of Ratzinger's official position); John
Thavis, Memo on Politicians Touches Nerve in U.S. Campaign, Sept. 17, 2004, http://
www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/cns/0405112.htm (discussing controversy
caused by leaked memo). Those who adopted a prophetic view toward abortion
and the election attempted to cast doubt on the casuistical way of reading the
Pope's analysis that follows from his decision to employ the framework of coopera-
tion with evil. See, e.g., Joe Feurherd, Critics Charge that Washington Cardinal Misled
Bishops' Conference, NAT'L CATH. REP., Oct. 1, 2004, at 5 (accusing Cardinal McCar-
rick of inaccurately representing Ratzinger's memo). For a prophetic attempt to
contain the casuistical approach, see Frank Pavone, The Ratzinger Fiasco, http://
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Alphonsus Liguori (1696-1787) in the eighteenth century,8 5 constitutes
the high water mark of the tradition in casuistical reasoning developed by
the Roman Catholic moral tradition. 8 6
How far, if at all, should we design or alter our own plans of action to
avoid their conscription into the morally objectionable plans of another?
The analytical matrix of cooperation with evil attempts to provide moral
guidance to an agent who contemplates performing an action, morally
good or neutral in itself, which he or she foresees will contribute to the
wrongful action of another agent. The Dominican moralist Anthony
Fisher summarizes the fundamental issue at stake in cooperation:
Though co-operating in the [wrongful] project, the agent in
question is not the one most directly involved, conceiving, insti-
gating, directing, coordinating, and actually engineering the op-
eration. Rather, she is in a secondary or subordinate role to the
principal agent(s) and contributes something which facilitates
the wrongdoing of the principal agent(s). What she wants to
know is how close she can properly get to taking part, without
becoming, as it were, an accessory, a conspirator. How involved
can she be without being tainted by it?87
After its formulation by St. Alphonsus, the matrix for analyzing coop-
eration with evil was developed and refined for over two centuries by the
moral manualists--Catholic scholars who wrote manuals to assist their fel-
low priests in hearing confessions by categorizing the nature and gravity of
priestsforlife.org/columns/columns2OO4/04-09-13theratzingerfiasco.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 20, 2006) (addressing controversy surrounding memo).
85. See my summary of the analytical matrix of cooperation with evil in M.
Cathleen Kaveny, Appropriation of Evil: Cooperation's Mirror Image, 61 THEOLOGICAL
STUD. 280, 282-86 (2000).
86. Sed melius cum aliis dicendum illam esse formalem quae concurrit
ad malam voluntatem alterius, et nequit esse sine peccato: materialem
vero illam quae concurrit tantum ad malum actionem alterius, praeter
intentionem cooperantis. Haec autem est licita, quando per se actio est
bona vel indifferens; et quando adest iusta causa et proprtionata ad gravi-
tatem peccati alterius; et ad proximitatem concursus qui praestatur ad
peccati exsecutionem. Ratio, quia cum tu praestas actionem indiffer-
entern sine prava intentione, si aliter illa abuti voluerit ad suum pec-
cadum exequendum, non teneris nisi ex charitate illud impedire; et quia
charitas non obligat cum gravi incommodo, ideo ponens tuam coopera-
tionem cum iusta causa, non peccas: tunc enim peccatum illius non
provenit ex cooperatione tua, sed ex malitia ipsius qui tua actione
abutitur.
ALPHONSUS LicuoI, THEOLOGIA MoRALis, bk. II, sec. 63 (1879). I do not mean to
suggest that St. Alphonsus was the first to consider the problem; in fact, he
brought a certain amount of clarity to a debate that was already well underway. See
Roger Roy, C.S.S.R., La Cooperation Selon Saint Alphonse de Liguori, 6 STUDIA
MORALIA 377 (1968).
87. Anthony Fisher, Co-Operation in Evil, CATH. MED. Q., Feb., 1994, at 15.
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the wide variety of specific sins the Catholic laity were likely to confess. 88
One would frame the question of abortion and the election in terms of the
cooperation matrix as follows: "Can an adult citizen cast a vote for John
Kerry in the 2004 presidential election, in view of Kerry's unwavering sup-
port of abortion rights?" As the question is framed, then, by voting for
Kerry, the voter will be cooperating in the evil consisting of the widespread
practice of abortion in the United States.
Not all cooperation with evil, however, is wrongful.89 In fact, the ma-
trix developed by the moral manualists for analyzing cases of cooperation
with evil is characterized by extremely nuanced distinctions. First, the
framework rules out formal cooperation, which is defined as contributing to
a wrongdoer's act precisely with the intention of helping him or her to
accomplish it. In this case, the prohibition of formal cooperation would
rule out voting for a pro-choice politician with the precise goal or inten-
tion of maintaining a regime of legal abortion. And indeed, Cardinal
Ratzinger explicitly said as much.90
Material cooperation, however, is another matter. In this case, it would
be material cooperation to vote for a pro-choice politician not intending
to support abortion rights, but foreseeing that one's vote might contribute
to that result. According to the Catholic tradition, material cooperation is
sometimes permissible, sometimes not, according to an elaborate matrix
that considers the gravity of the evil at stake, the importance of other
goods at stake, the contribution that the cooperator's act makes to the
occurrence of the evil, and how closely the act of the cooperator is con-
nected with the evil act to which it contributes. There has long been con-
siderable debate and discussion among Catholic moralists about where to
draw the lines in cases of material cooperation. 91
88. Examples of cooperation cases discussed by the manualists include the
following: Can a taxi driver bring a customer to an address that he knows to be a
brothel? Can a worker contribute to United Way when a portion of the funds will
support Planned Parenthood? Can a taxpayer pay her taxes when she knows that
some of the money will be used to support an unjust war? See generally Kaveny,
supra note 85, at 283-84.
89. This is an aspect of Catholic moral teaching that both Archbishop Chaput
and Archbishop Burke failed to communicate, if not to grasp, in their early com-
munications with the press. For a discussion of the viewpoints of Archbishops
Chaput and Burke, see supra note 82.
90. For a discussion of the Ratzinger memo, see supra note 84 and accompa-
nying text.
91. It was observed in one well-respected pre-Vatican II manual:
In estimating the sufficiency of the excuse for material co-operation, we
must consider the spiritual character and needs of another, our relations
to him, what and how great is his offence against God, the harm that may
accrue to a third person, the public harm likely to ensue, how close the
co-operation, how indispensable it may be. So many factors enter into all
questions of material co-operation, that only the most general principles
can be laid down. Great varieties of opinion, therefore, on any given case
except the most obvious, are inevitable, and there is no more difficult
question than this in the whole range of Moral Theology.
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As the Ratzinger memo suggests, voting for a pro-choice politician
without intending to further the practice of abortion qualifies as "remote
material cooperation" in evil. Remote material cooperation is the most
attenuated type of cooperation categorized by the manualist tradition, and
therefore is subject to the most lenient standard of justification. 92 As Car-
dinal Ratzinger notes, that standard has frequently been articulated by the
manualists as "proportionate reason."
93
What is "proportionate reason"? The meaning of the term is notori-
ously nebulous. 94 In essence, it requires a balancing test: the graver the
wrongful act, and the closer the connection between the act of coopera-
HENRY DAVIs, S.J., 1 MORAL AND PASTORAL THEOLOGY 342 (6th ed. 1958).
92. It is of great importance to distinguish between formal co-operation
in another's sin and material co-operation. The former is always sinful,
the latter not always so. Again, some material co-operation in the sinful
act of another is permissible, but it is important to distinguish between
immediate and mediate, proximate and remote co-operation, since a
more serious excuse is required for immediate than for mediate co-opera-
tion, as also for proximate than for remote.
Id. at 341.
93. Id.; see EDWIN F. HEALY, MORAL GUIDANCE 47 (rev. ed. 1960) ("Material
cooperation with another's evil act is allowed when one has a proportionate reason
for so acting. To have a proportionate reason means that, in this particular case,
the good effects balance the evil effects that result from the cooperation.").
94. Germain Grisez writes:
If material cooperation is not excluded as an occasion of sin, the problem
is that one's own interests in doing what constitutes material cooperation
are more or less in conflict with the interests of others who will suffer bad
side effects. In such cases, the Golden Rule ["Do unto others as you
would have them do unto you"] provides the test.
GERMAIN GRISEZ, 2 THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS: LIVING A CHRISTIAN LWE 442
(1993). Unfortunately, this way of framing the question, very common in the
older manuals, suggests that the conflict at issue is only or primarily between one's
own legitimate self-interest and the interest of third parties. The doctrine of coop-
eration has also been applied to cases where one is considering a conflict among
the legitimate interests of different groups of third parties. Nonetheless, the list of
questions Grisez poses to assist in assessing the moral acceptability of material co-
operation is very helpful, and does not suffer from the "framing" issue I just
identified:
Is there a morally acceptable option other than doing the act and materi-
ally cooperating, on the one hand, and, on the other, simply omitting the
act so as to avoid the side effects? Plainly, someone who cannot fulfill
some important responsibility except by materially cooperating with an-
other's wrongdoing has more reason to do so than someone with a mor-
ally acceptable alternative.
What kind of loss or harm will result from the wrong act in which one
would materially cooperate, how extensive will it be, how certain is it to
occur, and who will suffer it?
What other bad side effects will follow from doing the action that involves
materially cooperation? What kind of loss or harm will result from them,
how extensive, how certain, and who will suffer it?
What kind of loss or harm will result from forgoing the otherwise good
act, how extensive, how certain, and who will suffer it?
If one does not materially cooperate, will that prevent the wrong? Or will
the wrongdoer nevertheless be able and likely to act?
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tion and the wrongful act, the stronger the set of reasons needs to be in
favor of going forward with the act of cooperation.
What shapes one's assessment of "proportionate reason" regarding a
vote for President? What is required here is a full range of deliberation
about who would be the best President of the United States, the leader of
the only remaining superpower on Earth. First and foremost, a voter
needs to remember that he or she is electing a person, not a platform.
One needs to consider the character, skills and temperament of the candi-
dates for office; one has also to consider the character, skills and tempera-
ment of those they are likely to choose as their closest advisors. What
degree of the virtue of prudence do they possess? For many Catholic casu-
ists, Bush's record during his first term disqualified him on these grounds.
For example, before the election, it became impossible to deny the fact
that Bush's two major reasons for going to war against Iraq (to combat al-
Qaeda and to neutralize Saddam Hussein's alleged supply of weapons of
mass destruction) were seriously flawed, if not entirely specious. Revela-
tions of the torture and abuse of prisoners in American custody, as well as
the memos that justified such torture and abuse, called into question
Bush's commitment to the laws of war and the commitment to human
dignity they instantiate. On that basis, some Catholic casuists concluded
that Bush had conclusively demonstrated that he lacked the practical wis-
dom and moral judgment to serve as Commander-in-Chief.9 5
Second, one needs to consider the evil that is prompting the invoca-
tion of the matrix of cooperation. Catholic casuists recognized that the
abortion issue must be given due weight; they do not dispute Cardinal
Ratzinger's judgment that the over 1.5 million abortions performed per
year under the national regime of legalized abortion inaugurated by Roe is
Because mercy is the justice of the kingdom, a Christian reflection before applying
the Golden Rule brings fully into play the specific claims of love. Hence, in consid-
ering various losses and harms, one always should ask:
Does this loss or harm involve a probable and avoidable risk to anyone's
salvation? For instance, if the wrongdoer is not in good faith and mate-
rial cooperation is avoided, is he or she likely to repent and reform?
Will accepting this loss or harm seriously impede one from finding, ac-
cepting, or in some respect fulfilling one's personal vocation?
Will accepting it impair the witness that should be given by oneself or
one's community to God's truth and love?
Id. at 442-43. It should be noted that unlike traditional manualists (and unlike
Cardinal Ratzinger), Grisez does not put any weight on the distinction between
various types of material cooperation. In contrast, I have argued that those distinc-
tions are helpful, and can be intelligibly situated within a virtue theory approach to
morality such as that of Aquinas. See Kaveny, supra note 85, at 304-07.
95. "1 voted for George W. Bush and I'm heartily sorry now. My support was
motivated by prolife convictions, but so is my present dismay.... [O]ur present
policies, now dubbed the Bush Doctrine, are morally suspect and prudentially dis-
astrous." Sidney Callahan, A Prolife Case Against Bush, COMMONWEAL, June 4, 2004,
at 15.
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a pressing moral issue.9 6 Yet they did not believe that this issue, consid-
ered by itself, pointed toward a vote for George Bush. They questioned
whether Bush actually intended to ensure that Roe would be overruled.
They pointed out that Republicans had been running on an anti-Roe plat-
form for nearly thirty years, and that Republican appointments to the Su-
preme Court had supported Roe, at least in its core. 97 Furthermore, they
noted that in the event that Roe was to be overturned, decisions about the
legality of abortion would be returned to the states, the majority of which
would legalize the procedure.9 8 Catholic casuists judged that in a situa-
tion in which abortion was likely to remain legal for the foreseeable fu-
ture, John Kerry's social policies were likely to make it possible for more
women to choose childbirth rather than abortion. 99
96. "In 2002, 1.29 million abortions took place, down from an estimated 1.36
million in 1996." Alan Guttmacher Institute, Induced Abortion in the United States
(2005), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fbinduced abortion.html.
97. The legality of abortion will not change under either a second Bush ad-
ministration or a Kerry administration. Republicans have paid lip service-and
sometimes more-to the idea of overturning Roe v. Wade through antiabortion
Supreme Court nominees. They were wrong about Sandra Day O'Connor, wrong
about Anthony Kennedy, and wrong about David Souter-Republican Supreme
Court nominees who have supported Roe. This Charlie Brown-and-the-football
routine notwithstanding, the notion that an anti-Roe nominee would make it
through the Senate confirmation process, or that Bush would even nominate such
a person, is an extreme long shot.
Editorial, Politics, Piety, and the Catholic Vote, NAT'L CATH. REP., Apr. 30, 2004, at
24.
98. The Center for Reproductive Rights estimated that twenty-one states are
at "high risk" of banning abortion, nine states at "medium risk," and in twenty
states abortion rates are secure. It is in the interest of pro-choice groups, in my
view, to overestimate the number of states who will restrict abortion, as well as the
severity of the restrictions that will be adopted. See CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE
RIGHTS, WHAT IF ROE FELL? (Sept. 2004), http://www.crlp.org/pdf/
bo_whatifroefell.pdf (outlining state-by-state consequences if Supreme Court over-
rules Roe).
99. According to a recent study, women with incomes below 200% of poverty
made up 30% of all women of reproductive age, but accounted for 57% of the
abortions in 2000. Abortion rates decreased as women's income increased, from
44 per 1,000 pregnancies among poor women to 10 per 1,000 among the highest-
income women. Adjusting for different pregnancy rates, it is still the case that
high income women are the least likely to abort their pregnancies (15%), and
poor and low-income women were the most likely to do so (33%). Furthermore,
only one in six women who had an abortion was married. Nearly one in five wo-
men who had an abortion was a teenager; about half of them were younger than
twenty-five. See Rachel K. Jones et al., Patterns in the Socioeconomic Characteristics of
Women Obtaining Abortions in 2000-2001, 34 PERSP. ON SEXUAL AND REPROD. HEALTH
226-35 (2002) (connecting womens' socioeconomic characteristics with their likeli-
hood to pursue abortions). The investigators are associated with the Alan
Guttmacher Institute, a research center affiliated with Planned Parenthood Feder-
ation of America. Nonetheless, a Harvard Law School Professor and prominent
Catholic lay woman made essentially the same point fifteen years earlier. MARY A.
GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAw 59-60 (1987).
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Third, in choosing a candidate, Catholic casuists considered a wide
range of issues pertaining to human dignity and the common good. 100
These included not only the war in Iraq, the war on terror (including the
Bush administration's attempt at justifying torture in order to prosecute
the war on terror) and other issues of war and peace, but questions of
social justice and solidarity, such as the fate of social security and other
social welfare programs, the impact of the tax structure on the most vul-
nerable and the fate of illegal immigrants and other vulnerable popula-
tions under American law. In addition to abortion, other life issues were
relevant, such as euthanasia and stem cell research, capital punishment
and the protection and promotion of marriage and family life. On each of
these issues, casuists were inclined not merely to focus on the existence of
the morally relevant negative prohibition (e.g., a law prohibiting euthana-
sia), but to consider whether the relevant positive support structures were
also in place (e.g., sufficient public funding to care for impoverished eld-
erly). To insure the well-being of vulnerable populations, it is not suffi-
cient to ensure they are not harmed; by definition, a vulnerable person is
in need of the aid and comfort of others.'0 1
For many Catholic casuists who voted for Kerry, the judgment came
down to this: based on the evidence provided by his first term in office, a
second Bush term was seen as highly likely to inflict a new range of injus-
tice and suffering upon the nation and upon the world, while unlikely to
reduce the ongoing injustice of legalized abortion-on-demand. In con-
100. For representative examples of the Catholic casuist position supporting a
vote forJohn Kerry, see Callahan, supra note 95, at 17 (regretting having voted for
George Bush); Margaret O'Brien Steinfels, Time to Choose: Voting with a Catholic
Conscience, COMMONWEAL, Oct. 22, 2004, at 10 (concluding that John Kerry would
be no worse than George Bush from Catholic perspectives). See alsoJohn Langan,
S.J., Conscience and Controversy: Twelve Observations About Abortion and Politics, http://
www.avemarialaw.edu/news/Events/conferences/abortion2.pdf (presenting ob-
servations about relationship between abortion and politics). Langan's paper was
delivered at a conference entitled Public Witness/Public Scandal, sponsored by
Ave Maria Law School and held in Washington, D.C. on September 16, 2004. An-
other paper advocating a casuistical approach delivered at the same conference is
Monika K. Hellwig, Cultural, Social and Political Implications of the Controversy, http://
www.avemarialaw.edu/news/Events/conferences/AveMariaConfMHellwig.pdf
(last visited May 24, 2006). The papers of the other presenters (Gerard Bradley,
John Coughlin, O.F.M., and Robert George) are also available online at http://
www.avemarialaw.edu/news/Events/conferences/papers.cfm (last visited Feb. 20,
2006). For a compelling articulation of a casuistical approach conjoined with a
sympathetic description of the prophetic approach, see Mark Sargent, Election
2004: Respect for Life Issues, Oct. 26, 2004, http://www.mirrorofjustice.com/mir-
rorofjustice/sargent/election2004.pdf (advocating caution when selecting presi-
dential candidates). I myself also adopted a casuistical approach to the question of
voting in the election. See M. Cathleen Kaveny, Response to Russ Hittinger (and, Infer-
entially, to Greg Sisk, Gerry Bradley, Robert George, and Others), Oct. 29, 2004, http://
www.mirrorofjustice.com/mirrorofjustice/2004/10/cathy-kavenys-r.html (dis-
cussing considerations in selecting appropriate choice for President).
101. I make this point more extensively in M. Cathleen Kaveny, How Views of
Law Influence the Pro-Life Movement, 34 OIGINs 560 (2005).
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trast, while Kerry's position on the legal status of abortion was troubling in
the extreme, Catholic casuists did not see him as any more likely actually
to exacerbate the problem than Bush was actually to ameliorate it. At the
same time, Kerry was seen as likely to do less damage to other issues of
social justice and solidarity, locally and globally. This negative way of
phrasing the decision is deliberate: many Catholic casuists did not con-
sider themselves Democratic activists, but "hold-your-nose-and-vote-for
Kerry" citizens.
The difference between the prophetic approach and the casuistical
approach to the 2004 election can be seen in two guides that were re-
leased in order to influence the votes of serious Catholics. The casuistical
approach is represented by the 2004 Catholic Voter Guide, which is pub-
lished by the Catholic Voting Project. It takes as its centerpiece seven ten-
ets of Catholic social teaching, falling under the categories of life, family,
voting and solidarity. 10 2 The organizational framework used by the Catho-
lic Voter Guide was taken from a document produced by the U.S. Confer-
ence of Catholic Bishops to guide Catholic voters during the election,
entitled Faithful Citizenship: A Catholic Call to Political Responsibility;'0 3 more
specifically, the Catholic Voter Guide attempts to compare and contrast the
positions of the presidential candidates on over sixty issues in light of that
framework.10 4 The Catholic Voter Guide does not, however, attempt to or-
der the issues in a lexical ranking that would result in a clear decision for
one candidate. Nor, for that matter, does Faithful Citizenship. Both docu-
ments are guides to discernment, not a program for decision-making.
In contrast, the Catholic Answers group, which presents itself as de-
voted to Catholic apologetics from a conservative perspective, prepared
the Voter's Guide for Serious Catholics,10 5 ("Guide") which corresponds to the
more prophetic approach to the question of abortion and the election.
This guide asserts that there are five "non-negotiable" issues in the elec-
tion: abortion, euthanasia, embryonic stem cell research, human cloning
and same-sex marriage. 10 6 Consistent with a prophetic sensibility, the
102. See generally Catholic Voting Project, 2004 Catholic Voter Guide, http://
www.votingcatholic.org (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
103. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, Faithful Citizenship: A Catholic Call to
Political Responsibility (2003), http://www.usccb.org/faithfulcitizenship/
faithfulcitizenship03.pdf.
104. See generally Catholic Voting Project, supra note 102.
105. See Catholic Answers, Voter's Guide for Serious Catholics (2004), http://
www.priestsforlife.org/elections/voterguide.htm. Catholic Answers is run by Karl
Keating, an attorney who has no formal theological training.
106. Id. No authority is cited for the proposition that these are "non-negotia-
ble" issues for voters in the sense used in the guide; in fact, there is no such cate-
gory in official Church teaching. As I hope to have demonstrated above, Cardinal
Ratzinger's memo suggests a far more flexible casuistical approach to the decision.
Could the prophets have found some ground for their absolutist arguments in
traditional casuistry? Possibly. Some of the moral manuals state that " [m]aterial
co-operation with the sin of another that will do great harm to Church or State is
never lawful . . . ." DAvis, supra note 91, at 342. One manual gives the example
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Guide focuses on the absolute nature of the moral wrong at stake. "These
five current issues concern actions that are intrinsically evil and must
never be promoted by the law. Intrinsically evil actions are those which
fundamentally conflict with the moral law and can never be deliberately
performed under any circumstances." 10 7 The Guide goes on to instruct
Catholics to cast their votes overwhelmingly in accordance with their
stands on these five non-negotiable issues. More specifically, the Guide di-
rects Catholics not to vote for a candidate who is preferable on a "lesser"
issue if his or her stance on a "non-negotiable" issue is unacceptable.' 0 8
The Guide does not suggest that the likelihood that a candidate's stance on
any issue will make a concrete difference to the status quo should be given
any consideration whatsoever. The only time that a voter is allowed to
compromise is when all candidates for a particular office hold an unac-
ceptable position on the "non-negotiable" issues. While the Guide does
not explicitly tell voters to vote for George W. Bush instead of John Kerry,
there can be no doubt that its criteria logically compelled just such a
result.1 0 9
that it is impermissible to vote for a Communist running for President of the
United States, saying that "any cooperative action of voting for him would help on
an action that is gravely injurious to the state, and so it would not be allowed."
HFALY, supra note 93, at 42. One could imagine this argument being extended to a
firmly pro-choice candidate such as John Kerry. Yet the basis for the extension
would be unsound. A careful reading of the manuals reveals that their focus in
these examples is cooperating with evil in a way which prefers one's own private
good to the common good. What is at stake, however, in the debate over whether
a good Catholic can vote for John Kerry is precisely which candidate furthers the
common good.
107. Catholic Answers, supra note 105. This analysis does not comport with
traditional Catholic moral theology. The term "intrinsic evil," which finds its home
within the realm of casuistry, refers to the reason that an act is wrong (they are
wrong "ex objecto"-by reason of the object or immediate purpose of the acting
agent, not because of the broader circumstances under which the agent performs
that act), not to the degree that an act is wrong. Some intrinsically evil acts (e.g.,
telling a jocose lie) are far less serious than acts which are evil by reason of their
circumstance (e.g., dropping a bomb on a bunker containing one lone enemy
private, foreseeing but not intending the death of 1000 schoolchildren lined up
for food). In essence, Catholic Answers is here giving a "prophetic" interpretation
of a casuistical term.
108. See id. The Guide states:
Do not vote for candidates who are right on lesser issues but who will vote
wrongly on key moral issues. One candidate may have a record of voting
in line with Catholic values except, say, for euthanasia. Such a voting
record is a clear signal that the candidate should not be chosen by a Cath-
olic voter, unless the other candidates have voting records even less in
accord with these moral norms.
Id.
109. See id. The Guide makes no mention of Faithful Citizenship, the guide to
voting produced by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, which may be
found supra note 103.
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3. The Tension Between Prophets and Casuists
How do the practitioners of these two modes of moral discourse view
each other? As the rhetoric surrounding abortion in the context of the
2004 presidential election demonstrates, not very well. Let us begin with
how the prophets view the casuists. First, the prophets' radicality means
that they tend to adopt an "if you are not for us, you are against us" ap-
proach. The prophets view anything short of full agreement, both with
respect to ultimate values and with respect to strategy, as a betrayal of the
duty to offer uncompromising witness to the truth. More specifically, the
prophets tend to view casuistical approaches, even with respect to strategy,
as demonstrating an inadequate understanding of the enormity of the
problem of abortion, both with regard to the number of unborn lives
taken, and with regard to the particular horror involved in the taking of
completely innocent, vulnerable life.
Second, many prophets seem to have more respect for the radical
prophets of the opposition than they do for the casuists on their own side,
whom they view at best as morally blind, and at worst as morally disingenu-
ous. Radical pro-choice prophets mirror and reinforce the pro-life
prophets' belief in the centrality of the abortion issue to the fundamental
moral character of our community.
Third, prophets are impatient with, and often disdainful of, the intri-
cacies of argument in which the casuists engage. Prophets see casuists as
"rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic," 1 0 when what is required is
an immediate and radical turn in course.
How do the casuists view the prophets? Not much more favorably
than the prophets view the casuists. First, the casuists find the prophets'
radicalism deeply troubling. Their concern with one issue, and the identi-
fication of that issue with the moral health of the country, is seen by casu-
ists as a drastic oversimplification of the moral issues at stake in the
election. In addition, their commitment to an "all or nothing" attitude
toward that issue is seen as foreclosing the possibility of incremental
improvement.
Second, on the surface, casuists may seem to have more respect for
prophets than vice versa; casuists see prophets as performing an important
hortatory function, reminding us all about the transcendent importance
of certain values. But scratch the surface, and there is more than a little
condescension and wariness: Casuists tend to view the commitment of
prophets as the immature passion of youth; it is harmless when tightly
cabined on a college campus, but dangerous when allowed to threaten the
basic structures of society.
Third, if prophets see casuists as rearranging the deck chairs on the
Titanic, casuists see prophets as expecting God Himself to turn the ship to
avoid the iceberg. Casuists see prophets as engaging in a form of self-
110. GUSTAFSON, supra note 11, at 9.
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indulgence: Mesmerized by the power of their own rhetoric of condemna-
tion, they excuse themselves from the hard work of designing and imple-
menting a workable plan for ameliorating the evil which they condemn.
4. Choosing Between Prophecy and Casuistry
How, then, do people of good will decide whether to adopt a pro-
phetic or a casuistical approach to a particular issue? The obvious rejoin-
der to this question is to cast doubt upon its presuppositions. Perhaps the
use of prophetic style or casuistical style is not a matter of "decision" at all.
Perhaps it is a matter of intellectual personality; some people are more
drawn to one style, some to the other, by their intellectual temperament
and academic training.
Yet, to gain even a minimal hearing, would-be prophets need to
choose an issue that is worthy of their rhetoric. It is, of course, not logi-
cally impossible to address every question of the slightest moral signifi-
cance within a prophetic framework. One could attempt to cast each and
every decision, no matter how small, as an essential battle in the war be-
tween Good and Evil. At the same time, however, some concentration of
effort and attention upon issues of particular importance seems pragmati-
cally wise. How do moralists who are open to engagement in prophetic
rhetoric decide which issues upon which to concentrate their fire? Obvi-
ously, the issue must be seen as highly significant by the would-be prophet.
Yet significance is not enough. No one denies, for example, that the
deeds of serial killers such as Ted Bundy are horrendous. Yet they are
seen (rightly or wrongly) as social and cultural aberrations, which our soci-
ety firmly rejects and punishes. In addition to being significant, therefore,
an issue deemed worthy of prophetic attention must seem to crystallize a
fundamental moral or spiritual flaw in our society. By demanding that the
society look upon that issue in all its stark horror, the prophet attempts to
force the society to see itself for what it really is, and therefore to move
toward repentance and reform of life.
Abortion and torture, of course, are both issues which can easily qual-
ify as worthy of prophetic attention from American Christians and
Catholics. Moreover, there are obvious ways of linking them together for
purposes of prophetic argument. For example, the requirements of both
the "culture of life" approach proposed by PopeJohn Paul II in Evangelium
Vitae11 and the "consistent ethic of life" approach advocated by Cardinal
111. See POPE JOHN PAUL II, supra note 62. Evangelium Vitae begins with the
passage from the Second Vatican Council: "Whatever is opposed to life itself, such
as any type of murder, genocide, abortion, euthanasia, or wilffull self-destruction,
whatever violates the integrity of the human person, such as mutilation, torments
inflicted on body or mind, attempts to coerce the will itse'f... all these things and
others like them are infamies indeed." Id. 70 (quoting POPE PAUL VI, VATICAN II,
GAUDIUM ET SPES, 1 27 (1965)). Furthermore, there is no reason to think that
Pope John Paul II's remarks about the responsibilities of a democracy with respect
to laws permitting abortion would not also apply to laws permitting torture:
[Vol. 51: p. 499
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Bernardin 12 would support such a linkage. At the same time, both issues
are, in principle, susceptible to casuistical reflection. One avenue of such
reflection focuses on the acts themselves. What precisely, constitutes the
prohibited act of "abortion" or "torture"? Why, precisely, are such acts
wrong? Are there legitimate exceptions to the prohibition, given the defi-
nition of the relevant act? A second avenue of reflection focuses on the
appropriate societal response to these actions. Should they be criminal-
ized? Discouraged in other ways? Why? How should disputes about their
definition and legitimacy, especially in so-called "hard cases," affect their
legal status?
Reviewing the discussion during the time immediately surrounding
the election, it is striking that many American Christians, including many
American Catholics, did not apply the same style of discourse with respect
to both issues. Many of those who took a prophetic stand with respect to
voting and abortion sympathized with a more casuistical approach with
respect to President Bush's policies on the applicability of the Geneva
Conventions and the definition of torture, or at least remained silent
about the atrocities. Conversely, those who were more vocal in advocating
a casuistical approach to voting and abortion were more prophetic about
the administration's willingness to rethink the definition and the restraints
on torture in order to win the War on Terror. Before continuing our
Democracy cannot be idolized to the point of making it a substitute for
morality or a panacea for immorality .... Its "moral" value is not auto-
matic, but depends on conformity to the moral law to which it, like every
other form of human behavior, must be subject: in other words, its moral-
ity depends on the morality for the ends which it pursues and of the
means which it employs .... Of course, values such as the dignity of every
human person, respect for inviolable and inalienable human rights, and
the adoption of the "common good" as the end and criterion regulating
political life are certainly fundamental and not to be ignored.
Id.
112. See Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, A Consistent Ethic of Life: Continuing the
Dialogue, in CONSIsTENT ETHIC OF LIFE 12, 17 (Thomas G. Fuechtmann ed., 1988).
Torture was not even on the horizon as a debatable issue at the time Joseph Cardi-
nal Bernardin formulated his "consistent ethic of life"-nuclear deterrence was
the primary issue pertaining to military security, while capital punishment was the
primary "life issue" involving life that was not obviously "innocent." Nonetheless,
torture could easily be incorporated as a concern into the "consistent ethic of life."
Bernardin writes:
Abortion is taking life in ever growing numbers in our society. Those
concerned about it, I believe, will find their case enhanced by taking note
of the rapidly expanding use of public execution. In a similar way, those
who are particularly concerned about these executions, even if the ac-
cused has taken another life, should recognize the elementary truth that
a society which can be indifferent to the innocent life of an unborn child
will not be easily stirred to concern for a convicted criminal. There is, I
maintain, a political and psychological linkage among the life issues-
from war to welfare concerns-which we ignore at our own peril; a sys-
temic vision of life seeks to expand the moral imagination of a society,
not partition it into airtight categories.
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more general reflections on the use and limitations of the two types of
discourse, it will be helpful to consider the discussion of torture arising
out of the Bush administration's prosecution of that war.
B. Torture, Prophecy and Casuistry
1. Introduction
Needless to say, the debate over the appropriate American stance to-
ward torture has not been developed as extensively or as deeply as the
debate over our nation's appropriate stance toward abortion. Although
academics have long discussed the definition of torture, the harm it causes
and the circumstances (if any) under which it might be justified, torture
was not a topic that captured the attention of the American public until
the spring of 2004. That time period saw three distinct but not unrelated
events: the exposure of atrocities committed by American soldiers at Abu
Ghraib Prison, the emerging worries about the treatment of prisoners at
the American detention center at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and the declas-
sification of memos written by high officials in the legal arm of the Bush
administration, which argued that prisoners held on terrorism-related
charges were entitled to diminished legal protections against torture and
other forms of mistreatment.' 1 3 The debate over torture came to a head
in December 2004 and January 2005 around the congressional hearings to
confirm Alberto Gonzales as Attorney General of the United States. 11 4 As
Bush's White House Counsel, Gonzalez had endorsed and defended the
administration's justification of torture.
As actually conducted in the fall of 2004, the debate over the role of
torture in the War on Terror was not precisely parallel to the debate over
abortion and the election that I described above. As I noted above, the
two cases raised many of the same moral questions on a theoretical level:
1) What constitutes the proper definition of the prohibited act?; 2) When,
if ever, is the prohibited act, properly defined, justified?; 3) What is the
appropriate legal stance toward the act?; and 4) When, if ever, should a
morally serious person vote for a candidate who adopts a defective moral
or jurisprudential stance toward the act in question?
The energy in the debate over abortion in fall 2004 centered around
the fourth question-whether a vote for John Kerry in the presidential
election was morally justifiable, given his stance on abortion. In contrast,
the controversy over torture spent at least as much attention on the first
three questions. This debate was about what counts as impermissible treat-
ment of enemy prisoners, and more particularly, what constitutes torture.
113. See supra note 54.
114. Gonzales was approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee on January
26, 2005. See Eric Lichtblau, Senate Panel Approves Gonzales on a Party-Line Vote, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2005, at A21. He was confirmed by the Senate on February 3, 2005.
See Eric Lichtblau, Gonzales Is Confirmed in a Closer Vote than Expected, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 4, 2005, at A13.
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It was about the development and defense of moral categories, particularly
"negative moral absolutes"-how to define the set of actions that is never
permissible.
2. The Torture Memos
In early 2005, Cambridge University Press published a 1249-page vol-
ume entitled The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib.115 The volume
contains a wealth of documentation, including the main memos providing
a legal justification for Bush administration policy toward the treatment of
incarcerated Taliban and al-Qaeda forces. Two memos in particular are
worth particular scrutiny, both of which were written by assistant attorney
general Jay Bybee to White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales.1 1 6 The first
of these is dated January 22, 2002 and entitled "Application of Treatise
115. See THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 68. The title asserts a connection
between the policy of the Bush administration with respect to torture and sus-
pected terrorists, on the one hand, and the brutal mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners,
on the other. That assertion is supported by some of the reports contained
therein. For example, the independent panel charged by the Department of De-
fense to investigate the abuses notes:
Operation Iraqi Freedom is wholly different from Operation Enduring
Freedom [i.e., the battle against terrorism]. It is an operation that clearly
falls within the boundaries of the Geneva Conventions and the traditional
law of war. From the very beginning of the campaign, none of the senior
leadership or command considered any possibility other than that the
Geneva Conventions applied.
The message in the field, or the assumptions made in the field, at times
lost sight of this underpinning. Personnel familiar with the law of war
determinations for OEF in Afghanistan tended to factor those determina-
tions in to the decision-making for military operations in Iraq. Law of war
policy and decisions germane to OEF migrated, often quite innocently,
into decision matrices for OIF. W noted earlier the migration of interro-
gation techniques from Afghanistan to Iraq. Those interrogation tech-
niques were authorized only for OEF. More important, their
authorization in Afghanistan and Guantanamo was possible only because
the President had determined that individuals subject to these interroga-
tion techniques fell outside the strict protections of the Geneva
Conventions.
The Schlesinger Report (Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention
Operations), Aug. 2004, in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 68, at 948-49.
116. At the time both memos were written, Bybee was head of the Office of
Legal Counsel, an office which was traditionally understood as providing disinter-
ested legal advice to the Attorney General and to the President of the United
States. On March 13, 2003, his appointment to serve as a judge on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was confirmed by the United States
Senate. The nomination generated controversy over Gonzales's position on tor-
ture. See, e.g., Excerpts from Judiciaty Committee Hearing On Attorney General Nominee,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 7, 2005, at A18; David Johnston & Neil Lewis, Bush's Counsel Sought
Ruling About Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2005, at Al; Neil A. Lewis, Ex-Military Law-
yers Object to Bush Cabinet Nominee, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2004, at A36; Eric Lichtblau,
Gonzales Speaks Against Torture During Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2005, at Al.
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and Laws to al-Qaeda and Taliban Detainees."' 17 The second, dated Au-
gust 1, 2002, is entitled "Standards of Conduct for Interrogation."1 18
Both memos employ casuistical reasoning in order to justify a policy
which would drastically reduce the legal strictures protecting captured
members of the Taliban and al-Qaeda against harsh treatment by their
American captors.1 19 Their overarching goal is to clear away any legal ob-
stacles under international law or American law that would in any way im-
pede President Bush's freedom to control the interrogation of prisoners
captured in the War on Terror. Consequently, the memos belong to the
genre of legal advocacy rather than to that of scholarly investigation.
More specifically, their author, Jay Bybee, deploys casuistry as a tool to
further the objectives of the President of the United States, who stands in
the role of Bybee's client. Bybee does not treat the legal sources that he
analyzes, including the Geneva Conventions, as a source of moral wisdom
with which to illuminate a difficult decision; he does not interpret the let-
ter of the laws governing treatment of enemy prisoners according to its
animating moral spirit. Nonetheless, it would be wrong to say that the
memos are devoid of moral concern. On the contrary, they treat the obli-
gation of the President to protect the citizens of the United States against
terrorism not only as morally imperative, but also as overriding all other
moral issues. Bybee's casuistry, in other words, is not the exercise of moral
discernment in the course of practical reasoning, but is rather the deploy-
ment of a powerful analytical tool to clear away what he views as a potential
impediment to a morally and politically imperative course of action.
By intricately detailed legal analysis, the January 22 Memo argues that
the Geneva Convention protections governing treatment of prisoners of
war apply neither to the conflict with al-Qaeda 120 nor to the conflict with
the Taliban. 12 1 In brief, the January 22 Memo maintains that Geneva
Convention III, which governs the treatments of POWs, does not apply to
al-Qaeda because it is a terrorist organization and not a state actor. 12 2
117. See Jay Bybee, Memo 6: January 22, 2002 (Application of Treatises and Laws to
al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees), in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 68, at 81-117
[hereinafter Bybee, January 22 Memo]. This memo was based almost entirely on a
memo prepared by John Yoo, a Deputy Assistant Attorney General. SeeJohn You,
Memo 4: January 9, 2002 (Application of Treatises and Laws to al Quaeda and Taliban
Detainees), in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 68, at 38-79.
118. SeeJay Bybee, Memo 14: August 1, 2002 (Standards of Conduct for Interroga-
tion Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A), in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 68, at 172-
217 [hereinafter Bybee, August 1 Memo].
119. According to one article in the New York Times, the August 1, 2002 memo
was prepared in order to provide post hocjustification for harsh interrogation pro-
cedures used by the CIA on high-level al-Qaeda operatives, in particular Abu
ZuBaydah, a top aide to Osama bin Laden after his capture in April 2002. See
David Johnston & James Risen, Aides Say Memo Backed Coercion Already in Use, N.Y.
TIMES, June 27, 2004, at Al1.
120. See Bybee, January 22 Memo, supra note 117, at 89-90.
121. See id. at 90-105.
122. See id. at 89.
540 [Vol. 51: p. 499
PROPHECY AND CASUISTRY
Moreover, the members of al-Qaeda do not meet the qualifications for
POWs set forth in that Convention. 123 What about the Taliban? The Jan-
uary 22 Memo argues that Article III of the U.S. Constitution gives the
President the power unilaterally to suspend the Geneva Conventions with
respect to Afghanistan 124 or to interpret Geneva Convention III categori-
cally to say no member of the Taliban should qualify as POWs under its
provisions.1 25
Furthermore, the January 22 Memo maintains that neither al-Qaeda
nor the Taliban merit the protections of "common Article 3," which is a
provision common to all four Geneva Conventions and requires "humane
treatment" for those placed outside of combat by "sickness, wounds, deten-
tion, or any other cause." 126 The memo asserted that "common Article 3's
text provides substantial reason to think that it refers specifically to a con-
dition of civil war; or a large-scale armed conflict between a State and an
armed movement within its own territory."12 7 The American conflict with
neither al-Qaeda nor the Taliban fits that description. "Giving due weight
to the state practice and doctrinal understanding of the time, the idea of
an armed conflict between a nation-State and a transnational terrorist or-
ganization (or between a nation-State and a failed State harboring and
supporting a transnational terrorist organization) could not have been
within the contemplation of the drafters of common Article 3."128
The January 22 Memo recognizes that the President's decision to sus-
pend the Geneva Conventions may not be recognized as valid under inter-
national law. 12 9 One would think that such recognition would prompt the
author to reconsider his analysis. Instead, it triggered an expression of
defiance: "Customary international law cannot bind the President or the
123. See id. at 89-90.
124. See id. at 90-102. The memo suggested that appropriate grounds for sus-
pension might include the claim that Afghanistan under the Taliban was a "failed
state" unable to fulfill its treaty obligations.
125. See id. at 110-11. The memo also contends that if the members of the
Taliban were not protected under Article 4 of Geneva Convention III, "they would
not be entitled to the standards of treatment in common Article 3 .... Common
Article 3 ... does not serve as a catch-all provision that applies to all armed con-
flicts, but rather as a specific complement to common Article 2." Id. at 111. Arti-
cle 2 of Geneva Convention III applies to armed conflicts or declared wars between
two or more High Contracting Parties. See id. at 86. The memo argues that the
applicability of Article 2 triggers the POW provisions of Article 4 of the third Ge-
neva Convention. See id. at 90. The net effect of these contentions is that the
members of the Taliban, like the members of al-Qaeda, are entirely without protec-
tion under the Geneva Conventions.
126. See id. at 85 n.12. Before arguing that Common Article 3 does not apply,
the memo takes pains to minimize requirements; it "requires State parties to follow
only certain minimum standards of treatment toward prisoners, civilians, or the
sick and wounded-standards that are much less onerous and less detailed than
those spelled out in the Conventions as a whole." Id. at 85.
127. Id. at 86.
128. Id. at 88.
129. See id. at 102-07.
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executive branch, in any legally meaningful way, in its conduct of the war
in Afghanistan." 130 Why such a reaction? Clearly, because the intricate
arguments of the January 22, 2002 Memo were not meant to provide disin-
terested legal analysis; they were formulated as an effective means to
achieve a desired legal and political end, which became starkly apparent in
White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales'sJanuary 25, 2002 Memo to Presi-
dent George W. Bush.13 1 Defending Jay Bybee's January 22, 2002 Memo
against the criticisms of Secretary of State Colin Powell, Mr. Gonzales
bluntly highlights two advantages of determining that the Geneva Conven-
tions do not apply to the conflict. First, such a determination preserves
flexibility in fighting this "new kind of war," which places a premium on
"the ability to quickly obtain information from captured terrorists and
their sponsors in order to avoid further atrocities against American civil-
ians." 132 Second, it "substantially reduces the threat of domestic criminal
prosecution under the War Crimes Act."' 33
President Bush acceded to this advice. On February 7, 2002, he is-
sued a memorandum stating that: 1) the Geneva Conventions do not ap-
ply to al-Qaeda; 2) he, as President of the United Sates, has the authority
to suspend the Geneva Conventions as between the United States and Af-
ghanistan, but declines to exercise that authority at this time; 3) Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Convention does not apply to either al-Qaeda or to
the Taliban; and 4) Taliban detainees are "unlawful combatants" and do
not qualify as prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions; al-Qaeda
detainees also fail to qualify for that status. 134
130. Id. at 115.
131. See Alberto Gonzales, Memo 7: January 25, 2002 (Decisions Re Application of
the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban),
in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 68, at 118-21.
132. See id. at 119. Gonzales remarks: "In my judgment, this new paradigm
[of the war against terrorism] renders obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on ques-
tioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of its provisions requiring
that captured enemy be afforded such things as commissary privileges, scrip (i.e.,
advances of monthly pay), athletic uniforms, and scientific instruments." Clearly,
the United States was not worried about being able to provide athletic uniforms to
the prisoners at Guantnamo Bay. Id.
133. Id. Bybee'sJanuary 22 Memo, framed the question of the applicability of
the Geneva Conventions in terms of the strictures of the War Crimes Act (18
U.S.C. § 24441 (Supp. III 1997)), which prohibits as war crimes acts falling into
four categories, including "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions, and viola-
tions of "common Article 3." See Bybee, January 22 Memo, supra note 117, at 81, 83-
84. In so doing, in my view, it implicitly reinforces its underlying assumption that
international law is binding only to the extent it is incorporated explicitly into
American positive law. Furthermore, by focusing the analysis in terms of what acts
are criminally prohibited, rather than in terms of what acts are morally and legally
justifiable, Bybee is implicitly adopting Oliver Wendell Holmes's "bad man" theory
of the law-a theory which asks what one can get away with doing, rather than
what one ought to do.
134. See George W. Bush, Memo 11: February 7, 2002 (Humane Treatment of al
Qaeda and Taliban Detainees), in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 68, at 134-35
[hereinafter Bush, February 7 Memo]. Bush goes on to state, "As a matter of policy,
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The second memo from Mr. Bybee to Mr. Gonzales, dated August 1,
2002,135 is dedicated to enhancing the administration's ability to obtain
information pertaining to future acts of terrorism without incurring a sig-
nificant threat of domestic criminal prosecution under the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, as that Convention is implemented in federal law.136 The
cumulative effect of the memo is to encourage the President to authorize
obtaining such information by any means necessary, because a number of
factors render it highly unlikely that the interrogators will be punished for
their acts.
The memo begins by analyzing the applicable provision in the United
States Code, which makes it a crime for any person "outside the United
States to commit or attempt to commit torture."137 It elaborates on the
elements of the crime, noting in particular that to convict a defendant, the
prosecution must prove that the defendant acted with the specific intent
to cause severe physical or mental pain or suffering. 13 8 At the same time,
the memo points out that "a showing that an individual acted with a good
faith belief that his conduct would not produce the result that the law
prohibits negates specific intent."139
Next, the memo attempts to define the prohibited acts of torture as
narrowly as possible. It contends that:
[P]hysical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent in in-
tensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as
organ failure, impairment of bodily function or even death. For
purely mental pain or suffering to amount to torture. .. it must
result in significant psychological harm of significant duration,
e.g., lasting for months or years.
140
the United States Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely, and to
the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with
the principles of Geneva." Id. at 135 (emphasis added).
135. See Bybee, August 1 Memo, supra note 118. In December 2004, immedi-
ately before the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on the nomination of Al-
berto Gonzales to serve as Attorney General of the United States, the Justice
Department significantly retreated from the analysis outlined in this memo. See
Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Spells Out New Definition Curbing Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2005,
at Al. The revised policy is available at Department of Justice, Memorandum, Le-
gal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, Dec. 30, 2004, http://
www.usdoj.gov/olc/18usc23402340a2.htm.
136. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (2006).
137. See Bybee, August 1 Memo, supra note 118, at 173.
138. See id. at 174-75.
139. Id. (clarifying specific intent).
140. Id. at 172 (examining injury constituting torture). The memo goes on to
further limit the type of mental suffering that qualifies as torture:
We conclude that the mental harm also must result from one of the pred-
icate acts listed in the statute, namely: threats of imminent infliction of
such physical pain as a means of psychological torture; use of drugs or
other procedures designed to deeply disrupt the sense, or fundamentally
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Finally, after significantly limiting what would count as "torture" for
purposes of federal criminal law, the memo erects two further barriers to
its enforcement. First, the memo contends that "in the circumstances of
the current war against al Qaeda and its allies, prosecution . . . may be
barred because enforcement of the statute would represent an unconstitu-
tional infringement of the President's authority to conduct war." 14 1 Less
dramatically, but no less definitely, the memo maintains that the legal de-
fenses of self-defense and/or necessity mightjustify interrogators in engag-
ing in techniques that were indisputably barred as torture by the law, given
the magnitude of the threat posed to the United States after the attacks on
September 11, 2001.142
Taken together, the import of Bybee's memos is that there are few, if
any, limits to what American interrogators can do in order to extract infor-
mation from al-Qaeda and Taliban prisoners. In tone, argument and
structure, the memos suggest that Bybee views his analysis as a broom with
which to sweep away the web of international and national law protecting
prisoners detained by the United States in the War on Terror, in order to
facilitate American victory. Two features of his use of casuistry are worthy
of comment. First, Bybee's choice of casuistical techniques is governed, in
large part, by the end he seeks. His driving question is, "How can the
impact of applicable laws against torture on my client's course of action be
minimized?," not "How should my client shape his course of action in view
of applicable laws against torture, and the moral values they instantiate?"
Second, and relatedly, it is designed to create a sphere of action that is
comparatively unencumbered by the relevant legal norms, and the moral
norms they embody. It is not designed to extend the legal and moral
norms embodied in statutory and case law, moving by analogy from a fa-
miliar situation to an unfamiliar situation. Bybee's use of casuistry, in
other words, is not the exercise of practical reason in an effort to deliber-
ate in the first instance about what ought to be American policy toward
prisoners detained as part of the War on Terror. It is, rather, an effort to
eliminate the external barriers the law imposes upon his client's exercise
of practical reasoning in order to win the War on Terror.
3. Prophetic Voices
So how do the prophetic voices respond to revelations of the Torture
Memos? By and large they do not engage the intricate legal arguments
altar an individual's personality; or threatening to do any of these things
to a third party.
Id.; see also id. at 176-83 (interpreting American statutory law); id. at 184-91 (inter-
preting Convention Against Torture); id. at 191-200 (analyzing relevant American
and international judicial opinions).
141. Id. at 173 (recognizing barrier to enforcement).
142. Id. (recognizing self defense may justify torture in light of magnitude of
threat).
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mounted by Jay Bybee, Alberto Gonzales and their associates. 14 3 More
specifically, they do not respond by calling into question the validity of the
analysis itself; that is, they do not point to particular flawed arguments or
highlight particular flawed assumptions. With some modifications, their
response can be understood in terms of the two main features James Gus-
tafson associated with prophetic discourse, moral indictment and
utopianism.
The primary form of the indictment was not verbal; it was visual: the
horrifying spectacle of the abuses of prisoners that took place at Abu
Ghraib Prison. We all saw the photographs of a smiling American soldier
pulling a desperate, naked prisoner by a leash and of the bloodied and
bruised corpse being carried out of the prison on a stretcher.144 What
about the fact that the Torture Memos were never intended to apply to
prisoners at Abu Ghraib? Prophetic voices did not make a detailed argu-
ment regarding the relevance of the Torture Memos to the abusive condi-
tions in Iraq. Instead, they relied upon the fact that the photographs
raised a host of questions in the minds of those who saw them. If this is
the sort of treatment that merits a visual record, what is happening in
situations where there is no photographer present? What sort of ethos
pervades a military operation which can engender this sort of behavior
upon the part of American soldiers charged with guarding prisoners of
war? If the ultimate justification of torture is that it is necessary to win the
War on Terror, is the mere fact that the Bush administration recognizes
that Iraqi prisoners, unlike members of the Taliban or al-Qaeda, are
143. I do not mean to imply here that there were no casuistical responses to
the Torture Memos, which systematically attempted to critique their understand-
ing of the law. In my judgment, however, they were less prominent during the
initial phase of the scandal, for two reasons. First, engaging in fine casuistical anal-
ysis was seen by many, including many lawyers, as an inappropriate initial response
to the abuse. Second, formulating a detailed and comprehensive response to the
memos, as well as the incidents of abuse, takes time and study. For an eighty-two
page analysis and critique of the jurisprudence of the Torture Memos, see Jeremy
Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 COLUM. L.
Ruv. 1681 (2005).
144. David Griffith makes the insightful point that the cropping of the photo-
graphs affects whether one views the problem as one of a few bad apples in the
military or a systemic problem of abuse. He notes that "cropped, the pictures sug-
gest the work of only a handful of reservists. Uncropped, they show more soldiers,
some identified as military intelligence officers, a few watching, others preoccu-
pied with the most mundane activities. One picture reveals a man cleaning his
fingernails." David Griffith, A Good War Is Hard to Find: Abu Ghraib, Flannery
O'Connor, and the Problem of American Innocence, GoDsPY, Sept. 24, 2005, available at
http://www.godspy.com/issues/Abu-Ghraib-Flannery-OConnor-and-the-Problem-
of-American-Innocence.cfm. He goes perceptively to observe that the photos are
"icons, Rorschachs used by commentators to justify, criticize, or deconstruct the
war, and the United States." Id. Very tellingly in my view, Griffith invokes a pro-
phetic perspective at the beginning of the article by beginning with a verse from
the prophet Hosea: "'Sow for yourselves righteousness, reap the fruit of unfailing
love and break up your unplowed ground; for it is time to see the Lord, until he
comes and showers righteousness upon you.'" Id. (quoting Hosea 10:12).
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clearly protected by the Geneva Conventions likely to make any real differ-
ence? President Bush, after all, had initially justified the war against Iraq
at least in part on the grounds that Saddam Hussein's administration was
giving aide and comfort to terrorists. 145
From the perspective of the prophets, what was the basis of the indict-
ment against the casuists in the Bush administration? What was the root
cause of their disastrous policy? Fundamentally, the root cause was their
failure to obey divine law. In an open letter to Alberto Gonzales (who is
an evangelical Christian) dated January 4, 2005 and signed by more than
200 religious leaders, 146 we can see the development of a prophetic indict-
ment along these lines.
First, the open letter articulates the requirements of God's law; it con-
stitutes the basis against which all human conduct is to be judged:
We invite with you to affirm with us that we are all made in the
image of God-every human being. We invite you to acknowl-
edge that no legal category created by mere mortals can revoke
that status. You understand that torture-the deliberate effort to
undermine human dignity-is a grave sin and affront to God. 14 7
Second, the open letter issues its moral indictment, detailing the
manner in which Gonzales's actions failed to conform to the requirements
of the divine law:
How could you have written a series of legal memos that disre-
spected international law and invited these abuses? How could
you have justified the use of torture and disavowed protections
for prisoners of war? How could you have referred to the Geneva
conventions as "quaint" and "obsolete." We fear that your legal
judgments have paved the way for torture and abuse.' 48
Can we also find utopianism in prophetic responses to the Bush ad-
ministration's policy on torture, as Gustafson would predict? My sense is
that we come upon a type of reversal here; the utopia in question is a
negative utopia. More specifically, the prophetic voices do not gesture to-
ward a blissful world that will come into being if their prescription against
torture is accepted by the American government (after all, according to
145. SeeAddress Before ajoint Session of Congress on the State of the Union,
37 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 109, 115 (Jan. 28, 2003) (rationalizing war against
Saddam Hussein). "Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications
and statements by people now in custody reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and
protects terrorists, including members of Al Quaida." Id.
146. Church Folks for a Better America, Open Letter to Alberto Gonzales, Jan. 4,
2005, http://www.cfba.info/analyst/Gonzalesiletter.html (recognizing grave con-
cerns over Gonazles's nomination). Commonweal also published an editorial on the
Gonzales nomination. See Editorial, The President's Lawyer, COMMONWEAL, Dec. 3,
2004, at 5.
147. Open Letter to Alberto Gonzales, supra note 146.
148. Id.
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common accounts, that has been our world to date), but rather toward the
hellish existence that we will all endure if we no longer comply with the
relevant divinely given mandates. 149 Most importantly, the prophetic
voices on torture repeatedly suggested that we will lose our national iden-
tity if we proceed along this path. An editorial in National Catholic Reporter
begins by asking: "Who are we in America? What is being done in our
name?" 150 Bishop John Ricard, Chair of the International Policy Commit-
tee of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, writes "[t]he abuse
and torture of Iraqi prisoners have brought shame upon our nation, is an
affront to our most basic ideals, and will undermine legitimate efforts to
confront the very real threats faced by our nation and the world. 1 5 1
This threatened loss of identity, through loss of one's fundamental
commitments, is a recurrent theme in the Old Testament prophets. Con-
sider this passage from the book of Isaiah:
Jerusalem is crumbling, Judah is falling;
For their speech and their deeds are before the LORD,
A provocation in the sight of his majesty.
Their very look bears witness against them;
Their Sin like Sodom they vaunt,
They hide it not. Woe to them!
They deal out evil to themselves.152
The prophetic response to the Torture Memos and the abuses re-
vealed at Abu Ghraib assumed they revealed something deeply troubling
about the American character.' 53 The fact that we have stooped to both
justifying torture and engaging in the practice is a sign of our radical de-
149. One of the most powerful responses to the revelations at Abu Ghraib was
written by Dianna Ortiz, O.S.U., a religious sister who was a victim of torture while
teaching Mayan children in Guatemala. See Sister Diana Ortiz, O.S.U., Mr. Presi-
dent, Stop the Torture!, U.S. CATH., July 2004, at 50, 50 (denouncing torture wher-
ever and whenever it occurs).
150. Editorial, Difficult Questions Won't Go Away, NAT'L CATH. REP., Nov. 5,
2004, at 24, 24, available at http://natcath.org/NCROnline/archives2/2004d/
110504/110504t.php. For another argument about American identity, see James
Ross, Bush, Torture, and Lincoln's Legacy, AMERICA, Aug. 15-22, 2005, at 10, 10-13.
For other writings raising themes of the inconsistency of torture with American
values, see Editorial, Torture's Apologists, COMMONWEAL, Feb. 11, 2005, at 5.
151. U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, HORRENDOUS TORTURE OF IRAQI
PRISONERS IS CHALLENGE TO REFLECT ON LARGER MORAL ISSUES, http://
urww.usccb. org/comm/archives/2004/04-091. htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006); see also Let-
ter from Bishop John H. Ricard to House and Senate Conferees on Human Rights
and Torture (July 12, 2004), http://www.usccb.org/sdwp/torture.htm (supporting
codifying our nation's obligations by prohibiting torture or degrading treatment of
persons in custody).
152. Isaiah 3:8-9.
153. The Vatican newspaper responded in prophetic terms by focusing upon
the symbolic function of the photos at Abu Ghraib:
In its May 10 edition, L'Osservatore Romano commented on the widely pub-
lished photo showing a U.S. Soldier holding a naked Iraqi detainee on a
leash. Of all the images that have been released, this one is the most
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parture from the bedrock values upon which our nation was founded. To
the prophetic critics of torture, the idea that the United States can effec-
tively defend itself by engaging in acts so thoroughly inconsistent with our
fundamental moral commitments is both foolhardy and dangerous.
1 54
4. Casuistical Responses
Needless to say, it is impossible for Christians of any stripe to defend
what happened at Abu Ghraib. What, then, has been the response of the
conservative Christian defenders of the Bush administration with respect
to the question of American policy on torture? Unfortunately, as several
commentators have pointed out, the predominant response has been si-
lence. For example, as of November 2005, not one full-length article has
been devoted to the question of torture in First Things, arguably a publica-
tion of record for Christian (especially Catholic) Republicans. 155 Notwith-
standing the silence, it is possible to reflect more generally upon the shape
of a casuistical response to torture and the abuse of prisoners exemplified
by Abu Ghraib, as well as to find key elements of this response in some
conservative Christian commentary.
'tragically symbolic' because it shows a desire to treat the enemy almost as
an animal, it said.
John Thavis, Vatican Newspaper Condemns 'Inhuman Acts of Torture' by U.S. Soldiers,
CATH. NEws SERVICE, May 10, 2004, available at http://www.catholicnews.com/
data/stories/cns/20040510a.htm.
154. According to a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center and re-
leased November 17, 2005, "[T] he American public is far more open than opinion
leaders to the use of torture against suspected terrorists in order to gain important
information. Nearly half of the public (46%) say this can either often (15%) or
sometimes (31%) be justified." PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PREss
IN ASs'N WITH THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, AMERICA'S PLACE IN THE
WORLD 2005, at 24 (2005), http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/263.pdf. For an
illuminating examination of the conflicted American stance on torture, see Joseph
Lelyveld, Interrogating Ourselves, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2005, § 6, at 36.
155. A search of the First Things web site on November 28, 2005 for the phrase
"Abu Ghraib" revealed only three hits, one of which mentioned Abu Ghraib only
in an aside. The two other, more substantive discussions were in issues of the mag-
azine where the editor, Rev. Richard John Neuhaus, offered his opinion on the
events of the day. He unequivocally condemned torture, and flatly rejected the
theory that Abu Ghraib is attributable to "a few bad apples." See Richard John
Neuhaus, Bishops at a Turning Point, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 2004, at 76 (noting out-
rages committed by Americans at Abu Ghraib). He writes, "[t] here is a temptation
to place terrorists beyond the pale of humanity. But every human being, no matter
how radically he has debased himself, is a child of God, created in His image and
likeness." Id. In a subsequent issue, Neuhaus admits the reluctance of the maga-
zine to cover this issue in any kind of depth:
[A]s some readers have pointed out, either in praise or complaint, the
war on terror has not been center stage in these pages.... In considering
articles and reviews, we tend to shy away from subjects that are amply, and
more or less adequately, addressed in other publications. Editing is an
exercise in the art of discretion, and such judgment calls are eminently
debatable; as, indeed, they are debated among the editors.
Richard John Neuhaus, Internationalisms, FIRST THINGS, Dec. 2004, at 64.
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As we have seen, many religious thinkers who adopt a prophetic
stance on torture see the abuses at Abu Ghraib as revealing something
both important and disturbing about the American character. In contrast,
for those who adopt a casuistical stance, the abuses at Abu Ghraib were
essentially unfortunate anomalies. While deeply wrong and repulsive, they
do not reveal anything of significance about the American moral charac-
ter. An early example of this approach can be found in a column by
George Weigel, titled Abu Ghraib and Just War in Iraq.156 For Weigel, what
is important is the revulsion that most Americans expressed at the revela-
tions of the abuses of Iraqi prisoners, he writes: "If anything proves that
America is not a Realpolitik country in which it's simply assumed that
might makes right, it's the reaction to Abu Ghraib."1 5 7 Weigel maintains
that "no one knows the stain on military honor that Abu Ghraib represents
better than the officers and enlisted personnel who believe they came to
Iraq to liberate its people from a vicious dictatorship in which murder,
rape, and torture were normal instruments of state policy, not
aberrations." 15 8
Moreover, the casuists will not be as quick as the prophets to connect
the Torture Memos, which were designed to justify a range of coercive
interrogation techniques with respect to members of al-Qaeda and the
Taliban, with the abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib. A good example of
this approach can be found in conservative journalist Heather Mac Don-
ald's essays in The City JournaL In essence, Mac Donald maintains that Jay
Bybee's August memo on the topic was at least two steps removed from the
atrocities at Abu Ghrab. First, she argues that the memo was directed to-
ward interrogations conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency; they "had
nothing to do with the interrogation debates and experiments unfolding
among Pentagon interrogators in Afghanistan and Cuba."1 59 Second, she
contends that the Pentagon's interrogation practices in Afghanistan and
Cuba were also irrelevant to Abu Ghraib. She states:
The abuse at Abu Ghraib resulted from the Pentagon's failure to
plan for any outcome of the Iraq invasion except the most rosy
scenario, its failure to respond to the insurgency once it broke
out, and its failure to keep military discipline from collapsing in
the understaffed Abu Ghraib facility. Interrogation rules were
beside the point.160
156. See George Weigel, Op-Ed, Abu Ghraib and Just War in Iraq, DENVER CATH.
REG., June 23, 2004, available at http://www.archden.org/dcr/news.php?e=85&s=
3&a=2065 (discussing purpose of any just war).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Heather Mac Donald, How to Interrogate Terrorists, CrrvJ., Winter 2005, at
24, 32.
160. Id.
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In a second article, written in response to Marty Lederman's vigorous
critique of her first article,16 1 Mac Donald expands her argument by citing
the "Interrogation Rules of Engagement," which she maintains were "pro-
vided to all military interrogators and soldiers in Iraq.' 62 She argues that
"[t] he abuse in Iraq resulted from a violation of the rules, not from com-
pliance with them. Had interrogators and military guards followed the
guidelines governing their behavior, none of the sadistic treatment of de-
tainees would have occurred."1 63
Whereas the prophets interpreted Abu Ghraib as revealing a funda-
mental flaw in the national character of the United States, the casuists
attribute it to the grubby failures of uncontrolled and undisciplined indi-
viduals, whom Mac Donald refers to as the "grunts on the ground." 164 She
writes:
Soldiers talked back to their superiors, refused to wear uniforms,
operated prostitution and bootlegging rings, engaged in ram-
pant and public sexual misbehavior, covered the facilities with
graffiti, and indulged in drinking binges while on duty. The
guards' brutal treatment of the prisoners was an extension of the
chaos that already engulfed the prison. 165
From her casuistical perspective, the problem was not with American law
or mores-the military interrogation manuals clearly prohibited the mor-
ally atrocious behavior engaged in by American soldiers at Abu Ghraib.
The problem was with a small number of individuals whose characteristi-
cally human failings were undisciplined and uncontrolled in a way that
facilitated those atrocities. Mac Donald's essays suggest that Abu Ghraib
does not require Americans to examine their own moral values and com-
mitments; it simply requires us to see that they are enforced with sufficient
discipline among the young soldiers acting in our name.
What can the casuists make of the Torture Memos? It is important to
emphasize that a casuist need not defend them in toto; indeed, it would be
impossible for a casuist working within the resources of the Catholic Chris-
tian tradition to do so. While she does not draw explicitly upon religious
sources in making her arguments, Heather Mac Donald's essays are in-
structive regarding how a casuistical argument might proceed. She explic-
itly distances herself from Jay Bybee's August 1, 2002 Memo, which focuses
161. See Posting of Marty Lederman to Balkinization Blog, http://
balkin.blogspot.com/2005/01/heather-macdonalds-dubious-counter.html (Jan.
11, 2005, 13:47 EST) (critiquing Mac Donald's article How to Interrogate Terrorists).
162. Heather Mac Donald, Heather Mac Donald Responds to Marty Lederman on
Abu Ghraib and U.S. Interrogation Policies, ClrYJ., Winter 2006, available at http://
www.city-journal.org/html/eon 0113 .html.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. For Marty Lederman's reply to Mac Donald's second essay, see Post-
ing of Marty Lederman to Balkinization Blog, http://www.city-journal.org/html/
eon_01_13_05hm2.html (fan. 23, 2005, 23:31 EST).
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on the nature and scope of international and national laws against tor-
ture. 166 At the same time, her analysis implicitly legitimates the two funda-
mental questions Bybee grappled with in that memo, together with his
memo dated January 22, 2002.167 First, what are the positive moral and
legal obligations owed to members of groups such as al-Qaeda and the
Taliban, which do not comply with the laws of war? With respect to this
question, Mac Donald's argument concords with the argument of the Jan-
uary 22 memo, which maintained that the Geneva Conventions do not
apply to al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees. She writes, "Were the United
States to announce that terrorists would be protected under the Geneva
Conventions, it would destroy any incentive our ruthless enemies have to
comply with the laws of war."
168
Second, what are the moral limits of what we can do to such detainees
in the course of interrogations designed to obtain potentially life-saving
information from them? Subsidiary questions include what constitutes
"torture" that is prohibited always and everywhere; what constitutes "inhu-
mane treatment" that is generally prohibited, and what counts as a suffi-
ciently pressing reason or set of reasons to engage in progressively more
aggressive forms of interrogation. Mac Donald does not raise these ques-
tions in any systematic manner, let alone address them with any kind of
precision. Yet her essays are clearly designed to precipitate their discus-
sion. She argues:
[T] here is a huge gray area between the gold standard of POW
treatment reserved for honorable opponents and torture, which
consists of the intentional infliction of severe physical and mental
pain.... To declare non-torturous stress off-limits for an enemy
who plays by no rules and accords no respect to Western prison-
ers is folly. 169
166. See generally Bybee, August 1 Memo, supra note 118, (presenting views of
U.S. Department of Justice regarding standards of conduct under Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane and Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment). She writes, for example, "In response to the CIA's request, Assistant Attor-
ney General Jay S. Bybee produced a hair-raising memo that understandably
caused widespread alarm." Mac Donald, supra note 159, at 32. While Mac Donald
does not clearly articulate her objections to the memo, they appear to be, first, that
Bybee's definition of torture is too stringent; and second, that Bybee argues that
the president is not bound by either international treaties or American law in war-
time. See id. (suggesting Bybee memo was irrelevant to what happened in Abu
Ghraib).
167. See generally Bybee, January 22 Memo, supra note 117 (discussing applica-
tion of treaties and laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees).
168. Mac Donald, supra note 159, at 36.
169. Id. at 28.
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5. Torture, Prophets and Casuists
What does the controversy over torture reveal about the relationship
between prophecy and casuistry that was not revealed in the controversy
over abortion? As I argue in more detail below, it reveals two fundamental
aspects of that relationship. First, the Torture Memos exemplify how casu-
istry as a fundamental form of practical reasoning can be thoroughly dis-
torted, so that it becomes nothing more than an attempt to rationalize a
course of action already chosen for other reasons. Second, it reveals that
prophetic voices do not always critique such distorted forms of casuistry;
on occasion, they sometimes employ those distorted forms in order to
clear away impediments to their own ends. It reveals, in other words, that
the relationship between prophecy and casuistry is not only one of ineluc-
table opposition; there can also be a kind of guilty conscription.
The general refusal of the prophets to engage any of the administra-
tion's arguments about the applicability of the Geneva Conventions, or
other facially relevant international or American law prohibiting torture is
significant. 170 In time, once scholars have absorbed all the relevant legal
memos, I believe, it will be transmuted into accusations that the highest
members of the Bush legal team engaged in the sort of argumentative
practices that give casuistry a bad name. 17 1 Unfortunately for those of us
who find much of value in the practice, there is no denying that the term
"casuistry" has a pejorative connotation in common usage. A prominent
internet dictionary defines "casuistry" as "[s]pecious or excessively subtle
reasoning intended to rationalize or mislead.' 72 As Albert Jonsen and
Stephen Toulmin observe in their history of casuistry, one citation for the
word in the Oxford English Dictionary proclaims that "[c] asuistry destroys by
170. Some refused as well to be mollified by the Justice Department Memo-
randum reaffirming the responsibilities of the United States under the Geneva
Conventions and the Conventions against Torture: "This memo should not be al-
lowed to paper over an unprecedented national disgrace. From holding detainees
incommunicado to torturing them for the purpose of gaining intelligence, the
administration has taken a series of initiatives that violate fundamental freedoms,
basic rights and essential human decencies." Editorial, From Terror to Torture,
AMERICA, Jan. 31, 2005, at 3.
171. See Mark Shea, Toying with Evil: May a Catholic Advocate Torture, CRIsIs,
Mar. 2005, available at http://www.crisismagazine.com/march2OO5/feature2.htm (making
similar point without using "casuistry" in article). "Different political ideologies tend
to have different ways of finessing and nuancing what, in Catholic thinking, is
more bluntly called "mortal sin." Id. Criticizing the conservative writer Linda Cha-
vez, Shea writes:
Chavez's stated purpose is to open "rational debate" about what does and
does not constitute torture.... Is missing a meal torture? . . . That's a
perfectly reasonable question and would certainly be beneficial-if that's
where Chavez went with her article .... Instead she asks, "[I]f such meth-
ods are 'torture', is the United States justified in using them anyway?"
Mark that: Even if it is torture, can we do it anyway?
Id.
172. Dictionary.com, Casuistry, http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=
casuistry (last visited May 23, 2006).
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distinctions and exceptions all morality, and effaces the essential differ-
ence between right and wrong."
1 73
For those inclined to argue that the Torture Memos exemplify the
pejorative meaning of casuistry, one particularly apt piece of evidence will
be the manner in which Bybee developed his narrow definition of torture
in the August 1, 2002 Memo. 174 The focus of this memo is the Conven-
tion Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, codified in American law by Sections 2340-2340A of
Title 18 of the United States Code. As Bybee notes, "Section 2340A makes
it a criminal offense for any person 'outside the United States [to] commit
or attempt to commit torture."'1 75 He goes on to observe that Section
2340 defines an act of torture as an:
[A] ct committed by a person acting under the color of law specif-
ically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffer-
ing (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions)
upon another person within his custody or physical control.' 7 6
But what counts as "severe physical or mental pain or suffering"? In
order to answer this question, Bybee does not turn to other discussions of
torture in international law or in the scholarly literature. Instead, he
searches the United States Code for other instances of the isolated term "se-
vere pain," finally finding what he is looking for in "statutes defining an
emergency medical condition for the purpose of providing health bene-
fits." Without a hint of irony, Bybee contends that "although these statutes
address a substantially different subject from Section 2340, they are none-
theless helpful for understanding what constitutes severe physical pain."
He argues that "[tihese statutes suggest that 'severe pain,' as used in Sec-
tion 2340, must rise to . . .the level that would ordinarily be associated
with a sufficiently serious physical condition or injury such as death, organ
failure, or serious impairment of body functions-in order to constitute
torture."1
77
But there is irony aplenty to be found in Bybee's analysis. The spe-
cific statutory provisions pertaining to an "emergency medical condition"
cited by Bybee all pertain to the requirements that health care providers
must meet in order to receive federal funding through the Medicare and
Medicaid programs.17 8 Taken together, these statutory provisions express
173. ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY 12
(1988).
174. See Bybee, August 1 Memo, supra note 118, at 173 (noting mental pain or
suffering must result in significant psychological harm or significant duration to
amount to torture).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 176.
178. See id. (referring to statutory provisions which pertain to "emergency
medical condition").
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Congress's overarching concern to insure that no one in need of emer-
gency medical treatment will be denied such treatment. This concern not
only extends to enrollees in Medicare and Medicaid programs, but also to
those who are unable to pay for such treatment, and even to illegal
aliens. 179 Taken together, they express the conviction that the moral im-
perative to alleviate the severe physical suffering of another human being
overrides other important national goals and policies. For Bybee to in-
voke these statutory provisions-without paying attention to their broader
statutory context-in order to justify the infliction of severe physical suffer-
ing is deeply troubling, both morally and intellectually.
Consider what is perhaps the most well-known of the statutory provi-
sions that he draws upon in developing his definition of "severe pain," the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. Colloquially known as the Anti-Dumping Law, EM-
TALA prohibits hospitals that have executed Medicare provider agree-
ments from refusing to serve any patient who presents an "emergency
medical condition" on the grounds that he or she does not have the finan-
cial means to pay for the emergency services provided.
In his exposition of the "Anti-Torture Law," Bybee quotes a definition
of "emergency medical condition" which reflects the statutes he cites, in-
cluding the EMTALA. An "emergency medical condition" is a condition:
[M]anifesting itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (in-
cluding severe pain) such that a prudent lay person, who possesses
an average knowledge of health and medicine, could reasonably
expect the absence of immediate medical attention to result in-
placing the health of the individual . . . (i) in serious jeopardy,
(ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or (iii) serious dys-
function to any bodily organ or part.1 80
Based on the foregoing definition of "emergency medical condition"
Bybee goes on to define "severe pain" for purpose of the anti-torture law
as pain requiring that "[t]he victim must experience intense pain or suf-
fering of the kind that is equivalent to the pain that would be associated
with serious physical injury so severe that death, organ failure, or perma-
179. See id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1369(d) (2000)) (noting emergency medical
condition includes condition manifesting symptoms of severe pain); see also 42
U.S.C. § 1395w-22(d) (3) (b) (2000) (same); 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v) (1) (K) (ii) (2000)
(same); 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A) (2000)(same); 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (v)(3)
(2000) (same); 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2(b)(2)(C) (2000) (same).
180. See Bybee, August 1 Memo, supra note 118, at 173 (quoting 42 U.S.C.§ 1395w-22(d)(3)(b)). The definition in EMTALA at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e) (1) is
identical, save for the fact that it eliminates the phrase "such that a prudent lay
person . . . could reasonably expect." This omission is obviously necessary, since
EMTALA places the burden on emergency room physicians, not on patients, to
make the determination of whether an "emergency medical condition" exists.
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nent damage resulting in a loss of significant bodily function will likely
result."18 1
So what are the problems with his casuistical analysis? First, it is logi-
cally flawed. "Severe pain" is not defined in EMTAILA or in any of the
other statutes he cites. It is one of the defining criteria of an "emergency
medical condition." From a logical perspective, the EMTALA provision
followed in the structure of "If A (severe pain), then B (the elements of
an emergency medical condition)." Bybee's casuistry attempts to extend
this analysis by reversal, by making a statement of the form: "If (and only
if) B, then A." As any graduate student in a first-year logic class would tell
us, that extension-by-reversal is not warranted.
Second, even if we set its logical flaws aside, Bybee's casuistal analysis
is strikingly selective. In the relevant EMTALA provision, "severe pain"
(A) triggered an "emergency medical condition" (B), which was defined
to include not merely death, organ failure or serious impairment of bodily
function, but also a condition placing the "health" of the person in serious
jeopardy without immediate medical treatment. Not only did Bybee make
the mistake of exhaustively defining a symptom (severe pain) in terms of a
set of underlying medical problems that such pain might signal, he also
conveniently omitted the mildest problem in the set-severe pain as an
indication that one's health was in serious jeopardy.
Third, and more broadly, Bybee seems immured to the particular iro-
nies involved in evoking the terms of the Anti-Dumping Act in order to
justify a narrower reading of the Anti-Torture Act. EMTALA explicitly
included "severe pain" in the list of triggering conditions for an emer-
gency medical condition in order to insure that no one in severe pain
would be denied emergency medical treatment based upon inability to
pay-even if the pain was unaccompanied by any other symptoms. The
"severe pain" must be treated and controlled before a hospital can transfer
the patient. It is ironic-indeed perversely so-to invoke federal legisla-
tion imposing an obligation to alleviate physical suffering in order to jus-
tify the infliction of physical suffering.
Some of the argumentation in the Torture Memos, therefore, exem-
plify the sort of distorted moral reasoning that tends to give casuistry a bad
name. How do the authors defend their approach to moral and legal ar-
gumentation? A careful reading of the memos reveals that their ultimate
form of self-justification is actually prophetic, not casuistical, in nature.
Prophecy, in other words, distorts casuistry in order to make use of it for
its own ends. More specifically, reading through the Torture Memos, it is
clear that the authors understand the conflict between al-Qaeda and the
United States in almost absolute terms. The legal analysis is undergirded
by a portrayal of a conflict of fundamental moral values, highly characteris-
tic of prophetic discourse, that propels their use of a distorted casuistry to
181. Id. at 183.
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clear the way to employ any means necessary in fighting this enemy.182
Accordingly, the persuasive power in the Torture Memos does not come
from the tortured legal analysis itself. Instead, it comes from the impera-
tive for national survival against the threat of a ruthless and corrupt en-
emy, which the memos portray as inextricably linked to success in the War
on Terror.
183
For example, consider the structure of Part V of the August 1, 2002
memo, in which Bybee posits a virtually limitless presidential power in
prosecuting the War on Terror.1 8 4 Part V, Section B and Part V, Section C
defend this position with a number of arguments based on the structure of
the relevant Supreme Court opinions and the text, as well as the structure,
of the Constitution itself. Yet the burden of persuasion is actually carried
by Part V, Section A, entitled "The War With al Qaeda."185 Here, Bybee
characterizes what is at stake. He does not tell his readers what would be
gained by a decision to authorize a broader range of interrogation tech-
niques; indeed, it is questionable whether techniques verging on torture
are even effective means of obtaining information. Instead, he presents
his readers with the specter of what might be lost if interrogators do not
have all necessary means at their disposal-a devastating loss at the hands
of an implacable enemy.
More specifically, Bybee begins by recounting the acts and objectives
of al-Qaeda, most prominently including the attacks on September 11,
2001: "The United States and its overseas personnel and installations have
been attacked as a result of [O]sama Bin Laden's call for a Jihad against
the U.S. government, because the U.S. government is unjust, criminal and
182. See Andrew Sullivan, Atrocities in Plain Sight, N.Y. TiMrs, Jan. 13, 2005, § 7,
at 1 (explaining that Abu Ghraib tortures were scandals done in "plain sight").
Andrew Sullivan attributes this sensibility to the nation as a whole, not merely to
our leadership:
But in a democracy, the responsibility is also wider. Did those of us who
fought so passionately for a ruthless war against terrorists give an unwit-
ting green light to these abuses? Were we naive in believing that charac-
terizing complex conflicts from Afghanistan to Iraq as a single simple war
against "evil" might not filter down and lead to decisions that could dehu-
manize the enemy and lead to abuse? Did our conviction of our own
rightness in this struggle make it hard for us to acknowledge when that
good cause had become endangered? I fear that the answer to each of
these questions is yes.
Id. at 6-7.
183. See Bush, February 7 Memo, supra note 134, at 134-35 (explaining impera-
tive for national survival in face of enemy). In his memorandum declaring the
inapplicability of the Geneva Conventions to al Qaeda and the Taliban, President
Bush writes: "As a matter of policy, the United States Armed Forces shall continue
to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military
necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva." Id. (emphasis
added).
184. See Bybee, August 1 Memo, supra note 118, at 200-07 (noting constitu-
tional authority as Commander-in-Chief).
185. See id. at 200-02 (discussing what may be at stake if interrogators do not
have all possible methods of interrogation at their disposal).
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tyrannical.'" 186 After detailing the American response to this threat, he
notes that " [d] espite these efforts, numerous upper echelon leaders of al
Qaeda and the Taliban, with access to active terrorist cells and other re-
sources, remain at large. It has been reported that the al-Qaeda fighters
are already drawing on a fresh flow of cash to rebuild their forces."
187
Bybee then proceeds to suggest that engaging in aggressive, and possibly
torturous, interrogation techniques may be necessary to preserve the na-
tion itself:
Al Qaeda continues to plan further attacks, such as destroying
American civilian airliners and killing American troops, which
have fortunately been prevented. It is clear that bin Laden and
his organization have conducted several violent attacks on the
United States and its nationals, and that they seek to continue to
do so. Thus, the capture and interrogation of such individuals is
clearly imperative to our national security and defense. Interro-
gation of captured al Qaeda operatives may provide information
concerning the nature of al Qaeda plans and the identities of its
personnel, which may prove invaluable in preventing further di-
rect attacks on the United States and its citizens. Given the mas-
sive destruction and loss of life caused by the September 11
attacks, it is reasonable to believe that information gained from
al Qaeda personnel could prevent attacks of a similar (if not
greater) magnitude from occurring in the United States. 18 8
Upon this basis, Bybee goes on to argue that the "President enjoys
complete discretion in the exercise of his Commander-in-Chief authority
and in conducting operations against hostile forces."18 9 Section 2340A's
anti-torture strictures ought to be construed in a way that does not im-
pinge upon this discretion. Furthermore, any attempt on the part of Con-
gress to limit the President's power to control interrogation of enemy
prisoners is constitutionally impermissible. 190 If interrogators acting pur-
suant to a presidential directive were to be charged with a violation of
Section 2340A's strictures, they might appropriately invoke the defenses of
necessity or self-defense. "[T] he fact that previous al Qaeda attacks have
had as their aim the deaths of American citizens, and that evidence of
other plots have had a similar goal in mind, would justify proportionality
186. Id. at 200; see also Frontline, Osama Bin Laden v. The U.S.: Edicts and
Statements, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/
edicts.html (last visited May 23, 2006) (compiling various statements of Osama bin
Laden).
187. Bybee, August 1, Memo, at 201.
188. Id. at 201-02.
189. Id. at 202.
190. See id. at 203 ("Congress may no more regulate the President's ability to
detain and interrogate enemy combatants than it may regulate his ability to direct
troop movements on the battlefield.").
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of interrogation methods designed to elicit information to prevent such
deaths." 19 1
The normative substratum of Bybee's legal analysis presents al-Qaeda
as a ruthless enemy of the United States that must be defeated at all costs.
It is a prophetic substratum, resonating with those sections of the pro-
phetic books commonly referred to as the "oracles against the nations."' 9 2
The prophets of Israel and Judah not only condemned their own people
for faithlessness and moral ruin, they also chastised the pagan nations who
were the enemies of the Jewish people. It is instructive, for example, to
consider the oracles against Babylon in Isaiah and Jeremiah.19 3 Consider
the following passage from Isaiah, which is directed against the king of
Babylon:
All the kings of the nation lie in glory, each in his own tomb;
But you are cast forth without burial, loathsome and corrupt,
Clothed as those slain at sword-point, a trampled corpse.
Going down to the pavement of the pit, you will never be one
with them in the grave.
For you have ruined your land, you have slain your people!
Let him not be named forever, that scion of an evil race!
Make ready to slaughter his sons for the guilt of their fathers;
Lest they rise and possess the earth, and fill the breadth of the
world with tyrants. 194
On the basis of the "severity of the critique," biblical scholar David L.
Peteresen argues that these verses against the king of Babylon were likely
inspired by Babylon's total destruction of Judah (under King Nebuchad-
191. Id. at 211.
192. See, e.g., Isaiah 13-23 (revealing Isaiah's awareness of God's sovereignty of
the nations); Jeremiah 46-51 (presenting prophecies against other nations); Ezekiel
25-32 (explaining divine judgment against the nations), Amos 1-2 (discussing judg-
ment of Israel's neighbors for their sins). Contemporary biblical scholars take
pains to point out how the oracles against the nations were shaped by those editing
the canonical texts "to modify the negative attitude of these oracles and to open
them up more favorable toward the nations." Carroll Stuhlmueller, The Major
Prophets, Baruch, and Lamentations, in THE CATHOLIC STUDY BIBLE, RG 287, RG 329
(Donald Senior ed., 1990).
193. Jerusalem, the capital of Judah, fell to Nebuchadnezzar II, king of Baby-
lon, in 586 B.C.E. The Temple and the city were destroyed, and many Jews were
exiled to Babylon. Judah lost its status as a sovereign state and became a Babylo-
nian province. The Babylonian exile was short-lived; in 539 B.C.E., Cyrus, king of
Persia, conquered Babylon, allowed the Jews to return to Jerusalem, and facilitated
the rebuilding of the Temple, which was completed in 515 B.C.E. See Philip J.
King, An Outline of Biblical History, in THE CATHOLIC STUDY BIBLE, supra note 192, at
RG 31, RG 31-34 (giving history of historical events in biblical times). But the
intervention of the Persians did not bring political independence for the Jews, who
did not reestablish political sovereignty over their biblical homeland until the birth
of the state of Israel in 1948. See id. (outlining history of Jews' political
sovereignty).
194. Isaiah 14:18-21.
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nezzar) in the sixth century B.C.E. 19 5 Fifteen centuries later, the words
aptly capture the underlying attitude of the Torture Memos toward Osama
bin Laden and al-Qaeda. Bin Laden is a leader of a tightly knit organiza-
tion bent on destnlction of the United States; he is a "loathsome and cor-
rupt" leader. We must be willing to deal harshly with his ideological
"sons," "lest they rise and possess the earth, and fill the breadth of the
world with tyrants."
In light of the prophetic "oracle against the nations" in section V-A,
the strained legal and constitutional analysis in sections V-B and V-C be-
come not only intelligible, but defensible. The President of the United
States, must have unfettered discretion in making use of any means neces-
sary to defeat this new "king of Babylon," Osama bin Laden. Sections V-B
and V-C simply clear away the legal brambles that may hamper his "consti-
tutional power to protect the security of the United States and the lives
and safety of its people." 196
The fact that the distorted form of casuistry practiced by the Torture
Memos is actually motivated by a prophetic world view gives us, I think,
some insight into one of the reasons that some of torture's prophetic op-
ponents choose not to parse the arguments and expose the false assump-
tions in the Torture Memos. If one's interlocutor is not actually engaged
in casuistry, that is, in the honest exercise of practical reason in order to
determine what is to be done in a particular case, then it makes no sense
to offer a casuistical response to them. Effectively countering their argu-
ments requires unmasking and critiquing the prophetic stance that moti-
vates them.
The fact that the Torture Memos are helpfully understood as a case of
prophets making (distorted) use of casuistical discourse for their own pro-
phetic purposes leads us to ask whether the reverse can be the case: Do
casuists make use of prophetic discourse for casuistical purpose? It ap-
pears that the answer to this question must be "yes." Some, if not all, of
the prophets against torture are moved to adopt their position by a casuis-
tical insight: This type of action, or class of actions, not entirely well de-
fined, is completely inconsistent with human dignity, which must be given
uncompromising protection.
As I noted above, 19 7 Roman Catholic casuistry recognizes a category
of actions that one must never perform under any circumstance, the so-
called "negative moral absolutes." An "intrinsically evil act" is wrong by
reason of the agent's object in acting-the immediate purpose of his or
her action. It is always wrong, for example, to act with the object of inten-
tionally killing an innocent person, no matter what good may be obtained
195. DAVID PETERSON, THE PROPHETIc LITERATuRE 57 (2002) (arguing that
verses likely inspired by total destruction of Judah).
196. See Bybee, August 1 Memo, supra note 118, at 204.
197. For further discussion on negative moral absolutes as attributed to Ro-
man Catholic teachings, see supra notes 114-15 and the accompanying text.
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by doing so. 198 Casuists can and do dispute the specific characteristics an
action must exhibit in order to fall into this category; their disputes re-
volve around how properly to describe the immediate object of a particu-
lar agent's action. 199 At the same time, an agent's recognition of the
existence and force of these "negative moral absolutes" is understood as
the precondition for the functioning of casuistry in a reliable and uncor-
rupted way. As Pope John Paul II writes in the encyclical Veritatis Splendor,
"the human act depends upon its object, whether that object is capable or
not of being ordered to God, to the One who "alone is good," and thus brings
about the perfection of the person." Consequently, it is possible to see the
prophets against torture as animated by the desire to protect a fundamen-
tal moral insight that serves as the basis for practical reasoning. This is by
no means the abuse of prophecy by casuistry; in fact, I believe the purpose
of prophetic discourse is precisely to protect the conditions for undis-
torted practical reasons. Nonetheless, anything that can be used can be
abused.
The investigation of the use of prophetic discourse and the use of
casuistical discourse in the context of the recent controversy over torture
in the context of American interrogation of suspected terrorists reveals
that both these forms of discourse can be distorted and misused. We saw,
for example, that the Torture Memos exhibit the distorted form of moral
reasoning that has historically given casuistry a bad name. There is no
reason to think that prophecy cannot be misused in similar ways; the term
"false prophet" suggests as much. It also reveals that the two forms of dis-
course are not hermetically sealed from one another. We saw, more spe-
cifically, that the use (or misuse) of casuistical discourse can be motivated
by prophetic purposes, and casuists can respond with prophetic indigna-
tion when bedrock commitments of their system of practical reasoning are
ignored or undermined. In the next section of this Essay, I will attempt to
reflect more systematically and generally on the relationship between
prophecy and casuistry.
198. It is important to remember by "innocent" the Catholic tradition does
not mean "morally innocent," but rather a person who is not currently engaging in
an act of aggression.
199. The "doctrine of double effect" recognizes that one can engage in an
action that has two simultaneous effects, one good, and one bad. An act per-
formed with the object of securing the bad effect would be intrinsically evil.
Under some circumstances, however, it is licit to perform the action with two si-
multaneous effects, provided that one's aim or object in acting is to secure the
good effect, and that one accepts the bad effect as foreseen but unintended side
effect of the action. For example, one can licitly administer powerful pain medica-
tion to a cancer patient, acting with the object of alleviating great physical suffer-
ing, foreseeing but not intending that the medication will shorten the patient's
life. Casuists do not always agree how to distinguish the "object" of the action-
the agent's immediate purpose in acting-from a foreseen but unintended side
effect.
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IV. RELATING PROPHECY AND CASUISTRY
How, if at all, are prophetic discourse and casuistical discourse re-
lated? When is it appropriate to use one, rather than the other? In ad-
dressing these questions, I can only be programmatic. I will approach my
topic obliquely, first by outlining four ways of relating prophetic discourse
and casuistical discourse that I believe to be problematic, and secondly, by
attempting to describe how prophecy and casuistry might relate to one
another more fruitfully.
A. Problematic Ways of Relating Prophetic Discourse and Casuistical Discourse
There are in, my view, a number of unhelpful ways of relating casu-
istry and prophecy. Despite their differences, they share one general char-
acteristic: they involve the attempt of one mode of moral discourse to
conscript the other mode for its own purposes. Unhelpful ways of relating
prophecy and casuistry, in other words, involve a wrongful subordination
of one mode of discourse by the other mode of discourse, in a way that
inevitably results in distortion. As we saw above, the Torture Memos are
best understood as prophecy making use of a distorted form of casuistry
for its own purposes. It is not only prophecy, however, that can misuse
casuistry. As I briefly describe below, the reverse is also possible.
1. Ways in Which Casuistry Misuses Prophetic Discourse
Casuistry can misuse prophetic discourse by putting it on a pedestal.
By relegating prophecy entirely to the realm of an ideal world, casuistry
can dismiss its normative claims upon the world we live in here and now.
The prophetic calls to do justice to the widow, the orphan and the stran-
ger can be honored by the casuist as the pure norms that govern the king-
dom of God, even as they are set to one side as too pure and too
demanding for life in the kingdoms of this earth.
In a closely related move, casuistry can reduce prophecy to a moral
admonition. The urgent demand of prophecy is politely paraphrased, its
power reduced; it is turned into a true moral proposition and it is
defanged. An example of this approach can be found in Economic Justice
for All, the U.S. Catholic Bishops' Pastoral Letter on the Economy. It ob-
serves that:
[T]he substance of prophetic faith is proclaimed by Micah: "to
do justice and to love kindness, and to walk humbly with your
God" (Mic. 6:8). Biblical faith in general, and prophetic faith
especially, insist that fidelity to the covenant joins obedience to
God with reverence and concern for the neighbor.2 00
200. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL:
PASTORAL LE-TTER ON CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE U.S. ECONOMY 37
(1986).
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All true, yet something important is lost in the translation. Consider
this passage from the book of Isaiah:
The Lord rises to accuse,
standing to try his people.
The Lord enters into judgment
with his people's elders and princes:
It is you who have devoured the vineyard;
the loot wrested from the poor is in your houses.
What do you mean by crushing my people,
and grinding down the poor when they look to you?
Says the Lord, the God of hosts.
The Lord said:
Because the daughters of Zion are haughty,
and walk with necks outstretched,
ogling and mincing as they go,
their anklets tinkling with every step,
The Lord shall cover the scalps of Zion's
daughters with scabs,
and the Lord shall bare their heads. 20 1
The moral indictment of prophetic discourse cannot be separated from its
rhetoric of indictment.
Third, practitioners of casuistry sometimes use prophecy as a step
stool to bolster ideals that are not as unqualified or as impressive as they
might wish. More specifically, casuistry is a type of practical reason; it con-
siders what ought to be done in a particular case, given all the circum-
stances. Sometimes the decision reached by practical reason is less firmly
grounded in the relevant principles, facts and circumstances, than the rea-
soner would like it to be. If one is tentative about one's assessment of key
facts or circumstances, one ought to be correspondingly tentative about a
course of action chosen on the basis of that assessment. Yet casuists can
fear, sometimes reasonably, that any tentativeness in judgment on contro-
versial political or moral issues will be exploited by the other side. Conse-
quently, a strategically minded casuist might decide to play down the
inescapably tentative character of their conclusions by drawing upon a
prophetic interpretation of the situation.
In my judgment, some pro-life opponents to human embryonic stem
cell research avail themselves of prophetic discourse to buttress the inher-
ently debatable conclusions of a casuistical argument. More specifically,
they invoke prophetic language to buttress their claim that such research
is morally unacceptable because it involves the intentional destruction of
human embryos, which is tantamount to the intentional killing of human
persons, albeit very young ones. Archbishop Raymond Burke, for exam-
ple, has recently denounced human embryonic stem cell research, argu-
201. Isaiah 3:13-17.
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ing that to sign a petition in support of an initiative favoring such research
"is to promote the culture of death which tragically besets our nation." 20 2
Outlined in syllogistic form, the basic pro-life argument runs as follows:
Major premise: Each and every living, individual, human being
merits equal respect as a human person made
in the image and likeness of God.
Minor premise: This entity is a living, individual human being.
Conclusion: This entity merits equal respect as a human
person made in the image and likeness of God.
The moral insight of the pro-life argument is carried by its major pre-
mise. Pro-life Catholics believe it is morally unacceptable, for example, to
say that a fetus or a newborn does not count as a human person because it
is not yet capable of thought.20 3 It is equally morally unacceptable to say
that persons in a persistent vegetative state no longer count as human be-
ings, because they have irretrievably lost that capacity. 20 4
The minor premise, however, entails a factual judgment. In most cir-
cumstances, common sense suffices to identify individual, living members
of the species homo sapiens. But in order to determine the very beginning
and the very end of an individuated human life, we need to draw heavily
upon the best insights of biology and medicine. The decision when the
biological life of individual human being comes to an end is in large part a
scientific one, not a moral one.20 5 So too is the decision when an individ-
uated human being comes into existence.
202. See Raymond L. Burke, Safeguarding Human Life: The Very Beginning, ST.
Louis REVIEW ONLINE, Nov. 11, 2005, at Archbishop's Column, available at http://
www.stlouisreview.com/abpcolumn.php?abpid=9557 (last visited May 22, 2006) (argu-
ing that human embryos are human beings); see also Tim Townsend, Catholic Clergy
Will Oppose Embryonic Stem Cell Research from the Pulpit, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH,
Nov. 24, 2005 (explaining that Catholic priests will discourage parishioners from
signing embryonic stem cell research petitions in their homilies).
203. See PETER SINGER, PRAcricAL ETHICS 138 (2d ed. 1993) (adopting this
position and laying out moral arguments against abortion).
204. See, e.g.,John Harris, Euthanasia and the Value of Life, and John Finnis, A
Philosophical Case Against Euthanasia, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED 6-35 (John Keown
ed., 1995) (debating criteria for human personhood).
205. See PAUL RAMSEY, PATIENT AS PERSON 63-64 (2d ed. 2002)
No doubt there are various levels of death (clinical death, physiological
death, organ death, cellular death). No doubt also life and death fall
within the continuum of all life's processes.... These facts are not crucial
when, in a medical ethical context we ask the meaning of life and death.
This is, to ask when in the continuum of the beginning of life there is a
human life among us, and when in the continuum of the dying process
there is a life still among us who lays claim to the immunities, respect and
protection which in ethics and/or by law are accorded by a man to a
fellow man. Even if the "moment" of death is actually a span of time,
pronouncement of death still has this significance: that we need some
procedure for determining when a life is still with us, making its moral
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As Archbishop Burke himself recognizes, the pro-life argument
against embryonic stem cell research depends upon the scientific judg-
ment that an individuated human being comes into existence at fertiliza-
tion.20 6 Unfortunately, however, the available scientific evidence does not
unequivocally support thatjudgment. Until it reaches the age of approxi-
mately fourteen days, the embryo can divide, creating two embryos
through a process of asexual reproduction ("twinning"). It is also possi-
ble, but rarer, for two embryos to join together to constitute one embryo,
through a process of "combination. '20 7
These biological facts weaken the basis for saying that an individuated
human being comes into being at the time of fertilization, because individ-
uated human beings, who are mammals, do not reproduce asexually days
after coming into existence, and because individuated human beings do
not combine to form one human being. There is no question, of course,
that the embryo is biologically human, in the sense that its component
cells are not those of a plant or another animal. Yet more is required to
constitute an entire individuated human being than the possession of liv-
ing cells bearing a human genotype. Also required is a holistic, integrat-
ing organization with the prospect of maintaining a stable, individual
identity through time. The possibilities of twinning and recombination
raise doubts about whether the very early embryo has developed the stabil-
ity and coherence of biological identity that justify calling it an individual
human being.20 8
Those opposed to embryonic stem cell research are often reluctant to
admit that the case for the status of the early embryo as an individuated
human being is susceptible to questions that gave pause to giants in the
claims upon us, and when we stand instead in the presence of an unbur-
ied corpse.
Id. Ramsey goes on to state that: "No more should the definition of what death is
be confused with the methods by which it shall be determined that death has oc-
curred. One of these may undergo change without changing the other; or both
may be revised in the light of contemporary knowledge." Id.
206. See Burke, supra note 202 ("The truth that the human embryo is a
human being is not a matter of religious faith. It is a matter of biological science.
Biology, and .. .embryology, teaches .. .that once fertilization (or a procedure
which replaces fertilization like human cloning) takes place, a new human being
comes into existence.").
207. See The President's Council on Bioethics, Monitoring Stem Cell Research, at
157-80 (2004), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/stemcell/
pcbejfinal versionmonitoring-stem-cellresearch.pdf (providing brief, helpful
description of embryonic development).
208. Those who hold that the life of an individuated human being begins at
fertilization have articulated responses to these objections. For a concise presenta-
tion of the arguments on both sides, see id. at 74-78. See also The President's Coun-
cil on Bioethics, Human Cloning and Human Dignity: An Ethical Inquiry, at 133-38,
152-59 (2002), available at http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/cloningreport/
pcbe-cloning-report.pdf (exploring possible moral dilemmas of cloning).
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pro-life movement such as Paul Ramsey. 20 9 At times, in fact, the rhetoric
condemning embryonic stem cell research as the slaughter of innocent
human beings is heightened, rather than qualified, despite the factual un-
certainties.2 10 Why? In my judgment, this is partly because of political
wariness. Once opposition to human embryonic stem cell research be-
comes less about the concrete violation of the rights of particular human
beings (i.e., the embryos), and more about the relatively abstract harms
associated with exploiting the seeds of the next generation in a futile quest
to escape death, the casuistical argument becomes harder to make in the
public square. To counter the concrete appeal of the late Christopher
Reeve, or MichaelJ. Fox to the benefits of stem cell research, some pro-life
advocates believe they need the concrete appeal of other helpless, vulnera-
ble human beings-which is no doubt why President Bush staged a photo
opportunity with children born from frozen embryos.
21 1
Nonetheless, I believe it is a mistake for those who read the biological
data as supporting the position that an individuated human life begins at
fertilization to resort to prophetic rhetoric in their response to those who
read that data in a different way. It is one thing to put forward factual,
casuistical arguments in favor of life beginning at fertilization; it is another
thing entirely to say that anyone who is not persuaded by those factual,
casuistical arguments is an advocate of the "culture of death." This rheto-
ric of prophetic condemnation wrongfully obscures the fact that the dis-
pute between the parties does not lie at the level of fundamental moral
209. See Paul Ramsey, Abortion: A Review Article, in THREE ON ABORTION 13
(1978) (discussing various arguments in contemporary abortion debate). Ramsey
notes:
So in order to retain the belief that life begins at conception, [Germain]
Grisez (contra Hellegers) adopts the view that "a certain number of
human individuals ... cease to be shortly after conception," and at that
point two others begin by asexual reproduction (p. 26). In the case of
mosaics, Grisez relies on the fact that implantation cannot occur without
definition of function, so long as the two morulae are distinct from each
other they are distinct individuals, and "once combined the two cease to
be as such and form one new individual"-like a "grafted plant." With
considerable astonishment we may ask whether any such "individuality" is
the life we should respect and protect from conception. In trying to
prove too much, Grisez has proved too little of ethical import.
Id. at 29-30 (quoting GERMAIN GRiSEZ, ABORTION: THE MYTHS, THE REALITIES, AND
THE ARGUMENTS 26 (1970)).
210. See, e.g, Matt Sande, Embryo Destruction Bill Advances the Culture of Death,
MILWAUKEEJ. SENTINEL, May 28, 2005, available at http://www.jsonline.com/news/
editorials/may05/329342.asp (reporting on House of Representatives' passage of
Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act of 2005). "Last week, the U.S. House of
Representatives shamefully disregarded the right to life of innocent human beings
by passing a deadly measure that would fully rescind President Bush's federal fund-
ing restrictions on human embryonic stem cell research." Id.
211. See President Bush Meets with Families of Adopted Frozen Embryo-Children,
LIFESITE NEWS, May 25, 2005, http://www.lifesite.net/ldn/2005/may/0505250 5 .
html (reporting that Bush's visits with parents who had adopted children at embry-
onic stage was part of his campaign against embryonic stem cell research).
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commitments, but at the level of factual judgment on an obscure and diffi-
cult issue of human biology.
2. Ways in Which Prophets Misuse Casuistical Discourse
It is not only casuistry that misuses prophetic discourse; we can also
find mirror-image situations in which prophets misuse casuistical dis-
course. First, prophets can deny that casuistry has any legitimate contribu-
tion to make to moral reflection at all. They can portray casuistry as a type
of malignant rationalization, as a thin excuse for realpolitik in the domestic,
national and international spheres of human existence. Very crude, di-
vine, command theories of morality, which do not see themselves as rely-
ing in any way upon the frailties of human reason, can sometimes take this
line in any explicit way. Obedience to God's command is set over and
against attempting to find moral wisdom in the processes of discursive
reason.
Second, and sometimes related, prophecy can at times attempt to sub-
vert casuistry, taking its categories, grids, analogies and decision-making
procedures, and employing them in a way which leads to the practical use-
lessness of the categories themselves-and which points toward a pro-
phetic vista as the only possible alternative. For example, consider the
debate between pacifists and just warriors. Although early Christians were
pacifists, since the time of Constantine and the adoption of Christianity by
the Roman Empire, a number of Christian thinkers have advocated the
position that it may sometimes be just to wage war. Over the centuries,
Christian political theorists developed the just war theory, which in its pre-
sent form identifies seven criteria which should govern a just decision to
go to war (ius ad bellum)2 12 and two criteria that should govern just con-
duct in the waging of war (ius in bello). 213
Some pacifists, however, have taken the just war criteria and turned
them against themselves, interpreting the evidence in a way that would
justify virtually no war that has been waged in the course of human history.
An example of this approach can be found in the late Mennonite theolo-
gian John Howard Yoder's book, When War Is Unjust: Being Honest in Just-
War Thinking.2 14 A pacifist himself, Yoder sees this book as calling just war
theorists to be true to the requirements of their own theory, as insisting
that they resist the temptation to concoct rationalizations for decisions
made by nation-states and governments to augment their own power and
212. The seven criteria are: 1) just cause, 2) competent authority, 3) compara-
tive justice, 4) right intention, 5) last resort, 6) probability of success and 7) pro-
portionality. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, THE CHALLENGE OF PEACE:
GOD'S PROMISE AND OUR RESPONSE 85-100 (1983), available at http://www.
osjspm.org/cst/cp.htm.
213. The two criteria are: 1) discrimination and 2) proportionality. Id. 101-
10.
214. SeeJoHN HowARD YODER, WHEN WAR Is UNJUST: BEING HONEST IN JUST
WAR THINKING (2d ed. 1996).
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influence. 2 15 And surely, just war theorists might profitably read his work
for such purposes.
At the same time, however, it is clear that Yoder does not consistently
treat just war theory as the channel for practical reason that he explicitly
recognizes it to be. 216 Theoretically, he recognizes that it offers a struc-
ture in which Christians might legitimately grapple with the question of
whether and in what respect a particular war is being waged justly. Practi-
cally, however, he treats it as if it were either (at best) a toothless construct
of Christian moralists relegated to the ivory tower of academia, 2 17 or (at
worst) a propaganda tool of politicians who proclaim their Christian com-
mitments while actually practicing realpolitik in statecraft.2 18 He concludes
chapter 3, which discusses the evolution of the conduct of war from the
Middle Ages to the present, with the following indictment:
Every one of the above changes [in war] is sufficient to make the
application of the just-war tradition questionable. When taken
cumulatively, they have hollowed out the tradition to little more
than a shell. The words are still there, but the realities to which
they apply escape almost entirely the discipline that used to be, if
not effective, at least reasonably thinkable.2 19
The bulk of When War Is Unjust is devoted to describing the useless-
ness of the just war theory in restraining the conduct of wars in the real
world. Yoder expends very little effort outlining, and still less, trying to
think with contemporary just war theorists as they ponder the changing
circumstances of war in the real world. He does not, for example, grapple
with the copious and detailed analysis expended by Paul Ramsey on
pondering the application of the just war theory to conditions of the twen-
tieth century warfare, including the challenges posed by the Viet Cong in
215. See id. at 3 (discussing position behind just-war theory).
The just war position is... the one most Christians say they take. But is
that claim accurate? We shall observe that there is reason to doubt that it
is. My task is to ask what it would really mean to take a just-war position.
As an ecumenical contribution to the integrity and the self-esteem of my
just-war interlocutors, I shall proceed to examine the credibility of the
dominant tradition.
Id.
216. See id. at 7 (analyzing just-war tradition).
But before leaping to the basic question of credibility, we need a broader
acquaintance with what the just-war tradition is about. The tradition is
not merely a set of criteria to apply to a political situation. It is as well a
culture, shaped by a long history of thought and application, which
evolved along the way with more twists and turns than the popularizers or
even the theologians tend to acknowledge.
Id.
217. See id. at 19-31 (asserting hollowness of just-war tradition).
218. See id. at 32-49 (describing historical use of just-war tradition by political
leaders).
219. Id. at 30.
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the Vietnam War.22° Precisely because he does not engage the actual en-
gagement of just war criteria, his chapter entitled "Making the Tradition
Credible" conveys the overwhelming impression, first, that little effort has
been made to date by just war theorists and practitioners to apply the just
war tradition honestly and fairly; and second, that a fair application of the
just war tradition would rule out most if not all wars that have been waged
throughout history.
2 2 1
In short, in this book, Yoder is turning casuistry to prophetic ends. In
my judgment, his overall perception of the situation of just war theory is
articulated in the preface:
Most people who hold to that view have not been pressed to
think about it very critically, and many of those in fact believe
(wrongly) that there is no other view. Some, as we shall see later,
were in fact honoring its logic when in recent time they came to
say that they reject it. Others who say they hold to it and use its
vocabulary, do not in fact reason and act accordingly.
222
He attempts to use just war theory against itself, functionally leaving a
form of pacifism as the only available option, at least for self-professed
Christians. 223 Ultimately, however, Yoder's critique in Wen War Is Unjust
is deceptive. His own case for pacifism is rooted not in the failure of just
war theory but in his own commitment to the "war of the lamb," i.e., to the
path of self-sacrifice and suffering freely accepted by Jesus Christ.2 24 His
problem with the just war theory is ultimately its bedrock conviction that it
can be right to engage in non-spiritual warfare in order to ameliorate an
unjust situation. The basis of his critique, in other words, is ultimately
both radical and prophetic.
Third, and finally, prophecy sometimes uses casuistry as a mere instru-
ment to achieve its ends, just as casuistry sometimes uses prophecy in the
220. See PAUL RAMSEY, THE JUST WAR: FORCE AND POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY
427-536 (Univ. Press of Am. 1983) (1968) (analyzing insurgency warfare in Viet-
nam). Yoder does, however, mention this work and other important works in his
bibliography.
221. See YODER, supra note 214, at 71-80 (noting importance of spelling out
implications of just-war tradition in order for theory to be respected).
222. Id.
223. See JOHN HowARD YODER, THE POLITICS OF JESUS: VICIT AGNUS NOSTER
(1972) (developing his own theologically grounded pacifism).
224. See id. at 240 (analogizing lambs being slain to execution of Jesus).
The choice that [Jesus] made in rejecting the crown and accepting the
cross was the commitment to such a degree of faithfulness to the charac-
ter of divine love that he was willing for its sake to sacrifice "effectiveness."
Usually it can be argued that from some other perspective or in some
long view this renunciation of effectiveness was in fact a very effective
thing to do. "If a man will lose his ... life he shall find it." But this
paradoxical possibility does not change the initially solid fact that Jesus
thereby excluded any normative concern for any capacity to make sure
that things would turn out right.
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same manner. In some contexts, an explicitly prophetic voice is not likely
to be either welcome or effective. For example, one such context is the
legal realm, which is dominated by a casuistical approach, at least in the
Anglo-American tradition. In the United States, the legal realm constructs
an elaborate series of checks and balances upon political power, and
places significant constraints upon the choice of means that any agent
(e.g., an individual, a corporation or a governmental body or functionary)
may select in order to achieve chosen ends. In such contexts, prophetic
voices must apply casuistical tools instrumentally, in order to clear the way
for them to give full allegiance to the prophetic vision. Assuming that
George W. Bush and his advisors are indeed operating from the convic-
tion that the West is engaged in a "clash of civilizations" with Islamic mili-
tancy, it becomes very plausible to view the Torture Memos as essentially a
case of prophecy using casuistry-and in fact, as I argued above, as misus-
ing casuistry-to remove the legal and moral barriers that impeded full
compliance with their prophetic vision.
a. Toward a More Fruitful Relation Between Casuistry and Prophecy
Is there a way to move beyond the apparent impasse between casuistry
and prophecy? What would moving around this impasse require? Can we
articulate the conditions under which each mode of discourse is appropri-
ate? It seems to me that in order to answer these questions, we need to
take a step back, in an attempt to articulate the fundamental purposes of
each mode of discourse.
What is the purpose of casuistry? Fundamentally, it is a form of practi-
cal reasoning. It is an effort to discern the appropriate course of action in
the case at hand, in part by taking account of what has been judged the
appropriate course of action in similar cases. Practical reasoning is our
ordinary way of proceeding in the face of the countless decisions we must
make every day-each of which, as Aquinas tells us, has moral implica-
tions. We deliberate about the decision facing us by describing the rele-
vant particular facts and general situation, by framing the relevant moral
principles and action guides and by comparing the case at hand to compa-
rable cases faced by others or ourselves on previous occasions.
Because casuistry is a form of practical reasoning, those who hope to
practice it well must possess the virtues characteristically associated with
good practical reasoning. Chief among these, according to Aquinas (and
Aristotle), is the virtue of prudence-right reason with respect to things to
be done. In addition, Aquinas identifies three virtues closely associated
with prudence as responsible for guiding these particular elements of the
process of practical deliberation. Euboulia is the disposition to take good
counsel, which includes not simply seeking advice from the right people,
but providing oneself more generally with reliable information about all
20061 569
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
relevant aspects of the decision which must be made.2 25 Synesis is the dis-
position of good judgment about particular practical matters; for Aquinas
it consists in the cognitive power apprehending a thing just as it is in real-
ity. 226 Finally, gnome is the virtue of being able to recognize when one has
a truly exceptional situation on one's hands.22 7
It is the practice of casuistry by one who is bereft of the necessary
virtues that gives it a bad name. More specifically, in my judgment, there
are two situations in which casuistry tends to go wrong. First, casuistry can
be employed disingenuously, by which I mean that the one employing cas-
uistical tools only appears to be engaged in a form of practical reasoning.
In reality, such a person is not in fact committed to moral discernment
and deliberation in this particular case, but is using their trappings to jus-
tify a decision that was reached on other grounds. I have argued above
that prophets can misuse casuistical reasoning for such a purpose. They
are not, however, the only culprits. Any of us can misuse casuistical rea-
soning when we attempt to rationalize post hoc a decision we have actually
reached previously and purely on other grounds (e.g., fear, desire).
A second situation in which casuistry can go terribly wrong is when it
is practiced by someone whose process of practical reasoning is distorted
in a morally significant way. In such cases, unlike in the former class of
cases, the practitioner of casuistry is genuinely attempting to employ prac-
tical reason in order to deliberate about a particular course of action. The
attempt, however, is doomed from the start, because some aspect of the
broad set of assumptions and perceptions which shape and guide the pro-
cess of practical reasoning is skewed. Unfortunately, skewed assumptions
and perceptions frequently do not remain localized in their effect; they
have a way of infecting the whole of one's moral analysis. How, specifi-
cally, can the process of practical reasoning be morally distorted? In my
view, answering this question requires particular attention to the virtues
associated with prudence: synesis, eboulia and gnome.2 28 Agents who do not
possess the virtue of synesis are not disposed to take good counsel, or more
particularly to inform themselves about the relevant facts affecting the de-
cision at hand. It is tempting to rely upon a familiar, comfortable version
of "the way things are," rather than to incorporate the best available infor-
mation into one's decision-making process. Agents who do not possess
the virtue of eboulia are not disposed to perceive a situation just as it is in
reality. In some cases, that can mean completely missing a fundamental
225. See SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 40, pt. II-II, q. 51, art. 1. (defining
eubolia as one virtue of prudence).
226. See id. pt. II-I, q. 51, art. 3 (defining synesis as one virtue of prudence).
227. See id. pt. II-II, q. 51, art. 4 (defining gnome as final virtue of prudence).
228. See id. arts. 1,3-4 (discussing three virtues connected with prudence). As
Aquinas recognized, prudence and its associated virtues can be significantly
eroded by sin. See id. pt. II-II, q. 53 (analyzing vices opposed to prudence). A full
examination of how sin (both personal and social) corrodes moral perception is
beyond the scope of this Essay.
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component of the moral terrain-for example, failing to see that African-
Americans are equal members of the human community.2 29 In other
cases, it can mean appreciating the full ramifications of such a compo-
nent. For example, for approximately a century, Virginia officially ac-
knowledged the full humanity of African-Americans while failing to
appreciate that their laws against miscegenation were inconsistent with
that acknowledgment.2 30 Finally, agents who do not possess the virtue of
gnome are not able accurately to identify a truly exceptional situation or to
judge correctly what the exceptional nature of the situation does and does
not justify them in doing. For example, it is important to recognize that
being at war with another country creates an exceptional situation. While
that exceptional situation may justify a decision not to return property or
other resources that will be used in the enemy war effort,231 it does not
justify suspending the moral rule against intentional killing of the
innocent.
2 3 2
229. For a powerful account of a situation in which a morally flawed assump-
tion pervasively infected casuistical reasoning, see JOHN T. NOONAN,JR., THE ANTE-
LOPE: THE ORDEAL OF THE RECAPTuRED AFRICANS IN THE ADMINISTRATIONS OFJAMES
MONROE AND JOHN QUINCY ADAMS (1977) (chronicling fate of group of stolen
slaves held captive on ship named The Antelope). After the ship was captured off
the coast of Florida, an international dispute arose over the fate of the slaves, even-
tually ending up in the Supreme Court of the United States. See id. at 1. In his
opinion for the Court, although Chief Justice Marshall admitted that slavery and
the slave trade were contrary to the law of nature, he also found that they were
prohibited by no positive national or international law-a decision which permit-
ted the slaves to be classified as "property." See id. at 111-12. The only question for
the courts to determine was the monetary compensation deserved by the various
claimants for the loss of such "property." See id. at 113. It would be wrong to say
that Marshall did not recognize the humanity of the slaves-in one sense, he
clearly did. Yet he failed to allow that recognition to exert its proper influence in
his reasoning process; he failed, in other words, to recognize what it would mean
to honor that humanity in deciding the concrete legal dispute before him. In
Noonan's terms, one could say that the legal framework created masks (personae)
that obscured the faces of the persons (personae) whose lives Marshall disposed of
as chattel property. SeeJOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAw (2d
ed. 2002).
230. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding Virginia's law barring
interracial marriage unconstitutional).
231. See SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 40, pt. II-II, q. 51, art. 4. (distinguish-
ing between virtues of synesis and gnome).
Now it happens sometimes that something has to be done which is not
covered by the common rules of actions, for instance in the case of the
enemy of one's country, when it would be wrong to give him back his
deposit, or in other similar cases. Hence it is necessary to judge of such
matters according to higher principle than the common laws, according
to which synesisjudges: and corresponding to such higher principles it is
necessary to have a higher virtue ofjudgment, which is called gnome, and
which denotes a certain discrimination in judgment.
Id.
232. See id. pt. II-I, q. 64, art. 6. (stating that "it is in no way lawful to slay the
innocent"). But note that Aquinas admits that under certain circumstances, a
judge must pronounce sentence and an executioner must carry out the sentence
against an innocent man. See id. The judge "does not sin if he pronounce sen-
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We cannot do without casuistry or practical reasoning about what to
do in concrete cases. Moreover, we cannot deny the significant potential
for casuistry to go deeply awry, in the ways that I described above, as well as
in other ways. What is the remedy? In my view, the remedy is prophecy.
In order to explain how this can be the case, we need to consider the
function of prophecy, especially with respect to practical reason.
One thing we may say for certain. Whatever else prophecy may be, it
is essentially not practical reasoning. Turning first to the biblical prophets
as a touchstone, it is clear that the sole qualification for being a prophet is
being called by God to prophecy. Philosophical acumen and practical wis-
dom are not job requirements for prophets. 233 Prophets do not in the
first instance use practical reason to deliberate about the content of their
prophetic utterances; they respond to God's command regarding that
content.
What about the audience? The fundamental response which the
prophet seeks to evoke in his audience is obedience-he urges them to
comply with God's demand. A prophet does not encourage his audience
to pay attention to the dictates of their own practical reason; it is by follow-
ing those (mistaken) dictates that they have strayed so far from compli-
ance with divine will. The audience's sole task is to decide whether the
person claiming the mantle of a prophet is in fact who he claims to be.
Once that decision is made affirmatively, the need for practical reasoning
is diminished, if not entirely eliminated, with respect to the subject matter
of the prophecy. One does not quibble with the word of God-one obeys
it.
More specifically, the characteristic responses to a prophet involve ei-
ther obedience (if he is accepted as a true prophet) or what amounts to an
ad hominem attack (if he is rejected as a false prophet). In either case, a
deliberative conversation oriented toward action-reasoning together
about what is to be done-is not possible. More specifically, accepting a
person as a true prophet entails admitting that he is reliably transmitting a
message from God; there is consequently no room to negotiate, and no
reason to introduce additional considerations, which could only dilute
one's commitment to following the divinely mandated course of action.
Compliance, not deliberation and discussion, is the order of the day. In
contrast, rejecting a prophet's message inevitably entails rejecting him-or
at least a crucial part of his avowed identity. Repudiating the self-pro-
tence in accordance with the evidence, for it is not he that puts the innocent man
to death, but they who stated him to be guilty." Id. Reply Obj. 3. This is an at-
tempt at a deeper understanding of what it means-and what it does not mean-
to "slay the innocent."
233. For example, the prophet Amos was a breeder of livestock and a tender
of mulberry figs. See Michael L. BarrY, Amos, in THE NEW JEROME BIBLICAL COM-
MENTARY 209, 209 (1990). Jeremiah was a native of a small village and "heir of a
declassed priesthood"-he was likely viewed as a marginal figure by those in Jeru-
salem. See DAVID L. PETERSEN, THE PROPHETIC LITERATURE: AN INTRODucrION 98
(2002).
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claimed message entails denying his claim to be a faithful and accurate
messenger of God. In so doing, one implicitly suggests that he is either a
liar or deeply self-deceived. The purported prophet will be reluctant to
pursue a discussion with interlocutors whom he believes to be attacking
his character and/or mental stability, while the interlocutors will not likely
believe it worthwhile to engage in prolonged discussion with someone
they believe to be duplicitous or unbalanced.
Of course, not everyone who employs prophetic discourse claims to
be a true prophet, in the sense of claiming literally to be delivering a mes-
sage from God. Nonetheless, it strikes me that those who invoke pro-
phetic rhetoric to address a particular issue create the very same
limitations on discourse that are created by the biblical prophets. This
fact should not be surprising; while those availing themselves of prophetic
rhetoric may not claim to be delivering a message from God word-for-
word, they frequently do claim to be proclaiming God's unequivocal will
about a particular matter facing their society. The line between being a
messenger of God, on the one hand, and standing in the tradition of the
messengers of God, on the other, is not as sharp as one might think. 234
As I emphasized earlier in this Essay, few of those who employ pro-
phetic discourse in our own time claim literally to be prophets. In fact,
such a claim would be looked upon with great suspicion by most Christian
communities.235 Yet the nature and function of prophetic discourse is
much the same, whether it is employed by true prophets or by those who
aspire to stand in their footsteps. This is the case because the fundamen-
tal point of the message preserved in the prophetic books of Scripture is
not innovative; it is essentially conservative. Generally and characteristi-
cally, the Hebrew prophets called upon members of their community to
reaffirm their fundamental commitments and their fundamental values,
even as they confronted the challenges of new situations. Because God's
consistency renders those commitments and values unchangeable, one
does not need to be the recipient of a direct message from God in order to
avail oneself of prophetic themes and tropes in order to confront the
moral cancer afflicting one's community.
234. See ABRAHAMJ. HESCHEL, THE PROPHETS XXii (2001) (introducing his dis-
cussion of prophets). Abraham Joshua Heschel reminds us that even the biblical
prophets did not mechanically transmit God's word in a manner that eliminated
their own personal agency:
The prophet is a person, not a microphone. He is endowed with a mis-
sion, with the power of a word not his own that accounts for his great-
ness-but also with temperament, concern, character, and individuality.
As there was no resisting the impact of divine inspiration, so at times
there was no resisting the vortex of his own temperament. The word of
God reverberated in the voice of man.
Id.
235. KARL RAHNER, FOUNDATIONS OF CHRISTIAN FAITH Ch. VI (1982) (noting
that Jesus understood himself as "final prophet"). Thus, any modem prophet
likely would be received with great skepticism.
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If prophecy is decidedly not practical reason, how should we describe
its relationship with practical reason? In my view, it should be viewed as a
kind of moral chemotherapy. It is a brutal but necessary response to ag-
gressive forms of moral cancer, whose uncontrolled growth threatens to
corrupt practical reasoning, and ultimately to destroy the very possibility
of it. More specifically, as I argued above, practical reasoning in general
and casuistry in particular can go wrong in a number of ways. It can be
practiced in a disingenuous manner; it can be practiced with distorted
assumptions about the nature of reality, or with skewed perception of the
importance of the moral values at stake.
If severe enough, these distorted assumptions and skewed perceptions
plague moral reasoning like a cancer, causing it to develop and unfold in
deeply distorted ways. Prophetic rhetoric aims its destructive force at the
moral cancer, with the ultimate goal of restoring the possibility of the
healthy exercise of practical reasoning. How does it function? By destroy-
ing the diseased moral reasoning and promoting healthy re-growth, based
upon a secure connection with fundamental religious and moral truths,
which alone can serve as the basis for sound practical reasoning.
Again, it is instructive to turn to the biblical prophets for concrete
examples. When they chastise the Jewish people, they do so primarily be-
cause of Israel's faithlessness, calling upon their fellows to recover the con-
stitutive elements of their identity, particularly the primacy and
exclusiveness of the relationship between Yahweh and Israel. The terms of
that relationship are articulated most fully in the covenant given to Moses
on Mount Sinai. Although the Hebrew prophets focus a significant
amount of attention on individual actions or classes of action that exem-
plify the faithlessness of the Jews to Yahweh, they characteristically do not
view them as the locus of the exercise of practical reason. Instead, they see
them as the symptoms of a moral and spiritual disease which must be elim-
inated at the root.
For example, the biblical prophets regularly preached against idolatry
as the root of all evils suffered and committed by the Israelites. By com-
mitting idolatry, the Israelites did not merely raise the suspicion that their
practical reasoning was flawed in a localized or occasional manner. In-
stead, they conclusively demonstrated that they did not even possess the
necessary preconditions for the reliable exercise of practical reason. By
committing idolatry, the Israelites manifested the fact that they had oblit-
erated their consciousness of Yahweh's very identity as the one true God,
and of their own identity as Yahweh's Chosen People.
The Book of Hosea furnishes a good case study. As Abraham Joshua
Heschel notes, during the time of that prophet (the mid-eighth century
B.C.E.), the people of the Northern Kingdom of Israel worshiped in the
Canaanite cult of Baal, without entirely abandoning the worship of
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Yahweh. 236 Hosea depicted Israel's lack of faithfulness to the one true
God as a type of adultery. He vividly evokes Yahweh's hurt and anger at
this betrayal, as well as Yahweh's enduring desire for reconciliation with
His people. The vividness of Hosea's language is attributable in part to
the prophet's own agonized experience of marriage to his beloved but
serially unfaithful wife Gomer, whom God commanded him to marry.
237
Consider, for instance, this passage, in which Yahweh expresses his
rage at his people for their betrayal:
I am the Lord your God
From the land of Egypt;
You know no God but Me,
And besides Me there is no savior.
It as I who knew you in the wilderness,
In the land of drought;
But when they had fed to the full,
They were filled, and their heart was lifted up;
Therefore they forgot Me.
So I will be to them like a lion,
Like a leopard I will lurk beside the way.
I will fall upon them like a bear robbed of her cubs,
I will tear open their breast,
And there I will devour them like a lion,
as a wild beast would rend them. 23 8
Understandably, in this context, Hosea evinces no interest in discern-
ing the finer points of what precisely constitutes "idolatry." Such a discus-
sion would presume the ability of the participants to engage in an
undistorted form of practical reasoning, the very ability which had been
destroyed by the Israelites' indifference to the exclusiveness of the claims
of the one true God. In another time and place, however, such a casuisti-
cal discussion would not be out of order, as St. Paul's nuanced discussion
of eating meat sacrificed to idols indicates. 239
236. See HESCHEL, supra note 234, at 55-58 (describing religious affiliation of
Israelites when Hosea was prophet).
237. See Hosea 1:2-3 (describing Hosea's wife and children).
238. Hosea 13:4-8 (describing God's judgment on Israel).
239. See 1 Corinthians 8:4-9 (describing treatment of idols).
So about the eating of meat sacrificed to idols: we know that "there is no
idol in the world," and that "there is no God but one." Indeed, even
though there are so-called gods in heaven and on earth (there are, to be
sure, many "gods" and many "lords") yet for us there is one God, the
father, from whom all things are and for whom we exist, and one Lord,
Jesus Christ, through whom all things are and through whom we exist.
But not all have this knowledge. There are some who have been so used
to idolatry up until now that, when they eat meat sacrificed to idols, their
conscience, which is weak, is defiled. Now food will not bring us closer to
God. We are now worse if we do not eat, nor are we better off if we do.
2006] 575
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Chemotherapy can be dangerous. It kills healthy cells as well as dis-
eased ones. In order to improve the overall health of the patient, there-
fore, it must be used both accurately and sparingly. So, too, must the
moral chemotherapy of prophetic discourse. More specifically, as I ar-
gued above, the use of prophetic language in a particular context disrupts
the normal functioning of a deliberative community. It renders the nor-
mal interactions of mutual reason-giving impossible because the audi-
ence's only avenues of response to a prophetic statement are either to
acquiesce in the prophet's demands or to engage in what amounts to an
ad hominem attack. Those considering whether to use such language,
therefore, have to decide whether the prospect of disrupting normal com-
munal deliberations in order to reconstitute them on a sounder basis is
worth the price of the concomitant destruction to the social fabric.
In particular, prospective prophets need to remember that not every
moral-practical disagreement signals the breakdown of the conditions for
the possibility of practical reasoning. Furthermore, they also need to pay
attention to the root sources of important and neuralgic moral-practical
disagreements. For example, it is one thing to be opposed to welfare pro-
grams because the poor are not worthy of our assistance; it is quite an-
other to be opposed to them because one does not believe they actually
assist the poor. The former position is inconsistent with a basic Christian
world view, the latter position is not, whether or not it is ultimately correct.
Those involved in ordinary disputes of practical reason need to resist the
temptation to achieve premature closure by invoking prophetic discourse.
Finally, in my judgment, those who would avail themselves of pro-
phetic rhetoric would do well to consider how they themselves will pre-
serve a sense of solidarity with those against whom they direct their
criticism. The biblical prophets did not chastise the people of Israel or
Judah from an isolated position of moral supremacy; ultimately, they saw
themselves as belonging to the group of people whom they called to ac-
count. Not infrequently, the prophets begged God to turn aside His anger
and to have mercy upon the people.2 40 The motivation of the prophets is
ultimately constructive, not destructive: by calling their society back to its
fundamental principles, they aim to create a situation ofjustice, peace and
social harmony.24 1 Even the harshness of the oracles against the nations,
But make sure that this liberty of your in no way becomes a stumbling
block to the weak.
Id.
240. See Amos 7:1-3 (describing Amos begging God to have mercy on Jacob).
This is what the Lord God showed me: He was forming a locust swarm
when the late growth began to come up (the late growth after the king's
mowing). When they were eating all the grass in the land, I said: Forgive,
O Lord God! How can Jacob stand? He is so small! And the Lord re-
pented of this: "It shall not be," said the Lord God.
Id.
241. See Isaiah 49:14-18 (recounting God's refusal to forget children of Israel)
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which are directed against Israel's enemies, is tempered by a vision of the
whole world united in peaceful worship of the one true God.
242
V. CONCLUSION
In this Essay, I have explored the intersection between moral stance
and moral rhetoric. More specifically, taking as my case studies the long-
controversial issue of abortion as well as the emerging controversy of tor-
ture, I have argued that moral questions can be addressed in at least two
ways: by deploying the sometimes intricate form of practical reasoning
known as casuistry, and by invoking the clear and absolute call to rectitude
of the prophets. In my view, contemporary social fissures on issues such as
abortion and torture are as much attributable to conflicts in rhetorical
style as they are to substantive moral disagreement.
After introducing my topic in Section I, I attempted to define proph-
ecy and casuistry in Section II, as well as to articulate in preliminary form
some of the potential tensions between the two forms of discourse. In
Section III, the heart of the Essay, I first explained why both abortion and
torture are issues ripe for the development of controversy between
prophets and casuists who share the same underlying moral and religious
world view. I then proceeded to identify and examine the clash between
prophets and casuists over abortion and torture, as those issues presented
themselves in the context of the 2004 presidential election. This examina-
tion not only revealed how each form of discourse operates by itself in the
context of a concrete controversy, it also revealed something of how the
two forms interrelate. In particular, examination of the abortion contro-
versy suggests that prophets on one side of a social issue may experience
more respect for prophets on the other side of that issue than with casuists
on their own side. Conversely, the respect that casuists frequently express
for the moral purity of prophets quickly turns to impatience when the
casuists are confronted with what they believe to be un-nuanced and im-
practical prophetic demands. Examination of recent discussions of tor-
But Zion said, "The Lord has forsaken me; My lord has forgotten me."
Can a mother forget her infant, be without tenderness for the child of
her womb? Even should she forget, I will never forget you. See, upon the
palms of my hands I have written your name; your walls are ever before
me. Your builders make haste, as those who tore you down, and lade you
waste go forth from you; Look about and see, they are all gathering and
coming to you. As I live, says the Lord, you shall be arrayed with them all
as with adornments, like a bride you shall fasten them on you.
Id.
242. See Isaiah 66:18, 20 (containing Isaiah's prophecy that people of Israel
would endure).
I come to gather nations of every language; they shall come and see my
glory .... They shall bring all your brethren from all the nations as an
offering to the Lord, on horses and in chariots, in carts, upon mules and
dromedaries, to Jerusalem, my holy mountain, says the Lord, just as the
Israelites bring their offerings to the house of the Lord in clean vessels.
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ture reveals another crucial point-it is a mistake to present prophecy and
casuistry as forms of discourse that are hermetically sealed from one an-
other. More specifically, close analysis of one of the Torture Memos
showed the use of a debased form of casuistry in order to further ends that
are best understood in prophetic terms.
Section IV reflected more generally on the relationship between
prophecy and casuistry. Building upon Section III's recognition that
prophecy can misuse casuistry, I attempted to identify a number of ways in
which each form of discourse can fail to respect the other, in essence by
treating it as a means to its own ends. I then began to articulate a more
positive vision of the dynamics of moral discourse which would incorpo-
rate both prophecy and casuistry, each in its rightful place. More specifi-
cally, I suggested that casuistry-as practical reasoning-is our basic moral
language. It provides the framework for the countless decisions we make
every day, which can have a range of implications on our moral life.
Prophecy is by its very nature an extraordinary form of moral discourse; its
purpose is not to replace casuistry, but to correct its course. Prophecy, I
maintained, functions like a type of "moral chemotherapy"; it takes aim at
morally cancerous assumptions or perspectives on reality that threaten to
destroy the possibility of reliable practical reasoning within a particular
community at a particular time. Like chemotherapy, prophecy is inher-
ently destructive, but in service of an ultimately constructive purpose:
prophecy's goal is the reestablishment of the possibility of a healthy, func-
tioning context for moral deliberation and decision. Furthermore, the de-
structive aspects of prophetic discourse are not negligible, any more than
are the deleterious effects of an intensive course of chemotherapy. Those
considering whether or not to invoke prophetic discourse to make their
point in a particular instance would do well to consider whether the cure
will cause more harm than the disease.
In short, the thesis of this Essay has been that moral discourse in our
society is nearly as much about style as about substance. To put it another
way, I have argued that the choice of style of moral discourse is actually a
substantive moral question. Moreover, it is a moral question that cuts
across religious and political ideology. As I hope to have demonstrated,
those who are religiously and politically conservative are more inclined to
invoke prophetic language in their approach to voting for pro-choice poli-
ticians, while those of a more religiously and politically liberal bent are
more likely to be prophetic about the question of torture in order to ob-
tain information regarding suspected terrorists. The very idea of conserva-
tives being prophetic may seem unnerving to those whose framework for
moral debate was framed in the crucible of the 1960s, where religious and
social progressives dominated in the use of prophetic rhetoric. Yet as
James Darsey has demonstrated, the social and political history of the
United States demonstrates that conservatives are no less likely than liber-
als to invoke the fiery rhetorical style of the biblical prophets to make their
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point.24 3 In my judgment, they are also no less likely than liberals to de-
ploy prophetic rhetoric without thinking through the ramifications of so
doing.
We cannot do without practical reasoning or casuistry; it is the day-to-
day substance of our moral lives. We also cannot do without prophecy,
which calls practical reasoning into account when it has gone terribly
wrong. But what calls prophecy into account? There are, after all, false
prophets, and by extension, deliberately or innocently misguided invoca-
tions of prophetic rhetoric. One cannot reason with a false prophet any
more than with a true prophet. Except under special circumstances, one
cannot launch a counter-prophecy without thoroughly overheating the
context for moral discussion. One can, however, create distance for one-
self-and for one's audience-from a prophet by invoking the rhetoric of
irony. In A Dictionary of Modern English Usage, H.W. Fowler claims that
"[i] rony is a form of utterance that postulates a double audience, consist-
ing of one party that hearing shall hear & shall not understand, & another
party that, when more is meant than meets the ear, is aware, both of that
more & of the outsiders' incomprehension."2 44 In other words, through
the use of irony, one can create a context in which the false prophet's
message is prevented from having a broad effect. The false prophet, who
presents himself or herself as someone with unusually deep understanding
of a moral issue, is treated by the practitioner of irony-and by the com-
munity-as someone who "shall hear and not understand." By so doing,
the community reestablishes the basis for its moral deliberation, i.e., its
casuistry, without the interference of the false prophet. But the use of
irony to control prophecy is a topic for another day.
243. See generally JAMEs DARSEY, THE PROPHETIC TRADITION AND RADICAL RHET-
ORIC IN AMERICA (1997).
244. H.W. FOWLER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 295 (1926) (de-
fining irony).
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